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abStraCt 
The present thesis explored the cognitive and affective mechanisms 
underlying the cues used to make innocence-guilt decisions in the high-stakes 
situation of television appeals in which people appeal publicly for the return of a 
loved one.  
Two aspects of the processes involved in making judgements of veracity 
were studied. Part 2 examined the interaction between explicit and implicit 
judgments. The studies in Part 2 experimentally manipulated aspects of 12 
appeals to test hypotheses about the heuristics judges used to determine veracity.  
The hypotheses in these studies were initially based on the central assumption 
that in the absence of unambiguous information judges will draw on heuristics to 
make veracity judgments. These cognitive shortcuts were hypothesised to lead to 
biases in innocence-guilt judgments. The innocence bias was introduced as a 
potential predisposition that stood to be tested. Results did not reveal a consistent 
innocence or guilt bias. Rather, while all four experiments in Part 2 indicated the 
presence of different underlying cognitive processes across all experimental 
conditions, the results from these studies would appear to challenge the existence 
of any intrinsic tendency towards biases. 
In Part 3, the context of the appeals was taken as the basis for the 
assumption that truthful people would give clearer indications of grief than ones 
who were lying. Multivariate cues were analysed simultaneously using 39 
appeals, with a theoretical basis drawn from the grief literature. Eight 
previously unidentified aspects consisting of verbal cues drawn from grief 
literature are found to distinguish honest and deceptive appeals with high 
accuracy and reliability.  
The work thus contributed to the initial understanding of the interaction 
between explicit and implicit decisions in making innocence-guilt judgments. 
Standing models of cognitive processing and their implications for the present 
thesis were also discussed. Contingent upon further clarification of cognitive 
processes involved during innocence and guilt verdict decision-making, the 
findings are particularly germane to the area of televised press conferences and 
have implications for police and practice.  
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Longstanding research has repeatedly focused on identifying behavioural 
cues of truth-tellers and liars, with inconclusive results. Research in lie detection 
has established that individuals are poor lie detectors (Kraut, 1980; Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006). Yet, less is known of how people perform when making innocence-
guilt judgments. The current thesis focuses on implicit judgments relating to 
innocence-guilty verdicts and the potential usage of heuristics which may lead to 
biases and errors, to better understand underlying cognitive processes during this 
type of decision-making. When asked to make this type of judgment, an innocence 
or guilt bias and even an innocence default may be possible. Questions such as 
‘what encourages possible errors and has this any association with source saliency’ 
has not yet been studied where a specific context is considered.  
The process of systematic information processing and decision-forming, 
information can be attended to, comprehended, reacted to and accepted. During 
this process, receivers may resort to heuristics especially when the information 
source holds uncertain outcomes and with only limited information available to 
judges (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). This may lead to biases in searching from the 
judge’s own memory, experiences, stereotypes or external stimuli from the 
information source itself, either through a systematic and thorough processing of 
the message from the source, and/or through superficial, automatic judgments. If 
the amount of information and presence of valid cues in a context-specific stimulus 
material given to judges can be controlled and manipulated across different 
conditions, in which of these conditions will judges be more likely to resort to 
heuristics and which heuristics may these be?  
It would make logical sense that the concepts of innocence and truthfulness 
(together with guilt and deceit) would work in concert, at least in some cases. 
Kassin and Fong (1999), in their paper on judgments of truth and deception during 
interrogation, discussed in length the extent to which one can differentiate 
suspects who are guilty and suspects who are innocent. As did Inbau, Reid and 
Buckley (1986), the authors in this paper interchangeably discussed truth-
deception concepts from general lie detection research with that of innocence and 
guilt, because if the suspects were guilty they would very likely be lying in their 
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statements and vice versa. Link between innocence-guilt and truth-lie concepts 
are evident in Granhag and Hartwig’s (2008) paper, where the authors discussed 
frameworks concerning ‘the psychology of guilt’ and ‘the psychology of innocence’, 
and how understanding these can potentially improve one’s ability to detect lies 
and truth. The authors maintained that someone who is guilty will differ in the 
information they know about the crime from someone who is innocent and may 
differ in self-regulating behaviour. While there would appears to be a link, certain 
researchers are careful to underline their distinction between these two concepts. 
They cite examples of cases where innocent suspects can lie too (Sukumar, Wade 
& Hodgson, 2016). Nevertheless, lie detection literature is still relevant to the 
present thesis. As many of the theoretical underpinnings are also pertinent and 
applicable to innocence-guilt judgments, they will be discussed.  
The present thesis explored the cognitive and affective mechanisms 
underlying the cues used to make innocence-guilt judgements using the high 
stakes situation of television appeals in which people appeal publicly for the return 
of a loved one. The specific context of televised appeals was also taken as a basis 
for providing an objective continent in relation to theories and models of grief, 
which will be expounded in a later chapter. This chapter will focus on current 
findings in lie detection research as well as literature on innocence-guilt 
judgments. 
 
1.2 Assessments of truth and lies  
 Time and again, studies of lie detection show that judgements are not much 
better than the toss of a coin (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Consistently shown in 
several studies is that observers often use invalid cues to distinguish lies from 
truth, which partially explains poor accuracy rates. Vrij, Semin and Bull (1996) 
and Sporer and Schwandt (2007) underlined the difference between observed 
‘objective’ behaviours of liars and truth tellers, and in contrast the subjective 
beliefs of these objective behaviours. Using unreliable criteria for making veracity 
assessments can lead to wrong decisions, such as an inaccurate belief that ‘liars 
always do not tell stories in rich detail’.  
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The usage of invalid cues by observers seems to be well noted in deception 
detection literature (Anderson, DePaulo, Ansfield, Tickle & Green, 1999; Vrij, 
2008). Zimmerman, Compo and Carlucci (2013) asserted that poor deception 
detection ability and accuracy may relate to common misconceptions about cues to 
deception. Hartwig and Bond (2011) discussed that the actual behaviours that 
liars display are inconsistent with people’s beliefs about what these behaviours 
are. They also argue that self-reports cannot adequately capture the cues that 
people use in making veracity judgments because people may be unaware of the 
basis for their decision making. Vrij, Granhag and Porter (2010) introduced what 
is known as the ‘Othello error’ where certain nonverbal cues such as nervousness 
are used wrongly to indicate that a person is lying, when the interviewee could 
simply be fearful for being wrongly accused of committing a crime he or she did 
not do, or in fear of not being seen as truthful.  
So far it has been put forward that the two main reasons that human 
judges are poor in detecting deception is because they tend to use undiagnostic 
cues while doing so, and because there is a lack of diagnostic cues of deception. 
(Anderson et al., 1999; Vrij, 2008). Conversely, in a recent meta-analysis 
Hartwig and Bond (2011) found that this is rather due primarily to weaknesses 
of these behavioural cues itself. Their meta-analyses would suggest that 
individuals seldom rely on invalid cues, counter to earlier explanations and 
suggestions for these poor results.  
Furthermore, some researchers have also claimed that lie detectability in 
high-stakes conditions will be different from laboratory simulations (Cohen et 
al., 2010; Porter et al., 2008; Ekman, O’Sullivan & Frank, 1999; Miller & Stiff, 
1993; Granhag & Strömwall, 2004; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008; Frank, 
Paolantonio, Feeley & Servoss, 2004; Carlucci, Compo & Zimmerman, 2013). 
Low-stakes scenarios include trivial lies or lies that are not of a critical nature 
with critical penalties, typically set within a laboratory condition or university 
setting restricted by ethical concerns (Cohen, Beattie & Shovelton, 2010; Porter 
et al., 2008; Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara & Bull, 2004; Vrij, Edward, Roberts & Bull, 
2000). It was posited that the cues liars exhibit will be more discernible in a 
high-stakes situation than in a low-stakes one (Ekman, O’Sullivan & Frank, 
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1999). Miller and Stiff (1993) proffered that the higher the stakes, the higher the 
chance more reliable deception cues will be elicited where deceit will be more 
likely to be detected.  
Contrary to these propositions, Hartwig and Bond’s (2014) recent meta-
analysis found that even in higher stakes scenario truth-lie detection did not fare 
much better or easier. Using a sample of over 9000 liars and truth-tellers, the 
authors found little difference in how detectable lies were across different 
scenarios. These scenarios include statements moderated by level of sender’s 
motivation (i.e., sender is unmotivated or highly motivated) and highly emotional 
statements. This meta-analysis would show that in the latter scenario 
mentioned, high-stakes lies were equally detectable to inconsequential lies.  Vrij 
and Granhag (2012) also argued against the belief that cues to deception will be 
more distinct in high-stakes situations. They critiqued O’Sullivan, Frank, Hurley 
and Tiwana’s (2009) review citing that the selection of 13 ‘high-stakes’ studies 
and 18 ‘low-stakes’ studies in this work is dubious. Vrij and Granhag (2012) 
commented that the O’Sullivan (2008) paper included in this selection of work 
was only a commentary with little to no information given on how the 
experiment cited was conducted, and it was not peer-reviewed. Furthermore, Vrij 
and Granhag (2012) stressed that because it is arguable that in a high-stakes 
situation not only does this affect a liar’s behaviour but it could be rationalised 
that someone telling the truth will act in a comparable way, hence there will be 
little difference between the cues exhibited by liars and those by truth-tellers.  
 
1.3 Assessments of innocence and guilt  
As put forward in the opening paragraphs of this thesis, because decision-
making for innocence-guilt judgments are reasoned to be comparable yet distinct 
from that for truth-lie judgements, literature pertaining to innocence-guilt 
judgments will be considered separately in this section. 
The second paragraph of Article 6 in the European Convention on Human 
Rights asserts the presumption of innocence until proven guilty by law of anyone 
with a criminal offence charge (Council of Europe, 1988). Garrett’s (2008) review 
stressed the risks of a false prejudgment of guilt when suspects are in fact innocent 
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in the judicial system. Kassin, Goldstein and Savitsky (2003) highlighted the 
threats relating to prejudging a suspect as guilty during police interrogations. 
When holding a prejudgment of guilt, the authors found that more interrogators 
felt more compelled to obtain a confession regardless of the actual innocence or 
guilt of the suspect. Also, interrogators exercised a higher number of interrogation 
procedures and there was a higher evidence of behavioural confirmation taking 
place. This in turn affected the suspect’s own conduct, as well as the assessments 
of impartial observers. Kassin et al. (2003) divided this experiment into two parts. 
In the first part, suspects were either involved in a mock theft paradigm or an 
innocent act, and were later interviewed by interrogators who were either led to 
presume a judgment of innocence or one of guilt. This part was audio-taped. In the 
second part of this experiment, another group of participants listened to these 
taped interviews and assessed whether the suspects in the mock theft paradigm 
were innocent or guilty. This group of impartial observers judged 42% of the guilty 
suspects correctly as guilty, and judged 28% of those who were innocent as guilty. 
42% of the interrogators with a prejudgment of guilt judged the suspect as guilty, 
and only 19% of those with a prejudgment of innocence judged the suspect as 
guilty. The authors inferred from these results that both interrogators and neutral 
observers could not distinguish innocence from guilt very well in this experiment.  
In general, Kassin et al. (2003) and Inbau et al. (2001) stated that police 
officers usually decide to instigate an interrogation based on a (potentially 
inaccurate) a priori belief that a suspect is guilty. Kassin et al. (2003) maintained 
that once this presumption is formed, police officers may unintentionally pursue, 
construe or even produce evidence to substantiate this prejudgment, displaying 
behavioural confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998; Darley & Fazio, 1980) and a self-
fulfilling prophecy (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968).  
Shoemaker et al. (1973) found that negative and positive facial stereotypes 
were linked with innocence-guilt judgments in a scenario where evidence given to 
participants were ambiguous. After being shown a crime vignette, participants 
were told to choose a photo of a Caucasian white male from an array of 12 photos, 
who seemed the least probable one to have committed the crime in the vignette. 
This decision was associated with how participants assigned levels of guilt or 
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innocence. The authors also found that men tended to rely more on facial 
stereotypes in assessing guilt or innocence more did women in their sample. This 
study, however, reveals very little of the ability to correctly judge innocence or 
guilt when actual veracity of the suspect is considered, what people are thinking 
when they are making innocence-guilt judgments, and how they arrive at these 
decisions.  
Tamborini, Huang, Mastro and Nabashi-Nakahara (2007) maintained that 
stereotypes and heuristics are sometimes used by a juror as a cue to help them 
reach a verdict. Yet, the consequences of using stereotypes, heuristics and biases 
to determine someone’s innocence or guilt are detrimental and improper as a 
member of a jury in a legal trial. Tamborini et al. (2007) applied the heuristic-
analytical model to explore the influence of racial biases and heuristics people 
have of the judicial system on jury decision-making. They found that people using 
mental shortcuts relating to race and the legal-system influenced how they 
assigned innocence-guilt judgments. In particular, Tamborini et al. (2007) also 
discussed a term they coined the ‘presumed innocence’, which is defined as a 
mental shortcut in believing that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty. Their 
study seemed to substantiate the existence of a presumed-innocent mental 
shortcut and that it was expected to impact the way one perceives the judicial 
system and its processes. An example of this is the belief concerning the credibility 
of witnesses. 
If there is a likelihood that jurors employ biases and heuristics when 
making decisions of innocence-guilt of a sender, researchers in this field would do 
well to first locate areas where errors may stand to occur. This understanding may 
perhaps even improve innocence-guilt detection rates, should these rates 
materialises to be poor. Errors may be made during the judgments and 
interpretations of source characteristics, arising from the source and/or from the 
judge. A diagram of this framework is illustrated in Figure 1 below (Ng & Youngs, 
2016). Figure 1 is an operational and workable framework that has been 
systematically reviewed and categorised, applicable to both truth-lie and 
innocence-guilt decision-making. It is still currently largely unknown how people 
form impressions and process information when asked to make innocence-guilt 
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judgments. This thesis aims to better understand the underlying cognitive 
processes during this type of decision-making, and to uncover errors or 
misconceptions that judges may incidentally rely on when making such decisions. 
Expectantly, this will help shed light towards the detection rates in making 
innocence-guilt judgments. As such, the next chapter discusses errors that may be 
made during the judgments of a source, which may interrelate with the 
interpretation of source characteristics, presentation and content. 
Furthermore, the effects of a prejudgment of guilt or a presumption of 
innocence is recognised in available literature, but how much of this ‘prejudgment’ 
is a provisional state of mind and how much of this is perhaps a more stable innate 
tendency that is difficult to be changed (akin to a Spinozan bias) is largely 
unknown (Gilbert, Krull & Malone, 1990; Gilbert, 1991; Pennington & Hastie, 
1991). This distinguishes the concepts of a presumption applied to the reasoning 
in having to make a particular veracity decision, from an inherent predisposition 
in presuming innocence or guilt. Furthermore, more research is needed in 
determining how neutral observers perform in distinguishing someone who is 
innocent from someone who is guilty in high-stakes scenarios.  
 
1.4 Relationship between Cues of Lies and Truths  
 Another aspect that has not been studied is the relationship between cues 
of lies and truths in regard to their message content analysis. Whelan, Wagstaff 
and Wheatcroft (2014) published their work on content analysis of variables in 
television appeals. While valuable, the authors did not to consider analysis of the 
relationship between the variables they found; in other words, how these cues 
relate to each other. There have been advocates to using multiple cues rather 
than focusing on individual variables, and researchers who have acknowledged 
the difficulty in typifying and computing deceptive behaviours (Leal, Vrij, Mann 
& Fisher, 2010; Porter and ten Brinke, 2010; Vrij & Mann, 2004).  
Duran, Dale, Kello, Street and Richardson (2013) and Van der Zee, Poppe, 
Taylor and Anderson (2015) studied variables in relation to each other. This 
presents a method of analysing cues of deception that moves away from 
frequency counts. An analysis of the relationship between content analysis 
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variables of lies and truths gives a means of visualising the level of similarity of 
individual cases of a dataset, as well as similarities between behavioural profiles 
of truth-tellers in comparison to liars. Compared to linguistic tools, which 
ultimately rely on statistical differences between variables and can be skewed by 
factors common in high-stakes lie detection data such as number of cases and 
low variable occurrence rates, information visualisation based on algorithms 
within a set of verbal variables in lie detection allows an examination into 
between-variable distances. This aspect will be further expounded in Chapter 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
A framework identifying influences in veracity judgments 
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2.1 Introduction 
 As briefly discussed in the opening chapter, the general path people seem 
to use to make veracity decisions is through an inspection of the source (sender or 
statement). Somewhere between this inspection, the detectability of this source 
and the various characteristics of it, veracity decisions are formed. The literature 
review in the current chapter is to establish where errors can be made and 
understand the pathway in which veracity decisions are formed. 
 
2.2 Source (A)  
 Characteristics of the source itself, how the source is presented and source 
content can elicit what cues an observer deems important to them, which can in 
turn cause biases to surface. The following paragraphs methodically discuss 
several examples that have been pre-empted in literature under this category. 
 
2.2.1 Source characteristics 
An aspect that can bias veracity judgments accuracy is characteristics of 
the source, for instance, the attractiveness and appearance of the source (sender). 
Stokemer and Praimo (2015) recently found evidence that their participants, who 
were asked to vote for a political candidate with limited information about the 
individuals, were inclined to cast their ballots for the better-looking candidate. In 
contrast, participants who were allotted a detailed account of the contenders’ 
political competence were inclined to choose the more experienced politician. They 
concluded that participants who were less informed politically used the 
attractiveness of the candidates as a cue to help them make their decisions.  
In the same way, in making innocent-guilt decisions, participants may not 
at times be privy to information about the sender at their disposal. With limited 
information and an uncertain outcome, observers may well rely upon the 
appearance and attractiveness of the source in making their veracity assessments. 
There are various aspects to how an individual bases their assessment of how 
attractive someone is, and usually, these assessments are made upon physical 
appearance and sound (Baron, Branscombe & Byrne, 2008). These interpersonal 
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attractions are made by the evaluation of a person’s attractiveness, to form 
positive or negative impressions (Hinton, 1993).  
It is well documented that the attractiveness of defendants has an effect in 
courtroom decisions and jury decision-making. Efran (1974) reported that 
defendants who were more attractive received judgments with less certainty of 
guilt than their unattractive counterparts. The advantage of possessing good looks 
seems to continue even after the conviction process into sentencing. Leventhal and 
Krate (1977) discovered that defendants who were recognised as attractive 
received shorter sentences as compared to their counterparts, who were given 
longer terms. Patry (2008) stated that participants in a mock jury study were more 
disposed to assign a guilty judgment to unattractive defendants compared to 
attractive ones.  
While a wealth of research points to the many advantages of attractive, 
attractive-sounding, well-appearing individuals, there are a set of opposing 
findings. These findings assert that being attractive is linked to less favourable 
judgments of credibility (Johnson, Podratz, Dipboye & Gibbons, 2010). In any case, 
the general implication from the majority of research in social psychology and in 
criminology shows that one’s attractiveness and appearance can impact veracity 
judgments by means of observers expending this cue in making their judgments. 
Consequently, it is important to study the role of perceived attractiveness in the 
present thesis.  
  
2.2.2 Source presentation 
How a Source is presented is another aspect that is hypothesised to bias a 
judge’s veracity judgments accuracy. Presenting the source in pairs is an example. 
While existing research focuses on how groups lie more than individuals for 
monetary and honesty gains (Cohen, Gunia, Young Kim-Jun & Murnighan, 2099; 
Sutter, 2009), or cues used by pairs of liars and truth-tellers (Vrij, Mann, Leal & 
Granhag, 2010), no research has empirically tested whether paired or solo 
deceptions are more successful at misleading observers. However, Cohen et al.’s 
(2009) research hinted that groups can appear to be models of trustworthiness 
(Sutter, 2009). Bornstein, Kocher, Kugler and Sutter (2002) found that groups are 
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just as trustworthy as individuals in a game involving monetary incentive, thus 
on par in their ability to deceive observers. Zhou and Zhang’s (2008) study on 
computer mediated communication propose that group size, whether in pairs or 
threes, mediates deceivers’ behaviours.  
While most research, such as that of Granhag, Strömwall and Jonsson 
(2003) found differences in the consistency and preparation of pairs of liars and 
truth-tellers, subjective perception of these pairs and biases that may occur when 
judging more than one innocent or guilty person is not yet available in literature.  
Rozin and Royzman (2001) posited the ‘negativity bias’, which they 
theorised is an intrinsic tendency. Of great interest is the authors’ term of 
negativity dominance, where the combinations of negative and positive entities 
generate evaluations that are more inclined towards the negative rather than the 
simple arithmetical addition of both idiosyncratic values. According to the authors 
this bias infers the ability and potency for a negative or positive entity to 
contaminate and combine albeit both in dissimilar amounts.  
Taken together it is evident here that there is a considerable possibility in 
advancing research in this area in the context of determining innocence or guilt in 
high-stakes situations. For example, when a guilty individual who presumably 
exudes negativity and a sense of ‘danger’ to beware of, is paired with an innocent 
individual who presumably emanates positivity, negativity may dominate when 
both entities combine, whereas an innocent person may be perceived as less 
truthful via observers using a contagion heuristic and as a result pair bias may 
arise. In the present thesis, a contagion heuristic is defined as a mental shortcut 
whereby people identify someone as being of a certain trait or impression simply 
by close relationship with another person who exudes a similar trait or impression, 
and/or when both individuals are perceived in combination with each other. In 
other words, the assessment of Individual A influences how Individual B is 
perceived merely by close relationship or proximation (i.e., a husband and wife) or 
when both are perceived in concert with each other. A pair bias may arise as a 
result of this heuristic (Ng & Youngs, 2016). A pair bias is when an assessment of 
a person is erroneous due to the employment of a contagion heuristic. As the 
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example given above, a lying husband may be mistakenly seen as more innocent 
when paired with his wife who is telling the truth.      
 In line with this, the presentation format of the source itself is an aspect 
that may affect veracity judgments. Frank et al. (2004) suggested that a reason as 
to why lie detection experiments yield poor results is possibly due to the mode of 
presentation or communication medium. Lie detection studies assessing the 
accuracy of audio/video versus audio judges indicate contrasting findings.  
Zuckerman, Amidon, Bishop and Pomerantz (1982) discovered in their research 
that an individual’s voice tone is less well-regulated and therefore easier to 
observe leakages, in comparison to an individual’s face. Bond and Rao (2004) 
found that individuals in the audio-visual group performed better in terms of 
accurately judging lies and truths compared to those in the audio-only group, 
when the speaker was from another culture. Ekman (1989) posited that audio-
only cues remain more indicative of the actual veracity of a speaker as observers 
are not distracted from perceiving these visual unreliable and erroneous 
elements of deception. Davis, Markus and Walters (2006) established in their 
studies that in scenarios when observers are presented with an audio-only 
stimulus for false statements, they were more accurate in their judgments and 
reported lesser unbiased responses. Ekman (1981) noted that the audio format is 
a particularly salient mode of communication because we constantly listen to 
words and counter them as a reply; thus, observers may more habitually and 
efficiently perceive this channel as compared to non-audio modes. DePaulo, 
Stone and Lassiter (1985) noted that prediction of honesty is subjective to the 
medium the participants were shown, whether the target is presented in 
transcript form, audio-only format where observers merely listen to the stimulus 
without a visual element, visual-only format where observers only watch the 
stimulus without any audio recording, and audio-visual format. They found that 
under high motivation conditions, lies were detected better in channels that 
included non-verbal cues, namely the audio, visual and audio-visual channels 
compared to the verbal channel.  
 On the other hand, Sweeney and Ceci (2014) used an unrehearsed pro-
social lying paradigm, where university students and older adults lied 
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‘realistically’ to defend a research assistant. Again, this scenario was videotaped 
and shown to another group of participants. The authors found no significant 
difference between the audio-visual group who achieved an accuracy rate of 68% 
and the audio-only group who achieved an accuracy rate of 65%.   
From most of the studies mentioned in this section, it can be construed 
that the type of medium presented to a judge would influence their truth-lie 
accuracy rates (Bond & DePaulo, 2006).  Bond and DePaulo’s (2006) meta-
analyses revealed that truth-lie judgment accuracy declines when judging visible 
compared to audible lies. The authors suggested that one of the reasons for this 
finding is because it the typical typecast of someone who is lying is most easily 
brought out in a visual presentation mode. Additionally, when someone must 
judge the veracity of a sender with limited information or evidence other than a 
given video, they do not have many other alternatives but to resort to their pre-
existing understanding and stereotypes (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), which may 
potentially lead to biased judgments. Currently, it is still largely unknown if 
comparable results will also be revealed for innocence-guilt type judgments.  
  
2.2.3 Source content 
 The content of a Source is another aspect that can lead to biases in a judge’s 
veracity judgments accuracy. An example of content of source is how much sense 
a story makes, which interplays with a judge’s perception of whether it does or not 
and to what level it does or does not.  
In Canter, Grieve, Nicol and Benneworth, (2003) work on narrative 
plausibility, they examined what they termed ‘narrative plausibility’ by altering 
the sequence of a story structure in one condition, and keeping the story structure 
following Stein and Glenn’s (1979) model which follows the ‘Abstract, Setting, 
Initiating Event, Attempt, Consequence and Reaction’ structure. In the second 
setting, they reversed the order of the first, taking care that the narrative 
plausibility of the story in terms of syntax and grammar remained intact. The 
researchers found that to judge the plausibility of narratives, there are internal 
and external factors or attributions. The narrative structure is an internal 
element; it is essentially how the story develops and how it is organised. The 
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external factors are ‘anchors’, rubrics commonly agreed to be true such as ‘drug 
addicts are always crooks’. They found that external factors can radically or even 
subtly change a receiver’s judgment of a speaker’s credibility even though his or 
her narratives appear ‘internally consistent’. 
Following the results from this study, what happens when statements lack 
internal consistency in the current context? An international study directed to 
uncover stereotypes of liars conducted by the Global Deception Research Team 
found that among the top five invalid cues that people report using to judge 
perceived deception is speaker incoherence (2006, Study 1). A high number of 
participants from nearly 60 countries incorrectly hold the belief that if a statement 
is incoherent and does not make sense, it is more likely to be false. There is a lack 
of research in this area in innocence-guilt detection; evidently there exists a 
possibility in examining this issue further in a high-stakes context.  
 
2.3 Judges (B) 
In examining the possible errors that may occur while judging a source 
stemming from the judge itself, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) is of interest in 
initiating this understanding. The authors proposed that decisions will be 
especially prone to mental shortcuts, known as heuristics, when attempting to 
cope with probabilistic judgments of an event with uncertain outcomes such as the 
guilt of a defendant.  
Heuristics are used as a resort to reduce probability tasks with high 
complexities and in predicting these values into simpler judgment processes. 
While most heuristics serve to save cognitive effort and are generally useful, they 
can at times lead to inaccuracies in judgment. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
claimed that making a veracity judgment on something as uncertain in its outcome 
as in determining someone’s innocence or guilt, receivers may make judgments 
and decisions based on heuristic rules. Mental shortcuts can be viewed as rational 
and limit the demand on cognitive effort with the advantage that they can be made 
without full knowledge or information on a case; however, they can also cause 
deviation and biases. Biases are not the result of cognitive laziness, but rather it 
ensues from a distorted memory recollection or from external bases of information 
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that then guides and impacts judgments of the task ahead (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974).  
Evans (2007) stated that information can be processed by people either 
quickly where it does not demand very much of our cognitive reserve (Chaiken, 
Liberman & Eagly, 1989), or systematically where it demands much more effort 
from this reserve. Chaiken et al. (1989) proposed that processing information 
heuristically has a higher tendency to lead to biases, as opposed to systematic 
processing. Tamborini et al.’s (2007) study was introduced in Chapter 1. The 
authors applied one of the many heuristic-analytic models in their study, and in 
this study participants were asked to judge the innocence or guilt of the sender 
rather than an evaluation of their truth-telling or lying. They used a model 
outlined in Eagly and Chaiken (1993), Chaiken and Trope (1999) and Chaiken et 
al. (1989).  Hence, it could be said that the same theoretical frameworks that 
underlie lie detection are pertinent and applicable to innocence-guilt assessments.    
 The current thesis stresses that to understand how people come to make 
their judgments, researchers must first consider the context of the decision, as 
well as the social and cultural norms of the situation to assess why certain 
behaviours may be judged less favourably. For example, the influence of emotional 
display illustrated in the section above can be explained by the expectancy 
violation theory (EVT), which suggests that people hold expectations regarding 
which behaviours are considered normal in a given social scenario based on 
personal experiences, cultural and societal norms. When these expectations are 
violated, individuals who engage in that behaviour are judged less favourably 
(EVT; Dahl, Enemo, Drevland, Wessel, Eilertsen, Magnussen, 2007; Olsen, Roese 
& Zanna, 1996).  
 
2.3.1 Truth and lie bias error 
Two widely remarked biases in lie detection literature are the truth and lie 
biases (Levine, Park & McCornack, 1999; Ekman, O’Sullivan & Frank, 1999). 
These shows at least two types of biases that observers can be subject to in the 
course of the decision-making process. While the truth bias is defined as the 
propensity to ‘actively believe or passively presume that another person’s 
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communication is honest independent of actual honesty’, the truth default is a 
cognitive default in passively drawing assumptions about a statement or sender. 
Levine (2014, p. 380) defined as having a “passive presumption of honesty due 
either to a failure to actively consider the possibility of deceit at all or as a fall back 
cognitive state after a failure to obtain sufficient affirmative evidence for 
deception”. The truth bias is an observable measure (that may or may not be 
initiated by an unconscious truth default) where the possibility that a statement 
or sender might be untruthful comes into consciousness when actively prompted 
(Levine, 2014). 
 Put differently, the truth default occurs without conscious reflection and 
can be empirically measured via the observation of a truth bias. Essentially, the 
truth bias can be made with or without conscious reflection (Levine, 2014). Truth 
bias needs not be a cognitive default, so a Judge can arrive at a truth bias without 
requiring a truth default; however, a truth default helps explain why a truth bias 
transpires. If a judge has a truth default, then they may be more inclined towards 
a truth bias in their veracity judgments. The truth default theory (Levine, 2014) 
is in direct contrast with the ALIED perspective as the latter claims that there is 
no such cognitive default, rather, both truth and lie biases arise from the same 
underlying processes (Street, 2015). Burgoon, Blair and Strom (2008) offered a 
justification for this bias. The authors stated that individuals usually face a higher 
number of truthful messages than deceptive ones in everyday life. This results in 
a pre-set anticipation of honesty and a cognitive bias towards trusting messages 
and statements. 
Levine et al. (1999) repeatedly found in a series of studies that when sender 
veracity is truthful, in other words when the person is telling the truth, the 
receiver more frequently tended to correctly judge the veracity because receivers 
have a bias towards truth (McCornack & Levine, 1990; Levine & McCornack, 
2001). In contrast, Ekman et al.’s (1999) findings suggested that police officers 
tended to demonstrate a lie-bias, instead of a truth bias. They claimed that it is 
perhaps instinctual that law enforcement officers are in general more distrustful 
than their lay counterparts due to the nature of their occupation. However, Masip, 
Garrido and Herrero (2009) contended that although participants indicated a 
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strong truth bias during briefer conversations due to heuristic judgments, there 
was a decrease in the truth bias after longer communications were introduced. 
They suggested that the evidence of truth bias in previous studies of detecting 
deception could stem from the usage of stimulus material that are too short and 
those that are drawn from unhelpful behavioural samples.  
Vrij and Mann (2001a), Mann and Vrij (2006), Mann, Vrij and Bull (2004) 
and Vrij, Mann, Robbins and Robinson (2006) did not find evidence of the truth 
bias in their studies. Street and Masip (2015) recently found that individuals 
making several within-statement judgments were less likely to be truth-biased. 
The authors argued that this is not due to a time effect, rather it is the amount of 
evaluations being made step by step that provides the best explanation for this 
change.  
 
2.3.2 Innocence default and bias 
If, then, someone is asked to make an innocence-guilt judgment, an 
innocence bias is a possible outcome. As introduced in Chapter 1, while Kassin et 
al. (2003) found prejudgments or expectations of guilt and innocence it is largely 
unknown whether there would be an intrinsic tendency for people to presume 
innocence or guilt. An inherent predisposition to a presumption of innocence would 
be akin to a truth default, with the latter outlined by Levine (2014). Tamborini et 
al. (2007) also discussed a term they coined the ‘presumed innocence’, which is 
defined as a mental shortcut in believing that a defendant is innocent until proven 
guilty. Their study seemed to substantiate the existence of a presumed-innocent 
mental shortcut and that it was expected to impact the way one perceives the 
judicial system and its processes. An example of this is the belief concerning the 
credibility of witnesses. An innocence default is defined in the present thesis as a 
mental default that passively presumes the innocence of a sender or a statement. 
An innocence default may be possible (with an innocence bias being a measurable 
outcome of this default, that also may or may not have stemmed from this default), 
which still needs distilling and examination in a high-stakes context.  Similarly, a 
guilt bias in this thesis is defined as a disposition or passive presumption of guilt 
towards a statement or sender. 
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Related concepts to an ‘innocence bias’ will be discussed here. One such 
concept is the ‘halo effect’. The halo effect is a mental bias where a judge’s overall 
perception of someone influences their feelings and thoughts about that person or 
product’s character (Thorndike, 1920). The halo effect has been studied in its 
association with concepts of source characteristics as well as its implications for 
and in the judiciary system. One such concept is attractiveness (Wade & DiMaria, 
2003). Wade and DiMaria’s (2003) study would reveal that how attractive someone 
is can influence people’s perception of this person’s level of accomplishment and of 
their character. Likewise, Dion, Berscheid and Walster (1972) found a ‘what is 
beautiful is judged to be good’ phenomena, where someone who are good-looking 
are judged to have more favourable and good characteristics. Another similar 
concept was introduced by Paunonen (2008) who also explored a model of honesty 
that interrelates with other judgments. In this study, the author found that a 
sender who is truthful was judged to be more attractive and more likeable. 
These studies would suggest an interrelation of other judgments of the 
person (i.e., attractiveness) together with the ultimate verdict of them, whether 
this verdict be of character (Wade & DiMaria, 2003; Dion et al., 1972) or political 
knowledge and sophistication (Palmer & Peterson, 2012) for example. In this 
way, the concepts of ‘halo effect’ and ‘what is beautiful is good’ are comparable to 
that of an ‘innocence bias’ in the sense that all are robust concepts relating to 
person perception. They concern how we think and process information about a 
person, and interplays with feelings and thoughts are potentially present and 
influences the ultimate verdict of that person (Aronson, Wilson, Akert, 2010). 
This interrelation seems to also transpire vice versa. It could also be that people 
who are judged to be more honest, are then seen as more attractive, for example 
(Paunonen, 2008). These studies would suggest an interaction between a source 
(i.e., source characteristics), judges and their veracity judgments.  
The story model by Pennington and Hastie (1986, 1988) was put forward 
to explain how people come to make innocent-guilt judgments. It describes how 
people use source content (i.e., evidence), for example, as a basis to decide upon a 
guilty or non-guilty verdict. This model puts forward that people make decisions 
utilising three steps (Pennington & Hastie, 1993). The first involves forming the 
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story, the second involves recognising verdict options and the last consists of 
making a verdict. In the story formation phase, a juror attempts to organise 
evidence presented to them into an order that makes sense in terms of its 
content and chronology. They structure the story causally, using what they 
personally know of similar events such as personal experience, their expectations 
of what makes a complete story and the evidence presented during trial. 
Pennington and Hastie (1988) posited that jurors make decisions by reasoning 
the evidence presented and constructing an interpretation of this evidence, 
which then becomes the basis of an ultimate verdict.  
Pennington and Hastie (1988) postulated that ‘coverage’, ‘coherence’, 
‘uniqueness’ and ‘goodness-of-it’ contribute to the decision-making process in 
deciding whether a story is satisfactory or otherwise. Coverage denotes how 
much evidence is justified and explained by a specific story. The more evidence 
that can be accounted for, the higher the likelihood that the story will be 
accepted and the more confidence a juror is likely to have in that story. The story 
model proposed that consistency, plausibility and completeness all determine a 
story’s level of coherence. If a story has no internal and external contradictions, 
is parallel with the juror’s pre-held knowledge and contains all parts of what a 
juror believes makes up a story, the higher the possibility that the juror will 
accept the story. Jurors then map this causal model of an accepted story onto the 
verdict options available. The better the story fits onto the verdict options, the 
higher the juror’s confidence in the verdict-story matched-ness and it exceeding 
the required level of proof, and the more likely they will choose the verdict. There 
seems to be no mention of whether people have a predisposition towards 
awarding an innocence or guilt verdict, however, and this has not been 
previously studied if there are indeed such biases in Pennington and Hastie’s 
(1993) story model.  
The judicial system in the United States entails a presumption of 
innocence until proven guilty, ensuring the legal right of a fair and unbiased 
trial to protect suspects (Helgeson & Shaver, 1990). Helgeson and Shaver (1990) 
found in a mock trial experiment that their participants did not assume the 
sender’s innocence. The results from this study would suggest that irrespective of 
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what ‘legal instructions’ they were given, participants were still influenced by 
experimentally-induced biases. An assumption of innocence is where a suspect is 
to be considered innocent until proven guilty (Mueller & Laird, 2009). 
Incidentally, it is important to examine if people have an innocence bias or not, 
and whether thinking is different implicitly if judges are put under different 
experimental conditions and how these relates to their explicit judgments of the 
sender’s innocence or guilt. 
In the lie detection literature, the truth bias posits that this accuracy 
increases above chance level only with truthful messages, and hovers around 
50% or lower for deceitful ones (Levine, 2014; McCornack & Levine, 1990; Levine 
& McCornack, 2001). To recapitulate, it also postulates that truths are most 
often correctly identified as honest, but errors predominate when lies are judged. 
This thesis uses the same cut-off point in determining the occurrence of an 
‘innocence bias’ as in lie detection literature (Levine, 2014; McCornack & Levine, 
1990; Levine & McCornack, 2001), with a rate of above 50% indicating an 
innocence bias and a rate of below 50% indicating a guilt bias. The absence or 
presence of an innocence bias (as well as a guilt bias) will carry implications for 
the psycho-legal arena if can be further developed, supported or challenged. 
 
2.3.3 Meta-emotion bias  
The present thesis proposes that this is another possible error that 
conceivably contributes to lower veracity detection accuracy. Meta-emotion is the 
degree of sympathetic response towards an emotional sender (Granhag, 2006; Ng 
& Youngs, 2016). This is a person’s assessment of their felt emotions, which can 
bias their cognitive mechanisms while making veracity judgments. 
Schwarz (2012) and Srull (1984) postulated that individuals may use their 
feelings as a source of information particularly when under the circumstances 
where they consider their feelings as a highly significant source of information and 
also when more information about the source is not available. In highly emotional 
scenarios such as press conferences for missing or murdered relatives, observers 
may falsely deduce that their own felt emotions are a highly relevant component 
in making veracity assessments, especially when only fractional information is 
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known about the appealer. In broader terms, an observer may rely on their mood 
state as a heuristic cue, such as ‘If I feel very sad watching the appeal, hence they 
must be innocent’. As found in criminology literature, jury members may be more 
likely to seek out cues that back up the emotion they are feeling and misinterpret 
this unreliable or invalid cue to be consistent with this emotion, subsequently 
affecting their veracity judgment of the speaker (Salerno & Bottoms, 2010).  
 
2.4 Judgments (C) 
2.4.1 Implicit veracity assessments   
 As illustrated in Figure 1, judges can make a veracity decision implicitly 
and explicitly. In this thesis, explicit veracity assessments are defined as 
dichotomous ‘He is guilty’ or ‘He is innocent’ choices, which participants are 
allowed to make after viewing a video clip of a sender (Granhag, 2006). Implicit 
assessments, in contrast, are where observers are asked to evaluate a sender’s 
statement, appearance, and/or their own emotional reactions towards watching 
the video clip of the sender for example. In other words, any other questions asked 
apart from the statement or sender’s ground truth may be considered to be implicit 
judgments (Granhag, 2006).  
 It should be kept in mind that the idea that there is a considerable implicit 
factor in what is known as ‘implicit lie detection’ today is debatable (Granhag, 
2006). The author further argued that the available research (while few and far 
between) does not concern the fact that individuals are better at lie detection by 
primarily exercising their implicit knowledge, rather, this measure is essentially 
an approach to facilitate the understanding of individuals’ responses  to any other 
question except for ‘whether the sender lying or not’.    
 Some studies show advantages of measuring implicit, rather than explicit 
veracity judgments. Findings by Vrij et al. (2001), who ran a between-subjects 
study using police officers as their participants, showed that participants in the 
explicit group rated liars as somewhat more likely to be lying, on the other hand 
participants in the implicit group rated whether liars had to think harder than 
truth tellers and subsequently were more accurate in their implicit judgments. 
Here it can be seen that more information of cue perception is generated from 
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implicit veracity assessments rather than a dichotomous rating. Similarly, 
Landström, Granhag and Hartwig (2005) found in their study that when their 
participants were asked to make explicit veracity judgments they were not able to 
discriminate liars from truth tellers with an average accuracy score above chance 
level (50%) but performed better in implicit ratings, where they rated liars as 
thinking harder than their truth-telling counterparts and this difference, although 
not statistically significant, was close to. They also rated honest statements as 
having richer details, more plausible and convincing compared to deceptive ones. 
In summary, these studies claim that observers perform better when asked to 
make implicit assessments of veracity rather than explicit ones as they are able to 
distinguish certain aspects such as the sender’s statement or appearance for 
example. In contrast, Bond, Levine and Hartwig (2014) found no evidence that 
indirect lie detection provides better lie or truth discrimination compared to 
explicit decisions.  
 The advantages proposed in asking judges to make implicit evaluations are 
that 1) this is an indirect method of lie detection that is less ‘artificial’ than asking 
judges to make an instant explicit judgment (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), 2) regardless 
of whether it increases accuracy of judges’ veracity assessments, it will enhance 
our understanding of perceptions and consequent biases of observers in lie 
detection research. DePaulo and Morris (2004) recommended that implicit 
assessments be favoured instead of a sole measure of explicit judgments. The 
argument behind examining implicit assessments is to understand the underlying 
cognitive mechanisms that can help shed light onto low detection accuracy rates.  
 Both Street and Vadillo (2016) and Granhag (2006) argued that 
substantiation for only an indirect method of lie detection (purely implicit) is 
limited. However, current lie detection research mostly applies explicit lie 
detection methods. The biases and heuristics proposed earlier in this chapter 
cannot be explored under the sole reliance of explicit veracity assessments. The 
inclusion of both types of assessments will allow heuristics and cognitive 
operations to be studied. Granhag (2006) asserted that neither type of assessment 
is better than the other; but that it is important to recognise that judgment is, at 
times, ultimately the artefact of interaction between both types of assessment. 
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Granhag (2006) proposed that there are many types of implicit assessments, 
such as verbal i.e. “truth tellers tell stories that make more sense”, nonverbal i.e. 
“liars are more tense”, mental process of participant leading to their judgments, 
outcome of an observer’s perception of sender which is ‘object-level’ i.e. sender is 
‘thinking too hard’, result of an observer’s reflections on their own cognition (meta-
cognition) or emotions (meta-emotion) i.e. assessing how sympathetic the sender 
is, or how comfortable the observer was in reaction to the statement, as introduced 
in Section 2.3.3. Support for an implicit measurement of veracity via meta-
emotions is the hot hypothesis approach. Ask and Landström (2010) proposed that 
the above studies are missing the ‘hot’ component and therefore considered ‘cold’ 
hypotheses. Thagard (2006) explained the term ‘hot thought’, defined as emotional 
cognition and held the assumption that a viewer integrates the emotional aspects 
from a source into their judgment processes. In their study, they investigated not 
only statement believability, but also participants’ sympathetic response towards 
rape victim statements and how this mediates their credibility judgments of the 
victim, the sympathetic response being the added ‘hot’ component. They found that 
affective display mediated participants’ sympathetic responses and affected their 
perception of the victim’s veracity.   
This sympathetic response is synonymous with the concept of ‘absorption’. 
Kujipers et al. (2014) compiled previously-researched, similar definitions into four 
major facets, and comprised them into the Narrative Absorption Scale which will 
be further expounded on in Section 6.2.5.  
  
2.4.2 Conscious vs. unconscious information processing  
 Related to the section above is the concept of conscious and unconscious 
information processing where judges can make a veracity decision via systematic 
processing, and/or through a more autonomic route. As introduced earlier, the 
truth default theory is a cognitive default hypothesised to occur without conscious 
reflection and can be empirically measured via the observation of a truth bias 
(Levine, 2014). This theory claims that there is a strong possibility of a pre-
selected response bias. If this theory can be proven accurate, then the truth bias 
stems from a cognitive default that occurs unconsciously. In contrast, the ALIED 
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perspective claims that there is no such pre-selection or predisposition (Street, 
2015). Street (2015) went a step further to claim that so far available empirical 
evidence for unconscious lie detection is lacking. Street and Vadillo (2016) 
maintained that where an advantage can be dependably observed in terms of 
indirect lie detection accuracy, this outcome can be inferred to the conscious and 
deliberate part (in the absence of an explanation pertaining to the unconscious 
one).   
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As presented in Chapter 1, another aspect apart from context-specific 
heuristics and biases that has not been studied using high-stakes stimulus 
material is the relationship between cues of lies and truths in regard to their 
message content analysis. Other than the efforts of Whelan et al. (2014), research 
on content analysis in lie detection show much potential in the area of lie detection, 
but lacks an examination of its verbal components and still heavily relies on 
credibility assessment tools. The following paragraphs focus on what the main 
credibility assessment tools used are, and their associated problems. It is essential 
to consider these tools and the principles behind their usage, as much of the 
rationale behind this is helpful in understanding deception detection.  
 
3.1 Current content analysis methods 
Statement Validity Analysis (SVA) is a validity assessment tool which 
focuses on variables of an account that are correlated with truthfulness (Richard, 
2008). The purpose of the SVA is to provide an assessment of the validity of the 
recorded statement, not of the general credibility of the witness. The hypothesis of 
SVA is that accounts based on real events, often subject to unintentional errors, 
would consist of different features than the ones based on a deliberate lie (Vrij & 
Mann, 2004). Both true and false accounts are affected by stable personal factors 
as well as situational factors albeit different in substance and source. The content 
of an account based on a real event may be driven by stress, fear, forgetting, verbal 
and sensoric deficits as well as inappropriate interview techniques and the one 
based on a deliberate lie may be driven by motivation, general credibility of the 
person, personality disorders and plausibility of the lie, or the credibility of the 
statement as well as the person.  
SVA was built on detailed consideration of statement content using criteria-
based content analysis (CBCA). While the criterions has been shown to be 
beneficial in helping to discriminate truthful and false statements (Zaparniuk, 
Yuille & Taylor, 1995; Akehurst, Köhnken & Hofer, 2004), it stands that this 
validity checklist can be improperly used because of the difficulties in applying it 
(Gumpert & Lindblad, 1999). Gumpert and Lindblad (1999) comprehensively 
studied a Swedish application of SVA, with results revealing individual differences 
49 
 
  
among ten experts using the statement criteria in SVA and each emphasised 
different aspects of cases in order to reach their final judgment. In fact, most 
experts in this Swedish sample used an alternative hypothesis to reach their 
conclusions. While drawing from a small sample the results from this study draws 
a red flag towards the issues in using SVA. 
The main problems with tools such as SVA are that they lack 
standardisation and they are sensitive to contextual biases (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, 
Broers & Merckelbach, 2014; Risinger, Saks, Thompson & Rosenthal, 2002) where 
a set of occurrences shifts an individual’s decision threshold by function of 
expectancies they implicitly generate based on information derived from a context. 
An example of contextual bias is the confirmation bias, wherein individuals are 
susceptible to search for evidence that reinforces a pre-existing conviction while 
disregarding suggestions that contradicts it (Findley & Scott, 2006). The same 
problems can be said of Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN; Sapir, 2005). 
SCAN (Sapir, 2005) maintains that liars and truth tellers will use different 
language and developed a criterion list to assist in differentiating their 
statements. Bogaard et al. (2014) argued that there is no concrete evidence for 
SCAN’s capacity to differentiate these supposed differences. The authors also 
asserted that a further problem is that individuals will differ in the way they use 
SCAN, which is not standardised. Again, the same problem of individual 
differences in users can be said for CBCA and Reality Monitoring (RM; Sporer, 
1997). Sporer (1997) introduced RM and set eight criteria encompassing aspects 
such as realism, space and time details, sensory information and vividness. 
Moreover, RM is not used in criminal investigations unlike CBCA and SVA 
(Granhag & Vrij, 2005). 
Overall, the usefulness of content analysis in lie detection can be found in 
Vrij et al.’s (2010) work, where the authors maintained that truth tellers use a 
different verbal strategy as compared with liars. Those telling the truth were more 
likely to be fixated upon what had transpired and provided more detailed 
responses, whereas liars would prepare their answers for the questions to come if 
they could and would choose to deliver replies that were less comprehensive.  
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In the recent years computer analysis programs have been developed to aid 
content analysis, showing much potential in lie detection research. Pennebaker, 
Francis and Booth (2001) developed the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
(LIWC), which is a computerized method to analyse an individual’s use of 
functional and emotional words. It is essentially a word counting program that 
computes the ratio of words within several dozen classifications used in a 
transcript. This program searches for predefined clusters of words that correspond 
with the different classifications.  
Onyebadi and Park (2012) identified common characteristics of 419 scam 
emails. Using a computer program called Diction 5.0, the authors noted that these 
messages frequently contain various grammatical errors. Diction 5.0 operates 
similarly to LIWC, in that it is a computerised word count software with in-built 
content dictionaries. It analyses five core variables – certainty, optimism, activity, 
realism and commonality. Both Pennebaker et al. (2001) and Onyebadi and Park 
(2012) found that liars used different word patterns than truth tellers. 
 
3.2 Conclusion 
 These abovementioned tools and linguistic software lack a method in 
studying the relationship between all cues that differentiate behaviours of liars 
and truth tellers; a new method may offer a more rounded approach in studying 
deceptive and truthful content. The general findings and summaries from 
deception detection studies posit that behavioural cues, alone at least, are not 
useful. Over the past few decades, meta-analytic research in lie detection has 
shown that behavioural cues to deception tend to be unreliable and weak (DePaulo 
et al., 2003). The authors examined 158 behavioural cues and found there were no 
consistent cues that diagnostically distinguished liars from truth tellers, and no 
cues that reliably associate with lying with very small effect sizes and small 
numbers of estimates. Most differences were very small, difficult to discriminate 
in real life situations. Therefore the strength in using a method that provides a 
visual account of all speech variables is perhaps the much needed advancement 
from a reliance on individual cues alone. 
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  Following the discussion of literature established in the previous chapters, 
the current chapter first summarises the key implications and below sets out the 
aims of the thesis. 
   
4.1 Innocence-guilt judgments using high-stakes scenarios 
 Hartwig and Bond’s (2014) meta-analyses would seem to challenge 
longstanding belief in the field of lie detection (Cohen, Beattie & Shovelton, 2010; 
Porter et al., 2008; Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara & Bull, 2004; Vrij, Edward, Roberts & 
Bull, 2000; Ekman, O’Sullivan & Frank, 1999; Miller & Stiff, 1993) that low 
detection rates are partially due to the usage of low stakes scenarios lacking in 
ecological validity. Nevertheless, little is known of the how people make innocence-
guilt verdicts, how accurate they are and if any biases would emerge using 
televised press conferences of relatives appealing for the return of a loved one who 
is either missing or murdered.  
 
4.2 Considering norms 
The use of television appeals also underscores an example of a context-
specific study, and is discussed further in the next chapter. Within this specific 
context, considering the norms of the particular context of television appeals is 
crucial. This gives a unique meaning and direction for the material to be studied 
that can also offer generalised implications.  
 Sporer and Schwandt (2007) asserted that before being able to be applied 
practically, beliefs about observed behaviours need to first be studied and 
recognised. The notion in the present thesis is that before consideration of what 
subjective perceptions and expectations held by observers is possible, there is a 
pressing need to first explore the norm behaviour of a specific situation, in order 
to understand and compare the two. Television appeals feature individuals who 
are presumably distraught and grieving over the loss of their loved ones, either 
temporarily in a missing person’s case, or indefinitely in a murder case. Due to the 
specific nature of using television press conferences in the present thesis and in 
order to consider the norms of a family member appealing for a missing or 
murdered case, theories models of grief and their relationship with subjective 
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perceptions of a griever must be visited. As perceivers make veracity decisions, 
subjective perceptions that they deem as important (i.e. stereotypes and/or prior 
expectations) may guide these decisions, especially if not much other information 
is given to them (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Fiske and Taylor (1984) proposed that 
these stereotypes result from dependence on pre-formed beliefs stored in memory. 
Individuals employing stereotypes remain close to their pre-established 
information structures when considering incoming data. 
 
4.3 Addressing heuristics and biases  
 Following expectations, observers may form or fall into particular heuristics 
other than stereotypes while mentally encoding information when watching a 
television appeal. At the most basic level of their theory, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) postulated that decisions of guilt or innocence will be particularly 
susceptible to using mental heuristics because the judgment has an uncertain 
outcome. Individuals tend to rely on ‘rules of thumb’ in the face of uncertainty in 
order to make sense of the given situation (Gigerenzer, Todd & The ABC Research 
Team, 1999). While Granhag and Strömwall (2004) were keen to study underlying 
cognitive processes by requesting observers to verify their veracity assessments, 
all the processes and heuristics identified in the literature have never been 
properly pooled together and studied using high stakes stimulus material. Little 
is known of the perceptions and biases of television appealers.  
 As addressed in Chapter 1, a variety of biases stemming from the 
employment of mental shortcuts is possible and the general literature presents 
these biases scattered under a variety of frameworks. Yet none of these have been 
collectively investigated in the context of television appeals. These biases include 
(but are not limited to) appearance biases, emotional display biases and the 
possibility of innocence/guilt biases (Peace & Sinclair, 2012; Paunonen, 2006). 
Additionally, the innocence bias is also as a measurable outcome of a possible 
innocence default that stands to be tested in this context.  
 So far, it has been hypothesised that to distinguish an appealer who is 
innocent from one who is guilty, one must first study the norms of bereavement, 
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loss and distress. Observers’ perceptions and subsequent biases of grieving 
television appealers then give way to implicit and/or explicit veracity decisions.  
 
4.4 Explicit and implicit decision measurements 
 To observe whether people do indeed think differently when given stimulus 
material with controlled (different) induced biases, implicit questions can be asked 
and studied. As explained in Chapter 2, there exists a continuous reliance on only 
explicit judgments in most lie detection studies, with only a handful of studies 
investigating implicit judgments in lie detection research. Implicit judgments 
have been shown to facilitate the understanding of how perceivers think, and offer 
more insight than pure explicit judgments (Granhag, 2006).  
 The present thesis recommends that innocence-guilt research should move 
towards including an implicit evaluation process, not because it is better or worse 
than its explicit counterpart but because the two processes may work in concert. 
While this topic is not exactly new, existing research studies tend to isolate explicit 
and implicit components of lie detection and examine them separately such as in 
Vrij et al. (2001). This study separated explicit and implicit lie detection where one 
group of police officers were asked to assess video clips explicitly (whether the 
suspect is guilty or not guilty) and the other were asked to do so implicitly 
(whether the suspect seemed to ‘think hard’). Other studies that isolated explicit 
from implicit components in lie detection research include research by Landström 
et al. (2005), Hurd and Noller (1988) and Anderson et al. (1999).  
 As an alternative, measuring both decisions by the same group of judges 
can help investigate which implicit cues are prognostic of correct dichotomous 
explicit judgments. To measure implicit decisions in the current thesis, a 
questionnaire will be developed and this will be further expanded in Chapter 6.  
 
4.4.1 A measure of meta-emotion  
The measure of meta-emotion is an example of an implicit assessment of 
veracity. The study of felt emotions in information processing is belatedly 
recognised as important in studies of veracity judgments, and further 
substantiated as so in dual process theories (Slovic, Finucane, Peters & 
55 
 
  
MacGregor, 2007). Vrij et al. (1996) posited that experienced emotions also 
influence accuracy in veracity assessment. An observer will be stimulated to 
experience certain emotions when the possibility is raised that deception is at 
hand. This would be even more so when emotional stimulus material such as 
television appeals are shown. When the observer experiences these emotions, it is 
possible that they will closely search for behavioural cues that would reinforce 
their belief of this ‘deception’, consequently influencing the accuracy of their 
veracity judgment. Whether this measure is applicable and extendable to 
innocence/guilt-type veracity judgments is of interest in the current thesis.  
 
4.5 Relationship between variables 
 In missing or murdered relatives’ cases, the stakes are extremely high for 
appealers. By them choosing to deliver a public press conference, this provides a 
distinctive context to study. This context is often accompanied by unique emotions 
hypothesised to be attributable to grief and/or anxiety. It provides an avenue for 
advancing knowledge in the field as little is yet known about the language of liars 
and truth tellers in high stakes condition.  
 In conjunction with this, a final proposal in the present thesis is in regard 
to variability in occurrence of certain cues in particular contexts, specifically cues 
that may occur but with relatively low frequency. This sometimes results in a 
failure for such cues to be recorded in published studies at all. A method to study 
the relationship between all cues that differentiate behaviours of liars and truth-
tellers in spite of their frequencies has yet to be employed in high stakes detection 
deception literature. This way, cues with very low occurrence may also be studied 
in relation to cues that are higher in occurrence to form a more robust 
representation of all cues that occur within a particular context. Specifically, 
multidimensional scaling procedure allows the exploration of relationships 
between ordered variables, revealing any underlying structure that may surface. 
It has been widely used for examining structures in ordinal level variables derived 
from qualitative material. This procedure is further explained and employed in 
the second part of the present thesis in Chapter 12. 
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4.6 THESIS AIMS 
 Considering the issues and implications argued thus far and as 
acknowledged above, the present thesis will explore the following key issues.  
 
1. As its first aim, this thesis seeks to examine the impact in using ecologically valid 
and high-stakes stimulus material on the accuracy of judges in detecting innocence 
and guilt (in experimentally manipulated conditions). The link between explicit 
innocence-guilt verdict with other implicit judgments is of interest. Key issues and 
objectives within this main aim are: 
• Will judges perform above chance level if the Source’s stakes are high and certain 
cues are made more salient?  
• In examination of the meta-emotion bias, by experimentally manipulating the 
level of emotional display at Source level, will judges’ implicit and explicit 
judgments be influenced by this and be less accurate in detecting innocence-guilt 
in a specific high stakes context?  
• In examining the appearance bias (Source characteristics), will judges be 
influenced in both their explicit and implicit judgments (Account) by whether they 
are able to visually see the appealer or not (controlling for Source presentation)?  
• Will judges be influenced by a story sense bias and will this impact their explicit 
and implicit judgments accordingly? 
• What happens to implicit and explicit decisions when judges are exposed to more 
than one liar? What happens to these decisions when they are exposed to a liar 
and a truth-teller at the same time? 
• Will there be innocence bias when judges are exposed to more than one liar?  
• Will judges reveal different underlying cognitive processing across all studies due 
to saliency of different cues in different conditions? In other words, do different 
conditions evoke judges to detect different implicit cues?  
 
2. A second aim of this thesis is to investigate implicit veracity judgments in the high 
stakes scenario of television appeals and its relationship between with explicit 
judgments. The predictive value of individual implicit judgments towards explicit 
decisions is also of interest. Key issues and objectives within this main aim are: 
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• What implicit judgments help judges make accurate explicit judgments? (i.e., will 
judges show a high degree of meta-emotion towards the appealer, and will this be 
reflected in their explicit decisions?)   
• What implicit judgments help predict explicit judgments when these explicit 
decisions are accurate? (i.e., will the judges feel emotions towards the appeal, and 
will this help them make an accurate explicit veracity decision?) 
 
3. The final aim of this thesis is move away from the subjective perceptions of 
television appeals and in its place, to examine the actual cues that this high-stakes 
scenario may expose. Instead of focusing on the invalid cues observers may rely 
on, the aim is to uncover verbal cues television appealers actually express. There 
are key issues to explore and objectives within this main aim. This includes 
utilising a methodological approach that will allow not only using frequency counts 
in investigating the cues to deception but also in examining cues in relation with 
each other. The question to pursue an answer for within this aim is ‘Will using 
forms of multidimensional scaling reveal an underlying structure using the 
sample of television appealers, with the ability to distinguish genuine from false 
appeals with a high degree of accuracy?’  
 
4.7 Organisation of studies 
In light of the key issues acknowledged above, the following studies are 
conducted in two parts. All studies utilise a questionnaire further developed in 
Chapter 6 that contains both explicit and implicit veracity assessments.  
 Each study explores a different bias (all elaborated in Chapter 2) by 
experimentally manipulating the stimulus material. These experimentally 
manipulated materials exaggerate the differences between each study conditions 
to their extremities with the aim of revealing judges’ possible reliance on different 
implicit judgments (and heuristics that leads to response biases). In other words, 
by carefully manipulating the Source scenarios, these studies aim to observe which 
biases are more likely to emerge and if any differences in cognitive processes 
between experimental conditions do in fact exist. 
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Part 2 will explore subjective judgments and/or biases of judges of the 
truthfulness via implicit veracity assessments of these appeals, based on theories 
specifically expounded in each study. This part will investigate the stereotypes 
and heuristics that pertain to making veracity decisions.  Television press 
conferences are typically very brief, generally approximately 30 seconds to a 
minute in length. The next chapter introduces the stimulus material in full. 
Because video clips of press conferences are generally very short, moreover 
manipulated variables are present in each study, it is expected that judges will 
resort to heuristics (due to limited information about the appealers) such as 
meta-emotion and attractiveness especially when the wrong cues are accented. 
However, when these wrong cues are removed (i.e. removing visual cues in 
audio-only group or a pair bias in Solo condition) accuracy is hypothesised to be 
higher. 
Not only is the current thesis interested in subjective participant judgments 
but to also investigate diagnostic cues of liars and truth tellers, and how these 
cues form in relation with each other. Whether these differences are in fact 
distinguishable as well as statistically detectable is also of interest. In Part 2, the 
norms of grieving and theories of grief in general will also be explored. 
Investigating from the angle of grief theories underlying the current context has 
not yet been studied in lie detection research. Part 3 departs from perceived 
judgments, stereotypes and invalid cues judges more than often use, examining 
what verbal cues these liars and truth tellers reveal using high stakes scenarios. 
  
part 2: SubjeCtIve Cue perCeptIOn 
4.8 Outline of Studies 1 to 4 
4.8.1 Study 1: The perception of emotions in appeals 
 While people often use emotions as a cue to decide of whether someone is 
telling the truth or not, this is not a diagnostic cue (Vrij, 2000). Schwarz (2012) 
proposed the feelings-as-information theory, which maintains that we pay 
attention to how we feel and use it to inform ourselves of the circumstances at 
hand and as a source to make judgments.   
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Some studies have examined the role of emotion as a heuristic. Ask and 
Landström (2010) found that an emotional victim can affect credibility judgments 
as a heuristic with a group of police participants, and the magnitude of this effect 
was heightened with induced cognitive load. Landström, Ask, Sommar and Willén 
(2013) found that emotionality of a child shown when reading an account boosts 
participants’ judgments of credibility of that child, finding support for what the 
authors call the ‘emotional victim effect’. Reinhard and Schwarz (2012) found 
interplay between affective states on the process of detecting deception. The 
emotion participants feel at the time of the experiment influenced how they judge 
the truthfulness of incoming source content.  
The process behind this bias, where the emotional content is used as a cue 
to judge the veracity of the story, is relatively absent in innocence-guilt detection 
literature. By selecting highly emotional appeals and comparing them to appeals 
with low emotional content, it may be possible to highlight a meta-emotion bias in 
people having to make an innocence-guilt judgment. 
 
4.8.2 Study 2: The perception of Source presentation in appeals 
 While the appearance of television appealers cannot be manipulated, the 
manner of source presentation can be studied and judges’ responses pertaining to 
appearances can be recorded. Study 2 explores the possible bias in judgments due 
the availability of a visual element or the lack of it in judging the innocence or 
guilt of an appealer. It may be possible to highlight a visual bias in this study, if 
judges display different levels of accuracy in their veracity assessments with and 
without the aid of visual stimuli. It has been acknowledged that visual cues are 
particularly unreliable in lie detection (DePaulo et al., 2003). It has also been 
found that lie detection accuracy is higher in audio-only mode compared to ones 
with a visual element (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). It is of interest if innocence-guilt 
detection accuracy will decline, remain at chance level, or increase in an audio-
only condition.  
 
4.8.3 Study 3: The perception of story sense in appeals 
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 Very few lie detection studies have employed manipulation of verbal content 
in a statement. Reinhard and Sporer (2010), one of the few known studies to have 
exercised manipulation of verbal content, manipulated the consistency and 
plausibility of the transcripts in their study. While story sense is frequently used 
by observers as a cue to aid them in deciding a speaker’s veracity, there is a lack 
of research in this area in innocence-guilt detection; evidently there exists a 
possibility in examining this issue further in a high stakes context. The implicit 
judgment of whether a story makes sense versus when lacking sense, also lacks 
research in this area. This main aim of Study 3 is to investigate if story sequencing 
(thus altering level of story sense) has an impact on observer judgments of 
appealer veracity in the context of television appeals. It is conceivable that when 
unable to integrate or comprehend an appeal effortlessly, judges may turn to 
different implicit veracity judgments and potentially utilise mental short cuts. By 
controlling for the variable of story sense level and by making the availability of 
this cue higher in one condition than the other, it is expected that implicit and 
explicit judgments differ for both groups. It may also be likely that biases that 
form as a result of mental shortcuts be evident. 
 
4.8.4 Study 4: The perception of paired versus solo appealers  
Vrij et al. (2010) proposed that it is crucial to study liars and truth tellers 
in pairs as it reflects reality in the criminal world, where criminals usually work 
in groups or networks and not by themselves. As of yet, innocence-guilt judgments 
of pairs versus solo liars is still unknown. There are no studies to date which 
investigate whether two collaborating false television appealers are more 
successful at deception, as compared to when they appear solo even. Accuracy of 
veracity judgments has not been explored in these manipulated settings, and 
neither have implicit judgments been studied in this context. The main aim of 
Study 4 will be to discover how accurate judges are in their innocence-guilt 
judgments of appealers who are pleading for the return of their relatives, when 
these appealers are presented separately and as a pair; essentially whether paired 
liars are more successful in deception than when appearing solo. 
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part 3: ObjeCtIve verbal Cue analYSIS 
4.9 Study 5: Objective Verbal Indicators of Truthful and Deceptive 
Television Appeals  
As expounded in Chapter 3, verbal content analysis shows much potential 
in discerning lies from truthful statements, whereas behavioural methods may 
offer less ‘tell-tale’ signs (Vrij et al., 2006). In the current context, truthful 
television appeals are made by individuals who are in distress and grieving either 
the momentary loss of a missing relative or the permanent passing of one 
murdered. This accordingly provides a framework for studying prospective 
indicators of a deceptive appeal. While of course grief is displayed through 
physiology and behavioural actions, verbal aspects were chosen to be focused on 
in the current thesis as speech content has been validated to indicate the foremost 
importance and mental states of the appealer; such as finding the victim urgently 
or fervently attempting to cover up a crime (Pennebaker, Mehl & Niederhoffer, 
2003).  
Grief produces psychological, emotional and social change within an 
individual (Vance, Najman, Thearle, Embelton, Foster & Boyle, 1994) which 
manifests in their language (Pennebaker et al., 2003). These changes include 
altered relationships with society and changes in roles within the family of the 
victim. Study 5 tests the hypothesis that verbal indicators differentiate high-
stakes true from false statements. Verbal markers of emotion and grief will be 
drawn from the literature as the basis for a content analysis of the television 
statements, generating eight aspects of variables. In addition, this study employs 
a methodological approach that allows for the examination of verbal cues in 
relation with each other, so that even cues with very low frequency count included 
in analyses and assume a role in perspective with other cues that emerged. 
 
4.10 Ethical approval 
All studies presented in the current thesis received approval from the 
University of Huddersfield Ethics Board Panel. All participants who were 
recruited to take part in the experimental studies were over 18 years of age and 
gave informed consent to take part. Participants in the experimental studies 
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viewed television appeal and interview videos showing individuals pleading for 
help in the case of a missing or murdered relative aired on television news 
programmes. These appeal videos were acquired and purchased from news and 
media sources via the internet. An information sheet was given to participants 
before they took part in the studies, which clarified the objectives of the 
experiment, the nature of videos participants will be shown, that they can 
withdraw at any time should they feel the need to, that their participation is 
entirely voluntary, that their data will be treated with confidentiality and 
anonymity, meaning they cannot be identified (see Appendix B). Once their 
participation in the experimental studies were completed, then were handed out 
a debrief (see Appendix C).  
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As presented in the opening chapters, several researchers have put forward 
that one of the concerns in lie detection research is the lack of a highly ecologically 
valid and naturally occurring data source (Vrij, 2004; Porter & ten Brinke, 2008; 
DePaulo & Morris, 2004). It has been alleged that basing research data with low 
ecological validity runs the risk of not being able to detect the more idiosyncratic 
deception cues. The issues that were believed to arise with using laboratory-based 
studies in lie detection research include generalisability and relevance of results 
from the demographic typically used in such studies (i.e. university college 
students) to a wider population. The view was that by using highly ecologically 
valid and high-stakes stimulus material, results presented will yield a higher 
practical application to real-world investigations. Because high stakes deception 
has been theorised to lead to better detection rates due to a higher level of cue 
saliency (Miller & Stiff, 1993), it is possible that important cues remain 
undetectable in low ecologically valid datasets. As such, the cues exhibited by 
deceptive individuals were expected to be more palpable in a high-stake situation 
than in a low-stake one. Accordingly, it was regarded that participants’ accuracy 
rates may suffer when being exposed to laboratory-based stimulus as they would 
be unable to detect certain cues that are less salient. Conversely, Hartwig and 
Bond’s (2014) meta-analyses would seem to challenge this argument (Cohen et al., 
2010; Porter et al., 2008; Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara & Bull, 2004; Vrij, Edward, 
Roberts & Bull, 2000; Ekman, O’Sullivan & Frank, 1999; Miller & Stiff, 1993) that 
low detection rates are partially due to the usage of low-stakes scenarios lacking 
in ecological validity. Nevertheless, how people perform and how they make 
innocence-guilt judgments still warrant an examination in a high-stakes context. 
The present thesis uses real televised press conferences of relatives appealing for 
the return of a loved one who is either missing or murdered.  
DePaulo et al. (2003) stated that certain cues may only be relevant, useful 
and/or occur in a specific context which may not be generalisable to other 
situations, which is an important consideration in the present thesis. Whelan et 
al. (2014) highlighted the context-specific disposition of certain deceptive 
behaviour, stressing the importance of analysing ecologically valid lies and truths 
in the particular framework in which they occur. The authors maintained that 
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seemingly inconsistent discoveries in high stakes lie detection literature may be 
partly due to the nonexistence of a context-based effort. Other researchers 
propagated that the saliency of a cue and the production of it depend on the factors 
that come with a given situation (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010), and that therefore 
cues that are salient in one situation may not be so in another. Not having a 
contextually-focused high stakes research scenario may also pose the risk of 
excluding certain cues from appearing. In some contexts, not only the presence but 
the direction of a certain cue will may also differ from another, thus it is important 
to take context into consideration.  
 
5.1 Why are television appeals chosen over other stimulus material?  
 One such example of high-stakes stimulus material are televised press 
conferences. Television appeals ‘naturally occur’, where people are under pressure 
to give an apparently honest account of the situation as they understand it. The 
essence of television appeals is that the person making the appeal has a close 
relative who has either disappeared or been found murdered. In a press conference 
the appealer asks for help in finding the missing person or that victim’s killer.  
Throughout the English-speaking world law enforcement agencies use these 
appeals to encourage members of the public to come forward with relevant 
information and in the hope that the perpetrator will give themselves up. In 
several cases, the individual appealing is later found to be the culprit. Recordings 
of these appeals therefore provide a unique possibility for a naturally occurring 
experiment in which genuine and false appeals are available in the same format. 
Televised appeals are considered high-stakes because deceptive appealers have a 
very strong motivation to successfully dupe viewers and investigators of the case 
seeing as the consequence of not being able to do so may result in long-term 
imprisonment or death. Having a strong motivation to succeed in lying is theorised 
to generate a higher salience in deception cues (DePaulo et al., 2003).  
 Televised appeals are chosen over other forms of high stakes data in the 
current thesis for several reasons. In the experiments that follow in the present 
thesis, lay participants (non-law enforcement officers) will be asked to assess these 
appealers after observing these televised clips, having had no interaction with the 
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appealer. This is similar to how judgments are made in the actual investigation of 
the missing or murdered relatives’ cases, where both law enforcement authorities 
and television viewers will be establishing their explicit and implicit judgments 
while witnessing these appealers. Researchers Vrij and Mann (2001) used police 
participants in their study to observe these televised appeals, allowing the 
examination of explicit accuracy in law enforcement agents’ detection of deception 
in a high stakes scenario. Instead of being constrained to focusing only on police 
performance, using these appeals will also permit expanding the investigation of 
how non-law enforcement agents perform in detecting deception in this context.  
 In addition, these videos are easier to obtain without the need for police 
clearance and obtaining approval for other forms of restrictions, in comparison to 
material in the forensic context such as, for example, police interviews and 
emergency calls (Harpster, Adams, & Jarvis, 2009; Mann & Vrij, 2006; Mann et 
al., 2004, 2006; Vrij & Mann, 2001a; Vrij et al., 2006). Due to the public nature of 
televised appeals, where the appeal is broadcast on national television to gain the 
attention of the local community for help with the case, these appeal videos are in 
the public record and freely obtainable. Ten Brinke and Porter (2012), Whelan et 
al. (2014) and ten Brinke, Porter and Baker (2012) have all utilised television 
appeals as their target material. 
 Furthermore, to date, there has been no formal recommendations as to how 
these appeals are conducted, how they should be televised, what questions should 
be asked, and how ought these veracity judgments to be formulated. Compared to 
police interviewing which receives considerable attention (i.e. in outlining 
interview style suggestions in maximising the prospect of detecting deception in 
that context) (Baldwin, 1993; Dando & Bull, 2011), television appeals have yet to 
receive a proposal in policy or script to guide police officers involved in these 
missing or murdered relatives’ cases. The significance of having such a benchmark 
is reinforced by the fact that these appeals are conducted and broadcasted 
nationwide for public view. Even 911 calls and television shows such as COPS and 
Jeremy Kyle (Reynolds & Rendler, 2010), all of which were used in other high 
stakes lie detection research, follow a reasonably scripted guideline. If conducted 
right, the very way the appeals are managed can aid in the investigation of these 
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cases. Investigating this unique set of high stakes material is taking a step 
forward in gaining understanding in how these appeals transpire. Formal 
recommendations can subsequently be put forward. 
 Television appeals are a distinctive category of high stakes scenario, given 
that the individuals themselves typically contact the police to go forward with a 
public broadcast (Canter & Youngs, 2009). To reiterate, this lends itself a unique 
context and background to analyse. While there are cues which distinguish true 
from false accounts that appear more consistently across a high number of diverse 
deception situations and while it remains vital to determine these (Harpster et al., 
2009; ten Brinke & Porter, 2012, Reynolds & Rendler-Short, 2010; Toma & 
Hancock, 2010; Van Swol & Braun, 2014; Pennebaker et al., 2003), a number of 
researchers stressed the importance of taking account of the situation in which 
the lies and truths are told in order to identify indicators of deception (Whelan et 
al., 2014; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006; Porter & ten Brinke, 2010; DePaulo & Morris, 
2004). The significance of taking context into account is due to the anticipation 
that a variety of dynamics specific to this environment may affect what cues 
become prominent, what cues are generated, and in which direction they are 
expressed, which may be different from other high stakes contexts. Seemingly 
inconsistent discoveries in high stakes lie detection literature have also been 
attributed to the nonexistence of a context-based effort (Mann et al., 2002). Other 
researchers have also suggested that how salient a cue is, and the production of it, 
depends on the factors that come with a given situation (Porter & ten Brinke, 
2010), therefore cues that are salient in one situation may not be so in another. 
Not having a contextually focused high stakes research scenario may also pose the 
risk of excluding certain cues from appearing. 
 Evidently, there may be cues that may appear in the context of this real-life 
situation, exclusive only to this genre. Although these cues may only appear in 
this one context, the value of detecting such cues are advantageous given the 
severity of the case where a missing or murdered relative is involved and the 
possibility that either an innocent appealer may face a wrongful conviction or a 
guilty appealer walks free. Particularly, the cue of emotions has the potential to 
be remarkably prominent in this genre in view of the situation at hand, where a 
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loved one may be kidnapped or possibly dead. As such, the present stimulus 
material offers an interesting context to study the perceptions of norm in grieving 
and the cognitive biases that may transpire, as well as the prospect of studying 
diagnostic affective cues that distinguish truthful from false appeals. 
 
5.2 Existing research using television appeals 
Vrij and Mann (2001) were first to show their participants these television 
appeals for missing or murdered relatives. This exploratory research remains an 
invaluable step in uncovering observer judgments in high stakes conditions. These 
television appeals take place in a natural setting and are not performed in a mock 
setting, breaking certain limitations associated with lie detection accuracy and 
ability. Researchers who have followed suit in examining this particular real world 
data include ten Brinke and Porter (2012), Whelan et al. (2014) and ten Brinke et 
al. (2012) who all utilised television appeals as their analysis material. While there 
are palpable strengths in the Vrij and Mann (2001) study, there are limitations 
and critiques to be acknowledged in the authors’ methodology. Firstly, the 
researchers’ participants were police officers from Netherlands as well as from the 
United Kingdom. Participants were consigned to and tested in groups of up to five 
members at a time. Group dynamics and deliberation in the study generates 
concerns with extraneous variables which may have affected the study results as 
well as the group’s accuracy rates (Patry, 2008; Zajonc, 1965), which the authors 
acknowledged as well. Secondly, a sample pool of only policemen and women in 
Vrij and Mann’s (2001) study poses as a limit, making the study un-generalisable 
to the lay population. Television press conferences are revealed to the public 
sector, and in some cases even rely on the public’s tips and aid. Thus, it is also 
imperative to begin grasping a layperson’s judgments and their ability to make 
them in a high-stake lie detection context. Lastly, the appeals used in this study 
were all made in Britain, but the participants’ first language was Dutch. An issue 
that may arise here is born from research on language, culture and their relation 
to emotion. It is possible that the participants in the study may not have fully 
comprehended the emotions of the appealer thus hindering their full ability in 
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accurate judgments, despite arguments that emotions are basic (Ekman, 1977; 
Mesquita and Walker, 2002; Sarter, 2012).  
An extensive study published on television press conferences was conducted 
by ten Brinke and Porter (2011). False appeals are public, often televised appeals 
by individuals posing as victims, pleading for the safe return of the real victim who 
may be missing or murdered, when they are in fact the offender (Canter & Youngs, 
2009). Ten Brinke and Porter (2011) examined three modes of communication, 
namely speech, body language and emotional facial expressions or affect. Using 78 
false appeal videos gathered from all over the world of individuals pleading to the 
public for the safe return of a family member, they found that liars used more 
tentative words than truth tellers, and also spoke less. The use of tentative words 
seem to be the acquiescence that their family member will not be found alive, 
circumventing commitment to the lie, and to decrease psychological discord they 
would suffer from the inconsistencies between their what they know and what 
they choose to display. The researchers suggested cognitive loading and 
psychological distancing to be the likely cause but this hypothesis was not 
supported. Approximately half of the pleaders in the false appeal videos were false 
appealers, the other half being truthful and not culpable of the any crime in 
relation to the disappearance or murder of their relative. They found no evidence 
for body language cues that is different for genuine and false pleaders, possibly 
due to successful camouflaging. Genuine pleaders are more hopeful and 
committed to the safe return of their family member in the words that they use. 
Ten Brinke and Porter (2011) also found that false appealers tended 
to display feelings of disgust rather than sadness during their pleas. During the 
course of the plea, genuine appeals expressed sincere, full-face sadness and 
distress. The authors proposed that this reveals their candid emotions as well as 
to garner the empathy and the support required to lead their loved ones 
back home. In analysing the videos, the authors found that false pleaders were 
more likely to display a raised upper lip to express the emotion of disgust. It has 
been theorised that disgust is an innate, deep-seated reaction to the murderous 
act false pleaders have committed, even guilt and shame over their actions, or 
antipathy towards the victim (Chapman, Kim, Susskind & Anderson, 2009). Ten 
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Brinke and Porter (2011) also found that false pleaders blinked approximately 
twice as quickly more than genuine pleaders, which supports their previous 
findings in ten Brinke and Porter (2008) that arousal that stems from the finding 
that camouflaging emotions was correlated with higher blink rates. This 
challenged the more widely accepted idea that cognitive load is the only source of 
changes in blink rate during a lie (Leal & Vrij, 2010). Whelan et al. (2014) also 
explored television press conferences in their study and found behaviours that 
discriminated between truthful and false appeals. They found that false appealers 
used more equivocal and ambiguous language, tended to avert their gaze more, 
and engaged in higher incidences of head shaking as well as speech errors. They 
also identified truthful appealers made more emotion-related references, 
expressed more hope in finding the missing loved one alive, showed higher levels 
of positive emotions towards the victim and vocalised a higher amount of concern 
or pain. They also avoided brutal language in their appeals.  
While undoubtedly invaluable, these research efforts had neither 
considered subjective perception of observers in depth viewing these clips while 
investigating possible implicit biases that may occur during judgment and decision 
making processes, nor had they considered a multivariate approach in analysing 
diagnostic verbal cues – two key aims of the present thesis expounded in Chapter 
4. 
 
5.3 Ground truth 
 Rather than assuming ground truth, the present thesis applies a clear 
delineation of cases that qualify this definition to control for internal validity. 
Only cases substantiated with certainty beyond reasonable doubt will be used so 
as to also set a base line, thus subsequent results can be applied with a higher 
degree of confidence in cases where it is not then known in future. Appeal cases 
with sufficient ground truth has been verified with complete certainty 
corroborated by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to disconfirm the authenticity 
of their statement and to ascertain that the individual was implicated in the 
murder or disappearance of the victim. Usually in these cases a trial has been 
carried out and the verdict has also been assigned to the individual in question, 
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either whether they were not culpable for the death or disappearance of their 
relative or that they were in fact deceptive – unequivocal evidence both 
discredited their veracity of their appeal and ascertained their culpability for the 
murder or disappearance of the relative they were appealing for which 
subsequently led to their conviction and imprisonment.  The initial criteria were 
set in Vrij and Mann’s (2001) study, which was described in the section above, 
and were later modified by Porter and ten Brinke (2012). Ground truth was 
already established by ten Brinke and Porter (2011) as they utilised the video 
clips also used in the present thesis. An additional step in examining ground 
truth was also carried out in the present thesis for these clips via a search on the 
Internet from news sites and webpages pertaining to each missing or murdered 
relatives’ cases.  
 The types of evidence include discovery of DNA such as body fluids, 
possession of weapon such as a gun or other items from the crime scene, 
CCTV/video/speed/security recording, un-recanted confessions, discovery and/or 
knowledge victim’s body/body parts’ location, search history on computer in 
regards to the location of crime or body, post mortem evidence, unsatisfactory or 
inconsistent alibis, public tips, phone records, forensic evidence such as soil, expert 
evidence in court, fibre, blood spatter pattern and arson tracks. For instance in 
the case of one appealer pleading for the safe return of his wife and daughter, 
evidence of forged emails and him purchasing tarpaulins and an electric chainsaw, 
including an un-recanted confession and the discovery of the victims’ bodies 
instigated his arrest and conviction for both their murders. A more comprehensive 
table outlining evidence criteria met for all appeals can be found in Appendix H. 
 The present thesis will utilise video recordings of individuals appealing 
during television press conferences for the return of their relative, to search for 
what happened, and to find the killer or abductor of their relative. All clips will be 
obtained from a list of television appeals provided by ten Brinke (personal 
communication, 15th January 2014) to the current researcher who acquired 
permission to use some of these videos by independently purchasing these from 
news sites. The clips will consist of both female and male pleaders. They will be 
drawn from the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, New Zealand and 
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Australia. Appeals that do not contain adequate information, possesses 
questionable evidence that do not meet the criteria outlined in Appendix H or ones 
with no verdict yet from trial were not included in the sample.  
 
5.4 Length of stimulus material 
 The length of video clips that are used in the present thesis is to be 
considered as well. Ambady and Weisbuch (2010) coined the term ‘thin-slice 
vision’, which proffers that people often only need not more than ten seconds of 
visual exposure to make non-random judgments about a person’s character, 
internal states, sexual orientation, popularity, vulnerability and other traits. This 
brief exposure and interaction is enough for a complete stranger to paint 
inferences from someone’s nonverbal behaviour, but these researchers suggest 
that it comes with its own limits to what one can infer from thin-slice visions, but 
in reality, individuals make split judgments. Slepian, Bogart and Ambady (2014) 
maintained that thin-slicing actually centres judges’ focus to a specific group of 
cues, namely non-verbal ones. This focus will either increase veracity decisions’ 
accuracy or decrease it, providing helpful non-verbal cues exists within the 
stimulus material. Otherwise, accuracy in veracity judgments is likely to decrease 
(Street & Masip, 2015). The authors further suggested that thin-slicing holds the 
possibility of aiding or deterring the detection of deception, not due to the fact that 
they tap into the automatic and intuitive cognitive processes instead of the 
systematic and deliberate one, but merely because they deflect focus from either 
diagnostic or invalid cues.  
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To reiterate, not only is the present thesis interested in measuring explicit 
veracity assessments of ‘is the appealer guilty or innocent’, it is also interested in 
measuring implicit judgments in effort to gather more information about what 
cues they may be using in making their veracity decisions. The questionnaire aims 
to incorporate items that capture what valid and invalid responses judges may 
utilise. In the current chapter, implicit judgments that guide the derivation of the 
questionnaire used in the four experimental studies will be discussed. These range 
from implicit judgments of perceived emotions and meta-emotions, verbal 
elements i.e. ‘liars’ stories do not make much sense’, and judgments of the sender’s 
appearance.  
The aim is to study which questions contribute to judges’ explicit judgments 
as well as their accurate explicit innocence-guilt judgments. Guided by literature 
reviewed in the opening chapters, the questionnaire ultimately endeavours to 
uncover cognitive aspects of how judges may come to perceive both the appeal and 
the appealer.  
 
6.1 Defining the ‘implicit’ nature of question items 
 To avoid any confusion of the term ‘implicit’ used in the current 
questionnaire and throughout the present thesis, a definition of what this term 
means is specified here. First, a definition of intuition is discussed. While intuitive 
judgments are usually defined as instantaneous and requiring minimal mental 
effort (Hogarth, 2001; Myers, 2002), implicit judgments in the current 
questionnaire may involve either automatic processing or systematic ones that are 
more cognitively deliberate.  
 Granhag (2006) further theorised that measures in assessing whether a 
sender appears sympathetic involves more ‘intuition’, for example. Intuition may 
certainly contribute in the process of making implicit judgments for some question 
items more than others; however, Granhag (2006) proposed that there may not be 
a strong relationship between the two concepts. Furthermore, the available 
empirical evidence for unconscious lie detection is lacking thus far. Street and 
Richardson (2015) maintained that where an advantage can be dependably 
observed in terms of lie detection accuracy, this outcome can be inferred to the 
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conscious and deliberate part (in the absence of an explanation pertaining to the 
unconscious one). Besides, by asking judges a response to a question that may 
have initially been embedded in their ‘unconscious’, this may well surface it to the 
conscious level in any case. The present thesis adopts the definition of implicit 
cues of being responses by judges to “every other question but the statement’s 
ground truth” (Granhag, 2006, p. 188).  
 
6.2 Questionnaire measures and items 
 The questionnaire will comprise of 16 complementary questions divided into 
different components: meta-emotion, appearance, emotion and cognition of source 
content. The questions are all rated on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Bearing in mind that regression analyses will be 
conducted for implicit judgments, the number of questions included in the 
questionnaire had to be concise while still retaining the foremost implicit cues of 
importance. Participants will be given a questionnaire pack, which contains a 
briefing, consent form, the main questionnaire, a demographic questionnaire, 
answer sheet and debrief. These can be found in Appendix B to G accordingly. For 
the Audio-only condition, a specific question sheet can be found in Appendix E. To 
examine guilt and innocence biases, an additional dichotomous ‘Do you think the 
appealer is guilty or innocent (of being culpable in the murder of the victim)?’ 
question choice is included to assess binary veracity decisions.  
These cues are chosen because literature has depicted that they have been 
used by participants in deciding a speaker’s veracity, however these questions are 
not overtly asking participants whether they think the appealer is guilty or not 
except perhaps for the item pertaining to appealer credibility (which is closer to 
an explicit question than an implicit one). The concepts of cognition of source 
content, perceived appearance of source, emotional perception of source and meta-
emotion for and/or with source will be operationalised and be studied in Studies 1 
to 4 (Chapters 7 to 10). The following paragraphs discuss the literature pertaining 
to each question item that will be included. 
 
6.2.1 Credibility 
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Yuille (1989) wrote that credibility assessment refers to any attempt to 
ascertain truthfulness. When one makes a credibility judgment, one aims to 
determine the truth of a statement or story. In the present case credibility 
judgments can also be made in a police investigation, for example, of a television 
appealer pleading for the return of his missing wife. The judgment would consist 
of a judgment of whether he or she is credible in general, of not being culpable of 
the death or disappearance of his wife, and that he or she is not held responsible 
of the crime. While the story an appealer gives may make sense and may be 
plausible, they may still be judged as lacking credibility. Schwarz (2015) stated 
that in judging whether an account is truthful or otherwise, people typically pay 
attention to certain decisive factors. One of these factors include how credible the 
sender or source is. Other variables in the questionnaire are further segmented 
and expounded below in their appropriate sections. 
 
6.2.2 Cognition of Source content  
6.2.2.1 Story sense 
 Granhag (2006) proposed that certain measures of implicit veracity 
assessment pertain to the sender’s verbal behaviour. An example of a 
comparatively ‘verbal’ implicit assessment is that the account of truth-tellers will 
tend to make more sense. To measure the cognition of Source content, a series of 
questions were designed. Validation for including this component comes from 
epistemological research suggesting three vital clauses of truth: consensus or 
consistency, correspondence and coherence (Baudet, Jhean-Larose & Legros, 
1994). For speech to be deemed truthful, according to these researchers there 
should be no contradiction within the story content. The subject matter within this 
content needs to also be clearly interconnected. McAdams (2006) wrote that stories 
that illustrate characters without a clear motive, vague plot, no clear cause or 
consequence, or closure can be judged as incoherent as well. Not only does 
coherence pertain to the structure and organisation of a story, it also refers to the 
content of the story. Furthermore, the author proposed that an account that 
opposes or challenges an observer’s expectations and experiences can appear 
incoherent to them as much as an account that does not follow ‘internal’ structural 
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norms. Lam (2001) described that in an attempt for someone to assign a 
probability of guilt or innocence towards another, people first try to rule out stories 
or events that are incoherent and do not make sense. Hence, the question item 
‘Does the appealer’s story make sense?’ is included in the current questionnaire. 
 
6.2.2.2 Story plausibility 
Lam (2001) wrote that post establishing the stories that make sense or are 
coherent, jurors then would assign a degree of plausibility to the stories. This very 
much follows a Cartesian argument (Street & Kingstone, 2016) where 
understanding comes prior to believing or disbelieving, whereas the Spinozan 
rationale (Gilbert, Krull & Malone, 1990) would argue that individuals initially 
assume truthfulness and only later revise it necessary. In relating the variable of 
‘story plausibility’ with ‘story sense’, Schwarz (2015) posited that one of the factors 
that leads people tend believe a story more is when it is internally organised and 
lacking in inconsistencies.  
Statement Validity Analysis postulates that an assessment of the validity 
of a statement is not an assessment of the general credibility of a speaker (Vrij & 
Mann, 2004). Credibility of the speaker and validity of the statement are therefore 
two distinct criteria of truthfulness. While an observer can perceive that the 
statement is valid, he or she may still doubt how truthful the speaker is. Nahari 
et al. (2010) defined plausibility as sufficient but not necessary for credibility 
judgments, thereby firmly extricating both terms and designating them to be 
regarded separately. Something may be evaluated to be false even though it is 
plausible in theory. Chungh (2010) described plausibility as the likelihood that the 
events could have transpired in the way in which the appealer presents it. Connell 
and Keane (2006) defined a scenario that is highly plausible as one that matches 
existing understanding well, and has diverse resources to corroborate.  
In any case, plausibility remains to be a good linguistic cue for veracity and 
considerably affects credibility judgments. Thus, the question ‘Is the appealer’s 
story plausible?’ will be included in the current questionnaire. 
 
6.2.2.3 Well-thought-out 
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The Oxford Dictionary defines ‘well-thought-out’ as ‘carefully considered 
and planned’ (Well thought out, 2017). Vrij et al. (2010) proposed that liars tend 
to prepare a story when they can, if they are expecting to be interviewed. Well-
prepared liars are harder to detect than those who are not (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). 
This variable expects to measure how carefully people think the appealer has 
considered and planned their speech before giving the appeal on television with 
the question item ‘The appealer appears to have thought out well his or her appeal 
before appearing on television’. 
 
6.2.2.4 Organised 
 The item ‘The appealer gives an organised speech’ intends to measure 
whether judges think the internal order of the appeals are arranged in a 
systematic manner. While this variable is closely related to the variables of 
appeal sense and planning, it pertains more specifically to the structure and 
order of the actual appeal itself. According to the Oxford dictionary, ‘organised’ is 
defined as ‘arranged or structured in a systematic way’ (Organised, 2017). 
Structure of stories, which is comprised of episodes, affects a jury member’s 
understanding and how they make innocence-guilt decisions. The structure of 
these episodes corresponds to the structure of people’s existing knowledge about 
how the structure should be and of similar events related to the story 
(Pennington & Hastie, 1992). The temporal and causal order of a story can affect 
a judge’s perception of the story (Lam, 2001). Pennington and Hastie (1986, 
1988) found in one of their experiments that the ease at which stories could be 
constructed in terms of its order influenced a juror’s decision-making and what 
verdict outcome they make.  
 
6.2.2.5 Wording 
In relating ‘story organisation’ and ‘story sense’ with the variable 
‘wording’, a story that is internally consistent will be processed with much more 
ease (Johnson-Laird, 2012). The variable ‘The appealer words his or her 
sentences in a manner that is pleasant to hear’ will also be included in the 
questionnaire to measure if judges find the appeal’s sentence structure pleasing 
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to listen to, and if perhaps this could contribute to the rating of appealer’s 
innocence. To also note, Fernald (1993) found that infants as young as five-
months old were able to show negative affect to a language they were less 
familiar with compared to one language vocalised in English, to which they 
showed higher positive affect. While of course the purpose of this variable to be 
included is not to measure languages but rather in wording agreeableness, the 
same principle of ‘favouring the familiar’ applies here. The hypothesis, similar to 
that for ‘story sense’ and ‘coherence’, is that the more pleasant-sounding a 
sentence is, the higher the chance of a judge appointing innocence towards a 
speaker. 
 
6.2.2.6 Practice 
 While the content of an appeal could make sense, and its structure be 
organised and carefully planned, the perceived aptitude or proficiency in one 
giving the actual appeal is a related variable to consider. The Oxford Dictionary 
defines ‘practice’ as the ‘repeated exercise in or performance of an activity or skill 
so as to acquire or maintain proficiency in it’ (Practice, 2017). In terms of how well 
individuals judge liars and truth-tellers, Bond and DePaulo (2008) stated that 
practised liars are harder to detect than those who have not had much practice. 
The item ‘The appealer seems to have had practice in making television press 
conferences before’ intends to measure how much time or effort judges think 
appealers spent working on mastering and refining their appeal or appeal-
presenting skills before making appearing on television.  Inclusively, all five 
variables expect to evaluate implicit components of how judges cognitively process 
and view the story content. 
 
6.2.3 Emotional perception of Source  
 As extensively reviewed in Chapter 2, a number of research from multiple 
areas have shown that not only perception of emotional expression is associated 
with decision making processes, emotional content can bias these processes 
(Forgas, 1995; Doss, 2002; Slovic et al., 2007; Shafir et al., 1993). Schwarz (2015) 
proposed that besides source credibility (as introduced in Section 6.2.1), another 
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decisive factor in assessing the truthfulness of an account is the congruence of the 
story with the judge’s pre-existing beliefs and knowledge. The two variables that 
will be included in this questionnaire for this component is expected to reveal 
judges’ beliefs about Sources, balanced with the believability of speech while 
corresponding this with the expressivity of emotions (‘The appealer’s emotions do 
not seem to match his or her story’ and ‘The appealer displays less emotions than 
seems appropriate for their situation’). 
 
6.2.4 Attractiveness/appearance perception of Source  
 The interrelation between appearance and other factors, concerning how we 
think and process information about a person and how these may interplay with 
feelings and thoughts are discussed at length in Section 2.3.2. Two questions 
pertaining to attractiveness and appearance will be included in the questionnaire. 
They are ‘The appealer has a pleasant voice’ and ‘The appealer has an attractive 
face’. Literature has shown that a judge is instinctively capable (Fink & Penton-
Voak, 2002) of using various aspects of a Source’s appearance, including their 
attractiveness and the sound of their voice (Baron et al., 2008; Paunonen, 2006) to 
make veracity assessments of that person.  
  
6.2.5 Meta-emotion 
As introduced in Section 2.3, the present thesis draws attention to 
considering the context in making veracity judgments. Researchers must first 
consider this, as well as the social and cultural norms of the situation to assess 
why certain behaviours may be judged less favourably. This highlights the 
importance of how well an incoming stimulus integrates with pre-established 
norms and beliefs (Schwarz, 2015). As put forward in Section 2.3, for instance, the 
influence of emotional display can be explained by the expectancy violation theory 
(EVT), which suggests that people hold expectations regarding which behaviours 
are considered normal in a given social scenario based on personal experiences, 
cultural and societal norms (EVT; Dahl et al., 2007; Olsen et al., 1996).  
The more sympathetic personal reactions of the observers to the honest 
appealers (such as, ‘feel the appealer’s pain’ and ‘feel sorry for the appealer’), and 
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their corresponding lack of sympathy for the deceptive appealers, are also of 
particular interest in relation to recent developments in neuroscience. Studies on 
mirror neural mechanisms suggests that having this facilitates an experiential 
system that helps one comprehend what is observed in others, and this allows one 
to grasp someone else’s emotions (Rizzolatti, Fogassi & Gallese, 2006). Therefore, 
it is arguable that this kind of emotional synchronisation is more likely to occur 
with genuine emotions than faked emotions; hence one’s own emotional reactions 
to people can be used as ‘relevant data’ when making credibility judgements about 
them.  
A scale put forward by Kujipers, Hakemulder and Doicaru (2004) is a usable 
measure of this meta-emotion concept. Kujipers et al.’s (2004) scale focused on how 
absorbed and emotionally engaged one is into stories and films. Their scale 
includes all previously explored absorption-like concepts including previously 
investigated flow, immersion and narrative engagement were classified and 
summarised in their absorption questionnaire to form the absorption experience. 
The meta-emotion scale that will be used in the present study is adapted from 
Kujipers’ (2014) original questionnaire to contain five questions, relating to the 
level of emotional identification participants experience when watching each 
appeal video. The author tested their own model using Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) and reported the overall reliability of the scale to be α = .954, which 
is highly satisfactory.  
 Adaptation of Kujipers’ (2014) questionnaire is necessary for several 
reasons. Firstly, to include the full version of this questionnaire runs the risk of 
incurring maturation and practice effects, keeping in mind that judges would need 
to answer the same question items for each appeal video watched. Subsequently, 
maturation and practice effects are likely to threaten the internal validity of the 
current questionnaire. Secondly, both instruments are not appropriately worded 
for the unique scenario in the current thesis. Kujipers’ (2014) instrument was 
developed for text-based stimulus material (a short story) and not video or film. 
Thus, some words in the question items has to be changed. For example, the item 
‘I felt sympathy for the main character’ will be modified to ‘I felt sympathy for the 
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appealer’ to reflect the specific situation that the current thesis is interested in. 
The substance of the item will not be altered, however.  
 Kujipers (2014) posited that emotional engagement is an important aspect 
of this scale that pertains to feelings receivers have for and/or with characters (in 
the current case, for and/or with appealers). These feelings include empathy, 
sympathy and character identification. One of the objectives of a television appeal 
is to gain cooperation from the public in solving a missing or murdered relatives’ 
case. As aforementioned, television appeals are typically emotional broadcasts 
that potentially instigate sympathy and worry in viewers. The hypothesis is that 
the higher this emotional identification and level of meta-emotion felt for the 
appealer, the more likely a viewer will judge them to be innocent. To measure 
emotional engagement with the Source (appealer), three items are selected: “I felt 
sympathy for the appealer”; “I was worried about what was going to happen to the 
appealer and the missing person”; and “The appealer makes an appeal that 
affected me emotionally”. These specific items are selected to reflect the specific 
nature of television press conferences.  
 Attention is another aspect in their scale that is defined not as a character 
trait but as an effortless deep concentration of receivers feel while engaging in a 
sender (Kujipers, 2014). As a measure of attention, the items “I felt absorbed into 
the story the appealer was telling” and “When I was listening to the appeal I was 
focused on what happened during the appeal” are selected from Kujipers’ (2004) 
questionnaire as well. In Kujipers’ (2014) original scale, the Cronbach’s alpha for 
Emotional Engagement was .914 and the Cronbach’s alpha for Attention was .905.  
 
6.2.6 Supplementary questions 
 Other questions will also be included in the current questionnaire to ensure 
participants are not familiar with the outcome of the appeals or with the appealers 
themselves so as to eliminate the possibility of biased responses. These questions 
are ‘Do you personally know anyone who featured in the appeal you’ve just 
watched?’ (Question 18), ‘Do you know of the appeal you have just watched i.e. its 
outcome; the case?’ (Question 19), ‘If you ticked yes to knowing the appeal, what 
did you think the outcome was?’ (Question 20) and ‘If you have any other 
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comments or notes for this particular appeal, state below’ (Question 21). The 
advantages of using the present questionnaire are discussed further in Chapter 
11 in Section 11.7.4.  
 
6.3 General methodology across Studies 1 to 4 
 A total of 29 MSc students in Investigative Psychology from the University 
of Huddersfield were involved in the data collection process, as part of a module 
they completed for the Masters course entitled ‘Empirical Research and Research 
Writing’. They were assigned the task to acquire a minimum of ten participants 
and up to as many as they wanted to. All MSc students involved in the data 
collection were given a questionnaire pack prior to collecting data. This pack 
contained a briefing, consent form and the main questionnaire. These can be found 
in Appendix B to G and Appendix E. They were given the appeal videos pertaining 
to the experimental group they were randomly assigned to, to be shown to 
participants. These students were also given a standardised SPSS file to enter the 
raw data they collected, and this marks the extent of their involvement in the 
present thesis. These individual SPSS files were then transferred to the current 
researcher. Data analysis was conducted independent of the MSc students’ 
involvement.  
A breakdown of the number of students who collected data for each 
condition is reported here. Four students collected data for the Audio-only 
condition in Study 2, and another four collected data for the Audio-visual condition 
in the same study. Three students collected data for Study 1 (which was a within-
subject design). Six students collected data for the High Sense condition in Study 
3, and five students collected data for the Low Sense condition in the same study. 
Three students collected data for Paired condition in Study 4, and four students 
collected data for the Solo condition in the same study. All data across all four 
studies were collected during the same period of time, from September 2014 until 
January 2015. The total numbers of participants for each condition in each study 
are individually reported and can be found in the Methods section in their 
respective study. Descriptive information of participants is also reported in each 
individual study in the same section.  
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 The present methodological design employed a double-blind technique. 
Neither the Masters students running the experiments nor the participants in the 
present thesis knew what any of the conditions represented. Participants were 
also randomly allocated a condition, removing order effects. This decreased any 
threats to demand characteristics, which refers to participants attempting to 
behave in a certain way because they believe that this is expected of them (Orne, 
1962). This technique also lowered the chances of any experimenter effects from 
occurring as it was not possible for the Masters students to bias participants in 
any conditions. Furthermore, the employment of various experimenters in and of 
itself avoids experimenter bias (Orne, 1962). All conditions in all studies consisted 
of four video clips of individuals appealing for a missing or murdered relatives’ 
case (except for Study 1 which employed a within-subjects design; there were only 
two video clips for the condition of High Emotionality and a further two for Low 
Emotionality). The questionnaire given to participants to complete was exactly the 
same for each video clip. 
The same instructions as to how to conduct the experiment were given to 
all MSc students and were as follows: Before beginning to watch the video clips, 
participants were given definitions of ‘story plausibility’ and ‘credibility’. ‘Story 
plausibility’ here was defined as “the possibility that the appealer’s story could 
be true or could have taken place” and ‘credibility’ was defined as “your 
perception of how truthful the appealer is regardless of the story plausibility or 
even after it is taken into account”. All participants were asked to first watch or 
listen to a clip, and afterwards fill in the matching questionnaire before moving 
on to the next clip, and so on. This was carried out sequentially to not encourage 
simultaneous comparison of the appeals. Participants could watch the videos as 
many times as required and to change their decisions on the answer sheet at any 
point during the process. They were instructed beforehand that some of these 
clips would be genuine, while other appealers would be responsible for the death 
or disappearance of their relative. Participants received no training in lie 
detection. The experiment will be carried out on individual participants in a 
quiet room, with a laptop and headphones from which the clips could be played 
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via a PowerPoint presentation. This presentation will be carried out in a quiet 
room, for a clear audio experience.  
A concern to be acknowledged is the small number of trials carried out in 
all experimental studies in the present thesis. Unquestionably, a higher number 
of trials tends to lead to fewer unexplained variations in the sample and 
averages out some (or lowers) random error (Winokur, 2005). This ensures the 
best out of ‘signal-to-noise’ ratio which will enable interpreting outcomes with 
higher accuracy. Here, a signal depicts that a variable really influences the 
dependent variables, and noise depicts any random errors that may surface 
(Slutz & Hess, 2017). In other words, it is difficult to draw accurate conclusions 
from a small number of trials. While a higher number of trials unable to be 
conducted in the present thesis due to time constraints, this could be improved in 
future studies. However, the following studies presented in Chapters 7 to 10 
remain important and valid as a first step in uncovering the way people think 
when making guilt-innocence judgments using television appeals as stimulus 
materials.  
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Figure 1 in Chapter 1 depicts how a Source is presented and what it 
constitutes can affect outcomes in veracity judgments. A lateral point to be made 
is that observers may base their judgments on their normative expectancies of a 
stimulus based on their culture and previous experiences (Bond et al., 1992).  
While emotional display can affect veracity judgments, so can sympathetic 
emotional responses towards this display. According to Vrij (2008), there are 
several factors that can influence cues to deception, one of them being emotional 
reactions. Observers may then use their own emotional responses as an effortless 
but potentially faulty indicator in regulating their judgments in favour or to 
disapprove of the appealer in question in a difficult scenario where the outcome is 
ambiguous (Epstein, 1994). Also in Figure 1, this reliance on meta-emotions, or 
felt emotions, can then ultimately contribute to veracity judgements. Slovic et al. 
(2007) describes this reliance on such feelings and consigning a great significance 
of it in consequential decision-making the ‘affect heuristic’, which is synonymous 
with the concept of meta-emotion.  
 In the present study, since television appeals are typically emotional, one of 
the most salient and available cues available for observers to pick up from a 
television appealer are the emotions displayed. When watching something as 
emotionally salient as a television appeal observers may, as one might expect, 
develop a sympathetic emotional response towards the appealer. Resulting from 
this display of emotions (or the lack of) observers may, people rapidly form 
emotional imprints from their experiential thinking mode rather than a 
comprehensive cognitive-based assessment (Slovic et al., 2007) and evaluate their 
impression of the appealer – either favouring or disfavouring them (Shafir et al., 
1993). In the current thesis, expectancies of a grieving appealer are considered 
together with its relationship to level of emotional displays and veracity 
judgments. To understand and distinguish the emotions a true appealer shows 
and the ones a false appealer shows, the literature on what emotions a truly 
grieving person goes through is considered.  
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7.1 Perception of emotion in grieving individuals 
 If observers may form impressions and judgments of a television appealer 
based on their normative expectancies of a stimulus based on their previous 
experiences, consideration first needs to be given to what these normative 
expectancies might be, considering the specific context in the current scenario. In 
the present case, the normative expectancies cover the grounds of a grieving 
individual who has just temporarily or indefinitely lost a close family member. 
This provides a theoretical basis from a grief perspective in understanding 
judgment and decision-making processes of an observer in a high stakes deception 
detection context. To date, grief theories have not been applicably explored in this 
area of research. As of yet, the role of grief perception in television appeals, along 
with public expectations of how an appealer is ‘supposed’ to appear is currently 
unknown. In this section, consideration is given to theories and public 
expectations from available literature.  
 Early theories of grief include Freud’s (1917) and Lindemann’s (1944) 
psychoanalytic model, and Bowlby’s (1961) attachment model where conditions 
surrounding the death of a loved one affected the features, severity and period of 
the bereavement course. The second generation of grief theories include 
psychosocial transitions by Parkes (1972), Kubler-Ross’s (2005) five stage model, 
and Worden’s (1983) tasks of mourning where the tasks were the work that the 
mourner must do in order to advance through the course of grief. The major issue 
with these models was that they insufficiently explained variations of grievers who 
experienced similar encounters of bereavement, appealing a new zeitgeist of 
theories.  
In later models of grief, individual differences in grieving were recognised. 
Penman, Breen, Hewitt and Prigerson (2013) suggested that grievers may 
experience variations in emotional expressions such as sorrow varied with anger, 
behavioural changes and in thinking, sometimes experiencing disbelief of their 
situation or perplexity. Relating the principles of these theories to public 
expectations, social psychology research on grief has shown that participants 
assess emotional expression of grief to be significant (Costa & Stewart, 2007). 
Participants were able to identify diversity in grief responses, and considered 
90 
  
avoidance behaviours to be problematical. Boelen, van den Bout and van den 
Hout’s (2003) findings also concurred in that their participants found mourners 
who engaged in avoidant coping styles formed negative impressions and 
interpretations of the grievers. 
Theories aside, the medical terminology of the grief experience addresses 
grief in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual-V (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). The recent changes of bereavement diagnosis outlines, with the 
bereavement exclusion removed, that in grief painful emotions are experienced in 
waves, are usually amalgamated with positive reminiscences of the departed.  
Kubitz, Thornton and Robertson (1989) found that the type of death (in 
their case, sudden or anticipated) experienced by grievers can impact participants’ 
expectations and evaluations of grief. In television appeals, most cases are sudden 
rather than anticipatory, and even in deceptive appeals the appealers who have 
had culpability in the murder of their relative try to portray the type of death as 
sudden. Kubitz et al. (1989) also studied interpersonal attractiveness of the 
griever as a moderating effect, factorising gender of the griever, sudden or 
anticipatory type of death, and the intensity of the symptoms as exhibited by 
emotional expression. In their study, participants read scripts describing an 
individual grieving over the death of a friend and then rated the bereaving 
individual on a supplied questionnaire. Participants perceived males who 
exhibited less intense emotions for a sudden death as functioning better. They 
perceived females who exhibited less intense emotions for an anticipated death as 
more attractive, and lastly perceived an exhibition of higher emotional expression 
as appropriate in a sudden death vignette. In contrast, Penman et al. (2013) 
investigated public expectations of grief following bereavement after DSM-V 
changes and found no evidence that type of death influenced participants’ 
expectations of grief.  
 Studies have also suggested that participants assume an unfounded 
traditional stage model for the grief process (Breen & O’Connor, 2007; Costa & 
Stewart, 2007). Public expectations of grief also follow an unsupported time 
period, where grief is expected to lessen over time (Lensing, 2001; Costa, Hall, & 
Stewart, 2007). The general public have clear expectations concerning the 
91 
  
appropriate duration of grief, and in Costa et al. ’s (2007) findings provided 
evidence that participants viewed time as an important factor in their judgments 
of an ‘appropriate’ grieving model.   
In the context of television appeals, while no research has explicitly been 
done on the perception of emotional display, it is known that Susan Smith 
murdered her two young sons and proceeded to falsely appeal on television for a 
period of nine days for their return. She appeared to be earnestly crying in most 
of the appeal videos whilst blaming an African American man for the crime (Doss, 
2002). Here, Doss (2002) claimed viewers of the appeal appeared to believe her to 
be credible. This was ostensibly due to her believable level of emotional display, 
which was seemingly full of despair. Similarly, Anderson et al. ’s (1999) study 
showed that participants reported emotional involvement while telling the story 
(i.e. “...he looked really sad when telling the story...”; “She did not look genuinely 
happy...”) was used as a cue to determine the veracity of speakers. 
In consideration of the literature on grief theories and public expectation of 
grievers, it is posited in the current study that television appealers who are visibly 
distressed and expressed high levels of emotion will more likely be thought to be 
more credible. Judges may assess the probability of whether a sender is guilty or 
innocent based on how much they believe he or she represents someone who is 
grieving, and this is subsequently based on stereotypes of how a griever should 
behave. Because a high level of emotion is a particularly salient cue and readily 
picked up by observers, they may use this specific cue in regulating their veracity 
judgments. This may especially be the case when the outcome of a situation is 
ambiguous and little information is given about the appealers to judges. 
 
7.2 Meta-emotion bias 
The meta-emotion bias is not a new discovery, with previous research 
efforts reporting that emotional presentations can influence perceived veracity 
and character believability. This bias is where people try to use emotions as a 
cue in making veracity judgments (Peace & Sinclair, 2012). Baldry, Winkel and 
Enthoven (1997) found that rape victims who exhibited higher levels of emotion 
such as being in hysterics, crying, shaking and exhibiting clear despair were 
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seen as more truthful and were believed more than those who were neutral 
during their statements, an unfounded bias. These results were replicated by 
Bollingmo, Wessel, Eilertsen and Magnussen (2008). Wessel, Magnussen and 
Melinder (2013) again found similar results with those working in the child 
protective service area. In this study, participants rated eight mock videos of 
children acting and reading out accounts of being abused with differing levels of 
emotional expression for each account. Participants were strongly swayed by the 
level of emotional display and this consequently affected their credibility 
judgments of the child.  In a study by Bollingmo, Wessel, Sandvold, Eilertsen 
and Magnussen (2009) which also used a mock scenario, the authors found that 
giving participants the added instruction of not using displayed emotion as an 
indicator of truthfulness causes participants to adapt their decision-making and 
reduce the effect of this bias on subsequent credibility judgments they make.  In 
Wessel, Bollingmo, Sønsteby, Nielsen, Eliersten and Magnussen’s (2012) study, 
the actor was a young male accused of rape in a mock trial scenario. Mock juror 
participants judged the actor’s accounts. Findings from this study were that 
credibility judgments were highly affected by emotional display instead of story 
content.  
In light of these studies, this chapter aims to assess the possibility of a meta-
emotion bias through the use of implicit assessments, to examine whether this 
bias occurs in the context of television appeals. 
 
7.3 Attractiveness/appearance bias 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, the attractiveness and appearance of a sender 
can be used as a mental shortcut when having to make decision tasks about the 
sender. While it is extensively known that attractiveness can influence judgments, 
this has yet to be explored in the current context. 
 
7.4 Innocence bias 
As expounded in Chapter 6, explicit ratings will be measured as well as the 
more ‘implicit’ version of credibility. 
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7.5 Cognition of Source bias 
As introduced in the opening chapters, perceived level of a sender’s 
preparation and rehearsal for a story may bias observers’ veracity judgments 
(Akehurst et al., 1996; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). Vrij et al. (2010) proposed 
that liars tend to pre-formulate a story if an interview is anticipated since they 
must practice delivering the lie consistently. Deceitful individuals tend to rehearse 
stories so that it follows a logical consistency in hopes of being believed. In the 
present study, perceived preparation is measured implicitly via several questions 
pertaining to perceived practice, how well thought out the appeal seems to be, how 
organised it is and whether the wording of sentences is pleasing to hear – all 
outlined in Chapter 6. Whether the preparation bias occurs when level of 
emotional display is manipulated has never been investigated in the current 
context. 
 
7.6 Key issues to explore 
 The key aim of this study is to uncover how both emotionally charged and 
emotionally deprived television appeals of missing or murdered relatives’ cases 
impact upon judgments of appealer veracity, and whether differences in 
underlying cognitive processes exist between conditions. In consideration of all 
factors mentioned above, an observer watching television appeals may anticipate 
and form expectations of certain emotions or states of mind from someone who has 
just had their relative kidnapped or murdered, and potentially be absorbed into 
and identify with the appealer, and these expectations and identification in turn 
may affect their judgments of how honest or deceptive the appealers are. This 
expectation may regulate the implicit judgments of perceived emotional display 
and meta-emotion.  
 As abovementioned, social psychology research on grief has shown 
that judges assess emotional expression of grief to be significant (Costa & Stewart, 
2007). This implies that television appealers who are visibly distressed and 
expressing prominent level of emotion will more likely be thought to be more 
credible. Because a prominent level of emotion is particularly salient and available 
to observers to pick up on, especially when information on the appealer is scarce, 
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the hypothesis is that they will judge appeal videos showing high emotional 
display to be more innocent. Further, when the highly emotional appeals contain 
verbalised emotions such as ‘love’ and ‘miss’ towards the victim, an additional 
verbal cue is present for observers to pick up on. A secondary objective here is to 
explore whether other known biases, such as the attractiveness and appearance 
bias, preparation bias and innocence bias, will be significantly different between 
both conditions.  
 
7.7 Methods 
7.7.1 Participants 
This sample consisted of 51 individuals. All participants answered 
questionnaires pertaining to four appeal cases each, leading to a sum of 204 cases 
in total.  None of the participants had prior knowledge of the appeal or appealer. 
Participants were recruited by snowball sampling. They were from varying 
occupations ranging from dentist, prison officer, company director to farmer, 
psychologist, radio DJ and more; as well as nationalities/ethnicities (British, 
Asian, African, Middle Eastern, European and American). Participants who 
answered ‘not sure’ to other implicit variables were taken note of and results are 
presented in Appendix I. 
 
7.7.2 Material and Procedure 
As briefly introduced in Chapter 6, Bond and DePaulo (2008) highlighted 
that detectability and credibility are sometimes mutually exclusive, in that certain 
individuals’ veracity is obvious and some others indecipherable. Certain 
individuals just appear sincerer than others, and some others just appear more 
‘guilty’ regardless of their credibility. Even honest grievers can be mistakenly 
judged to be malingering. Kassin (2012) reported the case of Amanda Knox (now 
exonerated) where she was mistakenly judged by police and the court to be guilty 
of the death of her roommate because she did not exhibit any emotions as a 
reaction to the death. The issue of culture ties in with sender detectability as well, 
where Vrij and Fischer (1995) argued in their study of simulated rape cases that 
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not every individual or culture exhibit clear symptoms of distress when retelling 
an upsetting event they have experienced. 
 To curtail this issue of sender detectability, throughout Part 2 in the present 
thesis, where appropriate all judges in different conditions were shown video clips 
of the same appealers. In other words, while the appeal content differed in some 
way or form for judges in different conditions through experimental manipulation, 
the speaker in both conditions remained the same where possible. The only study 
where this was not feasible was in the current study, as it was not viable to use 
the same appealers for the conditions of High and Low Emotionality (i.e. if an 
appealer is highly emotional in an appeal video, it was impossible to manipulate 
the video-clip of the same appealer to be less emotional).  
 Hendriks and Vingerhoets (2006) found that observers in their study felt 
more sadness and emotional support as a response to being shown faces that 
were tearful compared to faces that were neutral. In the current study, the facial 
expression of crying was chosen to denote a ‘high emotionality’ and a neutral 
facial expression was chosen to denote a ‘low emotionality’. Highly Emotional 
appeals were selected based on the presence of crying (i.e., one appealer used 
tissues to wipe her tears, blowing persistent watery mucus discharge from the 
nose) and the presence of a cracking voice due to distress while appealing. In 
contrast, Low Emotional appeals were selected based on neutral expressions and 
an absence of visible distress in facial expressions and no crying or 
blowing/wiping water mucus discharge present or cracking voice. While noting 
that in some cases people feel sad and yet do not express this (Vrij & Fisher, 
1995), these facial expressions were chosen not only because they are 
qualitatively different expressions, but they have been shown to evoke different 
feelings and thoughts in people who view them (Hendriks & Vingerhoets, 2006). 
Two highly emotional appeals were selected and two appeals with low emotional 
qualities were selected. In addition, the two highly emotional appeals contained 
spoken emotions such as ‘miss’ and ‘love’ whereas the low emotional appeals did 
not. All judges experienced the same four videos a non-randomised order. 
 A difficulty in choosing highly ecologically valid data is that emotional 
display cannot be manipulated. In other words, the same appealer cannot be 
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manipulated to show high levels of emotional display in one condition and in 
another condition showing less emotion while giving the same appeal. This means 
that the current study cannot control for appeal content, which will be different 
for all appeals chosen. To counterbalance this limitation, the study design is 
maintained as within-group. Nevertheless, it cannot be firmly concluded because 
appeal content was not completely controlled for. Additionally, it was problematic 
to find guilty appealers displaying the emotional levels that corresponded with the 
selected definitions of what constitutes a ‘Highly Emotional’ and ‘Low Emotional’ 
appeal for this particular study. To recapitulate, Highly Emotional appeals were 
selected based on the presence of crying (one appealer used tissues to wipe her 
tears, blowing persistent watery mucus discharge from the nose) and the presence 
of a cracking voice due to distress while appealing. In contrast, Low Emotional 
appeals were selected based on neutral expressions and an absence of visible 
distress in facial expressions and no crying or blowing/wiping water mucus 
discharge present or cracking voice. Thus, all appeals selected in the present study 
were innocent.  
 One male and one female were chosen for each level of emotionality so as to 
balance for any gender effects. Appeal video 1 was 37.46 seconds in length, Appeal 
video 2 was 25.00 seconds in length, Appeal Video 3 was 26.20 seconds in length 
and Appeal video 4 was 44.97 seconds in length. Care was taken to select appeal 
with lengths as similar as possible, with an average of 33.41 seconds (SD = 9.53). 
The general methodology of how the experiment was conducted is outlined under 
Section 6.3 in Chapter 6.  
 Because individual differences were anticipated in appeal emotional level 
appraisal, only judges who agreed with the author’s categorisation of the 
emotional level were retained for further analyses. This step was taken so that 
we can be confident that judges viewing the videos assigned as ‘highly emotional’ 
videos also found them to be highly emotional, and the videos assigned as low in 
emotional content were also perceived by judges to be not very emotive in nature. 
This is to ensure that the independent variable sets out to measure what it was 
intended to measure. 
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Analyses were first conducted for explicit decision to determine accuracy 
rates and if an innocence-guilt bias occurred. As for implicit responses, a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality (Massey, 1951; Smirnov, 1948) was 
conducted, and because the K-S test showed non-normal data (as it is used to 
assess two samples with a reference probability distribution) a Wilcoxon’s Rank 
Test for within-subjects cases was then conducted.  To test if there was a 
statistically significant relationship between the accuracy of judges’ explicit 
decisions and level of appeal emotionality shown to them, a Chi-square was 
computed.  
 Logistic regressions for within-group analyses were also carried out to 
determine which implicit responses judges used to predict their explicit decisions. 
This analysis was used to explore the relationship between explicit and implicit 
decisions, regardless of whether judges may have attended to implicit cues 
consciously or unconsciously and meaningfully or otherwise. Regression was 
chosen as an analysis as it allows an understanding of which among the 
independent variables (implicit cues) are related to the dependent variable 
(explicit decision), and to explore the forms of these relationships. Variance 
inflation factors (VIF) are also analysed. VIF values that exceeds 10 and Tolerance 
values being less than 0.10 are often regarded as indicating multicollinearity 
(Dart, 2017). 
 In the current study, it was acknowledged that the number of independent 
variables observed was high relative to sample size. Overfitting can result in 
meaningless variables entering the model merely by chance, even if the model 
seems to have a good fit with the data used. Babyak (2004) stated that the issue 
with overfitted models is that results may not be replicated with a different 
sample, and thus findings with the current sample should be interpreted with 
caution. Nevertheless, all predictor variables included in regression analyses were 
each derived (and justified inclusion) from an extensive review of the literature 
expounded in the opening chapters of the present thesis. While the possibility 
exists that too many variables in a model leads to the potential issue of overfitting, 
Zhang (2014) stated that including a high number of variables as possible to 
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examine the association between a predictor and outcome variable can be 
beneficial and controls for confounding variables. 
The bootstrapping process is also applied as it is very useful for small 
sample sizes (Adèr, Mellenbergh & Hand, 2008) and works by making 
extrapolations of a population from a sample data. This process samples this data 
and then makes extrapolations about a sample from re-sampled data (Efron & 
Tibshirani, 1993). In the present study, this process is repeated 1000 times. Both 
bootstrapped models for high and low emotionality will contain the same twelve 
independent variables (plausibility, story sense, credibility, practice, well-
thought-out, wording, less-emotions, emotions-matched, organised-speech, 
attractiveness, voice attractiveness and meta-emotion level). 
  
7.7.3 Ground truth 
 Appeal 1 shows an innocent female appealing directly to the killer who 
murdered her daughter. Appeal 2 shows an innocent female appealing directly to 
the abductor of her missing daughter. Appeal 3 shows an innocent male appealing 
for the return of his granddaughter. Appeal 4 shows an innocent male appealing 
for the return of his missing nephew. All appealers made a direct appeal to the 
killer or captor, the missing person to get in touch, or to the public for information 
or assistance to search for the missing or murdered relative. In all four cases, 
substantial evidence was found to reinforce the appealers’ claims concerning the 
fate of their relatives. For Appealer 1, another man was convicted of killing her 
daughter, with evidence of an un-recanted confession, eyewitness accounts, 
surveillance video footage, public tip, and recovered bone fragments. For Appealer 
2, another man was charged with coercing, enticing and transporting a minor to 
engage in sexual activity with the appealer’s daughter, with evidence of confession 
and eyewitness accounts. For Appealer 3, his granddaughter’s body was found and 
post mortem examination suggests suicide with no evidence of foul play involved. 
Finally, for Appealer 4, his missing nephew returned home with no evidence of 
foul play involved.  
 
7.8 Results 
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7.8.1 Participants 
After removing cases where participants had knowledge of the appeals, 
there were 47 participants but only a total of 108 cases remaining for further 
analysis. The final sample consisted of 28 participants (45 cases) for the High 
Emotional condition and 19 participants (63 cases) for the Low Emotional 
condition. As some participants knew of more than one out of the four appeal 
cases, the total number of cases were lower than the overall number of 
participants. As individual differences were anticipated in appeal emotional level 
appraisal, the final sample only included participants who agreed with the 
question ‘The appealer displays less emotion than seems appropriate for their 
situation’ for low emotional appeals and disagreed for highly emotional appeals. 
Also, as individual differences were anticipated in appeal emotional level 
appraisal, the final sample only included participants who agreed with the 
question ‘The appealer displays less emotion than seems appropriate for their 
situation’ for Low emotional appeals and disagreed for High Emotional appeals. 
The final pool of participants ranged from 20 to 61 years in age (M = 29.61, SD = 
10.53).  
 
7.8.2 Explicit veracity judgments 
As shown in Table 1, Highly Emotional appeals reported a veracity rating 
of 56.00%, whereas Low Emotional appeals reported a rating of 40.60%. An 
innocence bias did not appear to be present. Implicit assessments of veracity are 
examined in the next section. 
 
Table 1 
Judgment rates for appeals for High and Low Emotionality conditions 
 
 High Emotionality  Low Emotionality  
Appeals 56.00% 40.60% 
 
7.8.3 Relationship between level of appeal emotionality and explicit accuracy rates 
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 Chi square results were χ2 (1) = 31.410, p < .05. This revealed that there 
was a statistically significant association between accuracy of judges’ explicit 
decisions and level of appeal emotionality shown to them.  The two variables 
(accuracy of explicit ratings and High versus Low Emotionality) are dependent 
and/or related. Phi values indicate the strength of this relationship and are chosen 
over Cramer’s V as both variables used in the sample are dichotomous (Jones, 
2009). The strength of association between the variables was high (ɸ = .54), 
demonstrating the presence of a substantial relationship (Davis, 1971).  
 
7.8.4 Implicit veracity judgments 
Results for the K-S test for normality indicated that the score distributions 
deviated significantly from a normal distribution (D = .123, p < .005). Due to the 
within-subjects design of the study and the assumption of normality being 
violated, a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was conducted (Wilcoxon, 1945). Descriptive 
statistics for participant truth scores between High and Low Emotionality, results 
from the Wilcoxon test, and effect sizes can all be found in Table 2. Cronbach’s 
alpha, the estimated internal consistency, for each scale items can be found in 
Table 3. Implications are reviewed in depth in Chapter 11 under Sections 11.6 and 
11.7. The Wilcoxon test would suggest differences in perceptual differences 
between both conditions. Story plausibility was judged significantly higher when 
judges were watching appealers who were visibly distressed, with a mean of 2.73 
and a standard deviation of 1.116 in comparison with appealers who lacked signs 
of visual distress at a mean of 1.71 (SD = 1.300). Similarly, the appealer’s story 
was perceived to make more sense significantly more in highly emotional appeals 
with a mean of 2.69 (SD = 1.104) compared to low emotional ones which recorded 
a mean of 2.06 (SD = 1.189). The same is said for perceived appealer credibility. 
Judges recorded a significantly lower mean for emotion matching in the low 
emotionality condition at 1.53 (SD = 0.815). The two conditions recorded 
significantly different meta-emotion levels, with appealers who were visibly 
distressed receiving a higher mean of sympathetic reaction and character 
identification at 11.93 (SD = 4.539) and those who lacked visible distress at a mean 
of 8.18 (SD = 2.949).  
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Table 3 
Cronbach's alpha coefficients for Study 1 
 
Meta-emotion Cognition Appearance Emotions 
0.74 0.47 0.30 0.54 
 
 
7.8.5 Logistic regressions analyses  
 Throughout Studies 1 to 4, Guilt was coded as 0 and Innocence was coded 
as 1. To assess what implicit cues judges may have used to predict their explicit 
veracity judgments within both conditions, binary logistic regressions were 
performed for both. Logistic regressions were carried out to investigate these 
perceived indicators of veracity as well as participant accuracy as dependent 
measures for both conditions. In this study, tolerance was greater than .10 for all 
items, and the variance inflation factor was also less than 10 for all items. This 
suggested that multicollinearity was not an issue in this study (meta-emotion, 
Tolerance = 0.64, VIF = 1.55; credibility, Tolerance = 0.67, VIF = 1.49; plausibility, 
Tolerance = 0.66, VIF = 1.52; practice, Tolerance = 0.88, VIF = 1.14; voice 
attractiveness, Tolerance = 0.80; VIF = 1.09; organised speech, Tolerance = 
0.69; VIF = 1.44; face attractiveness, Tolerance = 0.91; VIF = 1.10; less emotions, 
Tolerance = 0.60; VIF = 1.66; wording, Tolerance = 0.84; VIF = 1.19; well-thought-
out, Tolerance = 0.74, VIF = 1.34; emotions match, Tolerance = 0.62, VIF = 1.62; 
practice, Tolerance = 0.88, VIF = 1.14). 
First consideration was given to only Highly Emotional appeals. This 
helps predict which implicit veracity judgments judges could have used in 
parallel with their explicit decisions. The full regression model indicates that it 
was able to distinguish between respondents who explicitly reported a Guilty 
judgment from the ones who reported an Innocent judgment, with results 
reported as χ2 (12, N = 108) = 332.77, p < .001. The model explained between 32% 
(Cox and Snell R2) and 42% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in veracity 
judgments, and correctly classified 79% of cases.  
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Consideration was then given only Low Emotionality appeals and 
accordingly which implicit veracity judgments did participants utilised 
supported their explicit one. The full model indicates that it was able to 
distinguish between respondents who explicitly reported Guilty from the ones 
who reported Innocent with results reported as χ2 (8, N = 108) = 32.34, p < .001. 
The model explained between 27% (Cox and Snell R2) and 37% (Nagelkerke R2) 
of the variance in veracity judgments, and correctly classified 81% of cases.  
Although VIF values suggest that multicollinearity was not an issue in 
this study, precautions are also taken to reduce false positive findings. False 
positive findings are also synonymous with the fishing and error rate problem, or 
alpha inflation (Parker & Szymanski, 1992). This threat occurs when a high 
number of multiple statistical comparisons are being conducted and the 
possibility of making a Type I error increases with each comparison in attempt to 
test hypotheses and finding a significant effect (Parker & Szymanski, 1992). To 
lower this risk of false positives and to increase confidence in results, a more 
stringent cut-off point will be employed for the regression analyses (p < 0.01). As 
shown in Table 4, none of the independent variable made a unique statistically 
significant contribution to the model using this cut-off level for both condition.  
 
7.8.6 Not-sure answers frequencies 
As described in the Methods section, not-sure answers for all implicit 
decisions were recorded for the remaining cases retained for analyses. Judges who 
reported ‘not sure’ for the question item pertaining to emotion level were already 
removed to ensure only those who were sure were included in this study. For the 
remaining implicit cues, only percentage differences between both conditions that 
are higher than 10% are discussed. A table can be found in Appendix I showing all 
percentages of not-sure answers for both conditions. From this table, it can be seen 
that when low emotional appeals were shown, judges found it harder to rate the 
appealers’ story plausibility and level of practice.  
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Significant p values are in bold (p < 0.01). Standard deviations appear in parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Wilcoxon’s Rank implicit assessments between High and Low Emotionality conditions 
 
  High Emotionality means 
Low Emotionality 
means z r 
Truth score     
 Credibility 2.222 (1.396) 1.403 (1.137) -2.482* -0.24 
Cognition of Source Content 
scores     
 Plausibility 2.733 (1.116) 1.714 (1.300) -3.526* -0.34 
 Story Sense 2.689 (1.104) 2.064 (1.189) -2.482* -0.20 
 Practice 1.511 (1.160) 2.063 (1.256) -1.758 NA 
 Well-thought-out 2.222 (1.259) 2.095 (1.411) -0.418 NA 
 Organised 2.578 (1.138) 2.476 (1.189) -0.132 NA 
 Wording 1.933 (1.194) 1.667 (1.191) -1.535 NA 
Emotion scores      
 Less Emotions 1.644 (0.484) 3.286 (0.633) -5.640* -0.54 
 Emotion-match 2.933 (1.095) 1.533 (0.815) -4.580* -0.44 
Appearance scores     
Voice attractiveness 1.600 (1.355) 1.571 (1.214) -0.263 NA 
Face attractiveness 1.181 (1.062) 0.935 (0.939) -0.640 NA 
Meta-emotion score 11.933 (4.539) 8.175 (2.949) -4.313* -0.42 
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Table 4 
Bootstrapped binary logistic regression models for explicit judgments between High and Low Emotionality conditions 
 
 Model 1: High Emotionality Model 2: Low Emotionality 
Variables B (SE) OR 95% C.I. (Lower, Upper) p B (SE) OR 
95% C.I. (Lower, 
Upper) p 
Credibility .157 (.0240) 1.170 .730, 1.873 0.900 .494 (0.218) 1.640 1.069, 2.515 0.024 
Plausibility .487 (.0264) 1.627 .969, 2.732 0.066 .017 (0.230) 1.017 .648, 1.595 0.942 
Story Sense .114 (5.981) 1.132 .680, 1.884 0.691 .359 (0.228) 1.433 .916, 2.240 0.115 
Practice -.442 (0.235) 0.643 .405, 1.020 0.060 -.147 (0.209) 0.864 .574, 1.300 0.483 
Wording .163 (0.258) 1.177 .710, 1.951 0.529 .277 (0.234) 1.319 .834, 2.084 0.237 
Well-thought-out -.038 (0.222) 0.963 .623, 1.487 0.864 -.390 (0.193) 0.677 .464, .989 0.043 
Organised .138 (0.240) 1.147 .717, 1.838 0.567 -.032 (0.242) 0.969 .603, 1.557 0.896 
Less Emotions -.491 (0.230) 0.612 .390, .960 0.033 -.359 (0.210) 0.698 .463, 1.054 0.087 
Emotions Match .029 (0.233) 1.030 .652, 1.627 0.900 .009 (0.255) 1.009 .612, 1.662 0.973 
Face -.090 (0.281) 0.914 .527, 1.587 0.750 -.135 (0.249) 0.874 .536, 1.422 0.587 
Voice -.128 (0.223) 0.880 .633, 1.071 0.633 -.055 (0.227) 0.946 .606, 1.478 0.809 
Meta-emotion .136 (0.084) 1.146 .971, 1.352 0.107 .034 (0.075) 1.035 .894, 1.198 0.649 
Model 
description 
Model is statistically significant: χ2 = 31.87; df = 12; 
Nagelkerke's R2 = .423; Hosmer-Lemeshow test: χ2 = 7.66; df = 
8; p = .467    
Model is statistically significant: χ2 = 32.94; df = 12;  
Nagelkerke's R2 = .38; Hosmer-Lemeshow test: χ2 = 13.93;  
df = 8; p = .084    
 
Note: Significant p values are in bold; p< 0.01. Standard errors appear in 
parentheses.       
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7.9 Discussion 
The present chapter examined implicit judgments in relation to the variable 
of emotional display in the context of high stakes television appeals. Findings 
would tend to suggest support for the main hypothesis of this study; if an appeal 
had low emotional content (visually and verbally) judges were more likely to 
believe the appealer to be guilty.  
 With explicit accuracy rates, it was found that judges assessed appealers to 
be more innocent when they were crying or sobbing with the presence of a cracking 
voice, while verbally declaring that they ‘love’ and ‘miss’ the victim. In contrast, 
appealers who lacked visible distress in their facial expressions with no crying or 
cracking voice present and no verbalised declaration of affection towards the 
victim were more likely considered to be lying. Judges could have based their 
explicit judgments on how similar to a stereotype of a grieving individual they 
were familiar with. This stereotype included salient physical and emotional 
symptoms of acute grief that includes crying, sighing and shortness of breath for 
example, as exemplified in earlier theories of grief. In the review of literature 
individuals tended to favour a particular ‘stage’ of grief, more often an acute form. 
Maciejewski, Zhang, Block and Prigerson (2007) stated how this stage theory of 
grief has become well-accepted and putative, widespread to generalise a wide 
variety of losses, and this unsupported stage process is relied upon even in medical 
education. Here in the current chapter, judges seemed to have used their personal 
expectations of how someone who has just lost a relative should behave. When the 
appealers’ emotional behaviour matched their expectations, they tended to favour 
these appealers by awarding them a higher innocence rating.  
 In the within-group analyses of judges’ implicit veracity judgments, several 
implicit judgments emerged as significantly different between both groups with 
varying effect sizes. Story plausibility, story sense and overall appealer credibility 
were judged to be higher in the Highly Emotionality appeals when compared with 
the Low Emotionality ones, indicating that perceived level of appeal emotionality 
and verbalised affection towards the victim influences even how plausible a story 
sounds. A caveat mentioned in the Methods section was that the appeal content 
differed for all appeals, which could have affected judges’ veracity judgments. In 
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other words, these differences could be due to a clearer and convincing appeal 
rather than a higher level of emotional display that led judges to believe an 
appealer is more credible. For example, appeals that were low in emotional display 
level could have simply made less sense and were less plausible than those that 
were high in emotional display. Alternatively, it could also be that the presence of 
verbalised emotions portrayed the highly emotional appealers as more honest in 
their affections and longing for the victim, thus making their cases more 
compelling.  
The results in the current study would seem to suggest that there are 
differences in explicit ratings, and there are differences in thinking when people 
watch a highly emotional video versus one that is not as can be surmised from 
Table 2. Theories and studies discussed in the literature review in the present 
chapter would seem to suggest that people tend to favour highly salient emotional 
displays and judge them to be more innocent (Bollingmo et al., 2008; Baldry et al., 
1997; Breen & O’Connor, 2007; Costa & Stewart, 2007; Peace & Sinclair, 2012). 
Judges’ meta-emotion ratings were significantly different for both conditions, 
suggesting that Highly Emotional appeals increased judges’ own identification 
with the appealer in comparison to the appeals that were low in emotional display. 
However, sympathetic reactions and character identification did not predict their 
explicit decisions of whether the appealer was innocent or guilty, in both 
conditions. Therefore, while a visibly distressed appealer elevated sympathetic 
reactions of judges this did not regulate their cognitive processes, inferring that 
this did not contribute to explicit decisions (whether knowingly or otherwise).  
There was also no appearance and attractiveness bias present at least in 
the current sample, probably in part due to the lack of manipulation of this 
variable in this study. No conscious effort was made to find a set of appealers who 
were attractive and two who were not, partially because it is difficult with a 
limited sample of high stakes data and partly because it was not a main aim of the 
present study. Rather, this implicit judgment was included to examine the 
likelihood it was used in regulating veracity decisions via superficial processing.  
Tentative inferences can be drawn from the present study, but warrants 
further studies with a higher number of videos and trials. This conjecture would 
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benefit from further research as to whether level of emotional display really 
causes a change in the way information is processed by people and whether this 
causality subsequently alters and/or affects guilt-innocence decisions.  
An issue with using only innocent appealers was that it cannot be 
determined from the regression analyses as to whether results are predicting 
accurate explicit decisions, or simply what implicit judgments participants were 
using for the appeal videos. This issue will be addressed in the next chapter. The 
next chapter will examine the role of presentation format to remove or at least 
reduce both the meta-emotion and appearance biases. Though this chapter 
presented limitations in working with high stakes data, the importance of using 
ecologically valid stimulus material cannot be overvalued.   
 Another limitation of the present methodology considers the base rate 
argument and chance veracity assessments. For example, should the base rate of 
the stimulus to be assessed be 90% truthful and judges guessed truth all the time, 
judges would obtain 90% ‘accuracy’ simply by guesswork.  This accuracy is simply 
an artefact (Burgoon, 2015a), rather than judges achieving a 90% accuracy. Thus, 
using only truthful appeals makes it problematic to study an innocence detection 
accuracy (true negative rate), or specificity. The remainder of studies in the 
present thesis will employ a 50/50 ratio of truthful and deceitful appeals to control 
for innocence and guilt biases. Using this methodology, an examination of not only 
guilt accuracy (sensitivity) also known as true positive rate, can be reported as 
well as innocence accuracy (specificity) or true negative rate (Burgoon, 2015a). 
 Another apparent limitation was that content could not be controlled for in 
the appeals used in this study. Content of highly emotional appeals differed from 
those with low levels of emotion (it was simply unrealistic to locate a highly 
emotional appeal and a low emotional appeal with the exact same content), and 
this may affect veracity judgments separately to the emotional component. While 
chi square results would suggest a relationship between how accurate judges were 
in their explicit decisions and the level of emotionality, these results are of course 
still subject to further replication and investigation. Content differences still 
remain an issue, and in order to address this, the subsequent study will follow a 
different methodological approach, employing a between-subjects methodology.  
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Lastly, by applying the phase of only including Judges who agreed with 
the author’s categorisation of the emotional level in the chosen videos, this raises 
the possibility of rendering certain cues as correlational. For example, a Judge 
may think that an appealer is telling the truth and subsequently that they look 
emotional, or that the appealer is lying and subsequently that they do not look 
emotional either, or even that they look emotional and therefore they must be 
telling the truth. Currently there is no way to tell whether cue A affected cue B, 
or the other way around is true (see Section 9.9 for a brief discussion of this). 
This inter-relational process of the association between cues still requires further 
distilling in future studies.  
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CHapter 8: StudY 2 
 
 
 
 
 
perCeptIOn OF SOurCe preSentatIOn 
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From the results presented in Study 1 (Chapter 7) it was recognised that 
perceived emotional display has, to a certain extent, an impact on eliciting mental 
shortcuts. For example, judges felt significantly higher levels of meta-emotion 
with highly emotional content compared to ones lacking them. At times, some of 
these biases then did not contribute to explicit veracity decisions (i.e. one may have 
felt significantly more sympathetic towards a highly emotional appealer but it may 
have no bearings towards how trustworthy they think they are, as shown in the 
previous chapter). Results from the previous chapter may have been convoluted 
by the differences in the actual content of the appeals.  The current chapter refines 
its experimental methods and proposes that presentation format may prompt 
certain heuristics to be utilised and others to be suppressed. 
The rationale in studying presentation mode stems from several research 
studies which allege visual bias in regulating judgments and decision making, as 
will be expounded below in the literature review section of this chapter. Ekman 
(1981) stated that non-verbal modes of communication are particularly useful in 
detecting deception, but only so with the presence of emotions. Moreover, in 
situations that present relatively low motivation to deceive, the possibility is lower 
that emotions should emerge. Conversely, television appeals present high 
motivation to deceive if guilty and to solve the investigation if innocent, with 
appealers relying on a visual channel to plead their case.  
In order to understand how visual cues may affect innocence-guilt 
judgments, existing literature on presentation format are discussed, together 
with their impact on cognitive processes, sentencing and veracity judgments.  
 
8.1 Presentation format 
Chapter 2 showed how Source content can alter and influence its 
believability. The current chapter examines manipulation of Source 
characteristics – its presentation mode.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, Bond and DePaulo’s (2006) meta-analyses 
revealed that truth-lie judgment accuracy declines when judging visible compared 
to audible lies. The authors suggested that one of the reasons for this finding is 
because it the typical typecast of someone who is lying is most easily brought out 
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in a visual presentation mode. When someone has to judge the veracity of a sender 
with limited information or evidence other than a given video, they do not have 
many other alternatives but to resort to their understanding and stereotypes 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006), which may potentially lead to biased judgments. 
Currently, it is still largely unknown if comparable results will be revealed for 
innocence-guilt judgments using television appeals.  
In addition, support for reviewing presentation format comes from other 
studies in the lie detection literature such as one by Anderson et al. (1999).  Using 
pairs of friends as participants, results indicated that some the cues generated 
from their open-ended responses were from the appearance of their friend such as 
overall demeanour (i.e. they were less comfortable when telling the story), salient 
emotions (they were crying) and visual cues (i.e. they looked at me in the eyes). 
Their study showed that participants tended to mention more verbal cues, such as 
the content of the story or plausibility when judging an honest account, and in 
comparison, more likely to mention cues pertaining to appearance and demeanour 
such as nervousness and eye contact level when judging a deceptive account.  
Anderson et al. (1999) offered two explanations for why this difference in 
tendencies to mention different cues for truths and lies exist. The first explanation 
they posited was that perhaps their participants were observing reliable cues; 
however, the participants were not using said cues in their assessments. For 
example, the authors contended that if their friend’s story content was truthful, 
they perhaps picked up on aspects of the story content that were honest. When the 
story content is not so convincing and lacks believability, they may have been 
doubtful and sought after other cues to deception such as visual cues. Anderson et 
al. (1999) contended that it is possible observers first note verbal cues, and only 
when this cue is unsuccessful in persuading them, they move to a different cue. 
The authors also speculated from these results that their participants might have 
not fully understood the meaning of their own assessments. For example, they 
failed to recognise that the movement from pursuing story plausibility and 
consistency to visual cues could possibly be a hint that their friend may be lying. 
The authors also presented the possibility that another reason why different cues 
were mentioned for truthful versus deceptive stories were not due to differences 
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in attention, but in the memory retrieval processes and/or in the cue reporting 
stage. They suggested that participants who heard honest accounts perhaps 
encoded and/or retrieved memories relating to story content comparatively at a 
higher level than visual cues.  
Anderson et al.’s (1999) study indicated that a difference in implicit 
information processing occurs for truthful and deceptive accounts, and that the 
sources endorsing the implicit judgments were either visual or verbal. In relation 
to the present thesis and in consideration of the previous chapter’s limitations, the 
question is then raised as to whether implicit judgments will be affected when the 
visual cue of television appeals is removed and whether these differences further 
extends to appeals made by innocent and guilty senders. In addition, removing the 
visual cue potentially eliminates the probability of certain biases and heuristics 
occurring such as the appearance/attractiveness bias.  
 
8.2 Cognitive loading 
Additional support for increased accuracy when presented with only one 
channel comes from cognitive loading theory. Besides being more prone to 
incorrect reliance on visual cues, observers may also undergo an increase in 
cognitive load when perceiving an added visual element in the audio-visual 
format, let alone multiple appealers at times. An increase in cognitive load implies 
either an increase in the amount of information elements or sources to be 
processed or that a higher demand for processing is consigned for the same amount 
of information coming from the same source (Lavie, 2005; Sweller, 2010). The 
cognitive load theory (CLT) posits that at any one time, a working memory can 
process only a limited amount of information pieces (Miller, 1956). Chandler and 
Sweller (1996) asserted that CLT does not always recommend the integration of 
information from multiple sources. It is only required when the split information 
sources are incomprehensible when not integrated and do not supply all necessary 
information.  
 Research in several fields has shown that imposing cognitive load decreases 
performance, accuracy in performing tasks, motoric functions or memory 
(Vredeveldt, Hitch & Baddeley, 2011; Logie, Gilhooly & Wynn, 1994; Yogev-
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Seligmann, Rotem-Galili, Dickstein, Giladi & Hausdorff, 2011; Longstaffe, Hood 
& Gilchrist, 2014; Mann & Vrij, 2006; Weaver & Stewart, 2012). Otten, Alain and 
Picton (2000) found that visual loading impacts auditory processing, enhancing 
task performance. Hoffmann, von Helversen and Rieskamp (2013) recently 
discovered that cognitive load can, on the contrary, be advantageous rather than 
detrimental. In their study, they found that cognitive load encouraged a change to 
a similarity-based judgment strategy, which subsequently led to more accurate 
judgments. The authors argued that the outcome of cognitive loading boils down 
to the specific circumstance and/or type of load.  
Based on the number of studies mentioned above, research suggests that 
cognitive load impairs performance and judgment on critical tasks. Removing the 
visual cue in television appeals in effect imposes less cognitive load onto observers. 
By separating the visual dimension from the audio in the current study, it can be 
observed whether observers can perceive veracity and deceit through one channel 
of source information. Having examined the literature, including those on 
cognitive load theory, it is hypothesised that participants exposed to the Audio-
only condition will achieve higher explicit rating compared to those in the Audio-
visual condition.  
 
8.3 Attractiveness and appearance bias 
 As aforementioned, by presenting an audio-only condition to observers this, 
to all intents and purposes, sees to the removal of a visual cue bias. Encompassed 
within this visual cue bias is the attractiveness and appearance bias. To reiterate, 
it is well documented that the attractiveness of a speaker has an effect in veracity 
decision making as exemplified in Chapters 2 and 7. The general implication from 
much of research in social psychology and in criminology shows that one’s 
attractiveness and appearance impacts judgments of those judging their veracity.  
In the last chapter, it was found that some judges did not agree with the 
operational definition chosen for what constitutes a highly emotional appeal and 
what constitutes a low emotional appeal (see Section 7.9). This step was taken to 
ensure that the intended independent variable is really measuring what it is 
supposed to. However, in the current chapter (while still aspiring to assess the 
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visual influence on decision making), a way to bypass this issue is to manipulate 
presentation mode instead. In doing so, the question as to whether implicit 
judgments will be influenced by visual cues can be evaluated. 
 In the current chapter, the implicit variable of voice attractiveness is a point 
of interest. While observers may not be able to visually see how attractive an 
appealer is, a person’s voice can also contribute to how attractive a person is 
perceived to be (Ekman, Friesen & Scherer, 1976). Sound or vocal attractiveness 
can be referred to as how pleasant or unpleasant someone sounds to listeners 
(Bruckert, Bestelmeyer, Latinus, Rouger, Charest, Rousselet, Kawahara & Belin, 
2010). Hughes, Dispenza and Gallup Jr. (2004) found that how participants rated 
the attractiveness of a voice correlated and predicted sexual behaviour and body 
configuration. Another study with regards to the effects of sound and how it affects 
judgement was conducted by Surawski and Ossoff (2006), where participants 
rated the physical and vocal attractiveness of politicians.  The authors found that 
if a politician had an unattractive voice, the ratings for this politician were low 
even if the politician was physically attractive. Therefore, even with the removal 
of a visual appearance and attractiveness bias, the perceived attractiveness of an 
appealer’s voice may lead to superficial information processing. Moreover, this 
potential bias has never been tested in an audio-only format in comparison with 
an audio-visual one. 
 
8.4 Innocence bias  
 In lie detection literature, Buller, Strzyzewski and Hunsaker (1991) 
observed that face-to-face communication was more easily affected by truth bias 
whereas participants viewing through other media were not as susceptible. It is 
not known whether an innocence bias will carry over when judges are asked to 
make innocence-guilt assessments. 
 
8.5 Meta-emotion bias 
 Similarly, a meta-emotion bias may be affected due to the elimination of 
visual cues, which can prompt differences in implicit judgments according to how 
television appeals are presented format-wise. Hussain, Calvo and Chen (2013) 
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proposed that viewers experience cognitive loading when presented a task which 
requires an emotional response. The emotional response impedes and impacts 
upon their accuracy in performing the task as well as their behavioural response 
towards it forming a circular argument. When watching an emotionally laden 
television appeal, for example, observers may perceive and experience certain 
emotions when they believe that the appealer is lying, which possibly prompts 
then to search for visual cues that may point to their deception.  The removal of a 
visual element may reduce perceived and experienced emotions to some level. In 
turn this can result in fewer searches for invalid indicators of deception to support 
the experienced emotions. 
 
8.6 Cognition of Source content bias 
 Likewise, these implicit variables introduced in previous chapters may also 
be influenced depending on the presentation format. 
 
8.7 Key issues to explore 
 The general premise of the current study is that by presenting a television 
appeal in an Audio-only format, the observers will be removed from unnecessary 
and even misleading visual variables (that may or may not be related to 
deception). By removing the visual element, not only is cognitive load hoped to be 
reduced, the issue of using a visual-based heuristic is made unavailable. The main 
hypothesis is that there will be a difference in explicit accuracy rates for both 
mediums, with the accuracy rates improved when the appealers are presented 
audio-visually compared to an audio-only channel. An additional hypothesis is to 
uncover predictors of veracity judgments, with the hypothesis being predictors will 
vary for both channels, due to expected underlying cognitive mechanisms in both 
channels. Observers may adapt and use different implicit cues to aid themselves 
in making veracity decisions – in a condition where both visual and verbal cues 
are available and salient to them and differently in a condition where the visual 
cue is not available.   
 
8.8 Methods  
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8.8.1 Participants 
 This sample of participants totalled to 180 participants for both groups, 
with 720 cases as each participant judged four cases of these appeals. None of the 
participants personally knew any of the featured appealers in this study but some 
reported knowledge of certain appeals from watching or hearing it on television. 
They were recruited using a mixture of snowball and opportunity sampling from 
the UK and Europe. They were from varying occupations ranging from financial 
advisor to engineer to chemist to carpenter to cleaner to gardener to insurance 
broker and more; as well as varying nationalities/ethnicities (British, Asian, 
African, Middle Eastern and European).   
 
8.8.2 Material and procedure  
 A methodological consideration in the current study is the usage of a 
between-subjects design instead of a within-subjects one as in the previous 
chapter. The advantage of using a between-subjects design is the ability to 
determine not only what implicit decisions were used by judges, but also what 
generated and predicted accurate explicit decisions. In addition, this design 
controls for appeal content, in that both conditions will be exposed to the same 
appealers with the same appeal context, thus there is no issue of sender 
detectability here. This was impossible for Study 1 as one cannot manipulate or 
change an appealer’s emotional display in real life high stakes data. The appeal 
content will remain the same for this study. By using two different presentation 
modes with the same appeal content, it can be said with a higher level of certainty 
that implicit judgments are directly related with the experimental conditions. 
Furthermore, the use a between-subjects design decreases demand characteristics 
compared to a within-subjects design (Rubin & Badea, 2010; Orne, 1962).  
 Another refinement in the present study is the use of both true and false 
appeals as an independent variable. Evidence from previous research suggests 
that differences exist in processing and veracity judgments, with regards to the 
actual veracity of the source (Just & Carpenter, 1976; Johnson-Laird & Savary, 
1999). Not sure answers for all implicit decisions will be recorded for the remaining 
cases retained for analyses. 
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As a between-subjects experimental design, two sets of press conferences 
will be selected for the purpose of this study. In the first set, judges will be exposed 
to press conferences in an Audio-visual format. In the second, the same press 
conferences will be viewed by a different group of judges without the visual 
element. Thus, all judges will experience the exact same Audio content of the 
appeals in a non-randomised order; the only difference being that one group will 
watch the appeal with a visual element of the appealers pleading and the other 
group did not. The videos will be put into a PowerPoint presentation, and range 
from 34.21 seconds to 160.09 seconds in length with an average of 69.74 seconds 
each. The general methodology of how the experiment will be conducted is outlined 
under Section 6.3 in Chapter 6. 
 Regarding the content of the appeals, some of the appeals are interviews 
and some others are direct appeals; this is due to the limited choice of appeals 
present for the current study. It is recognised that presentation of videos may 
confound with veracity. There is a likelihood that interviews could be more 
persuasive (or otherwise) than direct appeals. That said, since the current study 
executes a between-subjects experimental design, all judges in both conditions 
will experience the same set of appeals be it interviews or direct appeals in terms 
of appeal content. Thus, the fact that not all press conferences selected are direct 
appeals will not affect between-subjects responses. Judges will follow the same 
instructions and procedure as Study 1 in the last chapter. The same method of 
analysing results will be conducted in this study. To test if there was a 
statistically significant relationship between the accuracy of judges’ explicit 
decisions and presentation mode, a Chi-square will be computed.  
 As the previous chapter, logistic regressions for within-group analyses will 
also be carried out to determine which implicit responses predict their explicit 
decisions. This analysis will be used to explore the relationship between explicit 
and implicit decisions, regardless of whether judges may have attended to implicit 
cues consciously or unconsciously and meaningfully or otherwise. Regressions will 
also be conducted to determine which implicit responses predict accurate explicit 
decisions. Variance inflation factors (VIF) will also be analysed to check for 
multicollinearity (Dart, 2017). Two additional Mann Whitney U tests will be 
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conducted for honest and false appeals between both conditions as the present 
study utilises two true and two false appeals and judges may utilise different 
implicit cues for truthful and false appeals. 
 Unlike the previous chapter, the present study will only contain ten 
independent variables in all bootstrapped models (plausibility, wording, 
organised-speech, story sense, credibility, practice, well-thought-out, voice 
attractiveness and meta-emotion level). The variables of emotions will be 
removed as judges in the Audio-only condition will not be able to visually 
appreciate these. The bootstrapping process was applied here (Efron, 1979). This 
process operates by generating a new sample from a given sample size. It is very 
useful for small sample sizes (Adèr, Mellenbergh & Hand, 2008) and works by 
making extrapolations of a population from a sample data. This process samples 
this data and then makes extrapolations about a sample from re-sampled data 
(Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). In the present study, this process is repeated 1000 
times. 
 
8.8.3 Ground truth  
Appeal 1 shows an innocent female giving an account of her murdered 
daughter and directly appeals to the killer who murdered her daughter. Interview 
2 shows a guilty female giving an account of what happened the day her boyfriend 
went missing. Interview 3 shows an innocent male giving an account of what 
happened the day his wife went missing and directly appeals to the public for 
information. Appeal 4 shows a guilty male giving an account of what happened the 
day his granddaughter went missing. In all four cases, substantial evidence was 
found to either discredit false appealer’s claims or reinforce true appealers’ claims 
concerning the fate of their relatives. For Appealer 1, another man was convicted 
of the crime of killing her daughter; for Interviewee 2, various pieces of evidence 
were presented in court including a gun, rented car, phone, friends, camera, palm 
print DNA; for Interviewee 3, his alibi stands and another killer was convicted of 
raping and murdering his wife; and for Appealer 4, a tip from a member of the 
public and the found body were the main evidence. 
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8.9 Results 
8.9.1 Participants 
 After removing cases where participants had knowledge of the appeals, 616 
cases remained for analysis. The number of participants was N = 180, with 94 
participants (317 cases) for the Audio-only condition and 86 participants (299 
cases) for the Audio-visual condition. The final pool of participants ranged from 17 
to 75 years in age (M = 29.96, SD = 12.62).  
 
8.9.2 Explicit veracity judgments 
 As presented in Table 6, judges in the Audio-only condition recorded an 
overall rating of nearly 70%. This rating was higher than what was reported by 
those in the Audio-visual condition which, at 53.45%, was very near chance level.  
 
8.9.3 Relationship between source presentation and explicit judgment rates 
 Chi square results were χ2 (1) = 13.761, p < .05. This revealed that there 
was a statistically significant association between accuracy of judges’ explicit 
decisions and presentation mode. The two variables (accuracy of explicit ratings 
and Audio-only versus Audio-visual) are dependent and/or related. The strength 
of association between the variables was .163, indicating a weak relationship 
(Davis, 1971). Phi values indicate the strength of this relationship and chosen over 
Cramer’s V as both variables used in the sample are dichotomous (Jones, 2009). 
The strength of association between the variables was small (.163), demonstrating 
the presence of a weak relationship (Real Statistics Using Excel, 2017). 
 
8.9.4 Innocence bias 
 Table 5 shows judgment rates for true and false appeals for both conditions. 
The results of the current study did not support the presence of an innocence bias. 
Furthermore, accuracy was lower for truthful appeals compared to false appeals 
in the Audio-visual condition.  In the Audio-only condition however, this pattern 
was reversed. 
 
Table 5 
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Judgment rates for True and False appeals for Audio-only and Audio-visual 
conditions 
 
Appeals Audio-only  Audio-visual  
False 65.70% 54.90% 
True 72.60% 52.00% 
Total 69.20% 53.45% 
 
8.9.5 Implicit veracity judgments 
Non-parametric tests were applied to questionnaire items analyse in 
greater detail the differences in implicit veracity judgments. Results for the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality (Massey, 1951; Smirnov, 1948) indicated 
that the score distributions deviated significantly from a normal distribution (D = 
.102, p < .005). Cronbach’s alpha, the estimated internal consistency, for each scale 
items are presented in Table 6. Again, implications are reviewed in depth in 
Chapter 11 under Sections 11.6 and 11.7. Results from the Wilcoxon test, and 
effect sizes (r), can be found in Table 7. 
 
Table 6 
Cronbach's alpha coefficients for Study 2 
 
Meta-emotion Cognition 
0.56 0.35 
 
Implicit decisions revealed several underlying perceptual differences of 
judges for the two conditions. Interestingly, the appealer’s voice was perceived to 
be significantly more attractive in the Audio-visual condition with a mean of 2.30 
(SD = 1.322) compared to those in the Audio-only condition which recorded a mean 
of 1.99 (SD = 1.268). The two conditions recorded significantly different meta-
emotion levels, with judges who could only hear the appeals recording a lower 
mean of sympathetic reaction and character identification at 9.54 (SD = 3.568) and 
those who were in the Audio-visual condition at a mean of 10.44 (SD = 3.123. 
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Judges in the Audio-visual condition reported a higher mean for whether the 
appealer’s wording was assembled in a manner that was pleasant to hear at a 
mean higher (M = 2.25, SD = 1.05) than those in the Audio-only condition (M = 
1.87, SD = 1.09).  
 
Table 7 
Mann Whitney U implicit assessment for Audio-only and Audio-visual conditions 
 
  
Audio-only 
mean 
Audio-
visual 
mean 
Z r 
Innocence 
score 
    
 
            
Credibility 
2.046 (1.213) 1.777 (1.307) -2.118 NA 
Cognition of Source 
content scores 
  
 
            
Plausibility 
2.025 (1.251) 2.127 (1.224) -0.161 NA 
 
            Story 
Sense 
1.986 (1.319) 2.087 (0.899) -0.516 NA 
 
            
Practice 
2.004 (1.125) 1.891 (1.389) -0.57 NA 
 
Well-
thought-out 
2.192 (1.188) 2.118 (1.253) -0.167 NA 
 
            
Organised 
2.110 (1.100) 2.190 (0.880) -1.118 NA 
 
            
Wording 
1.870 
(1.090) 
2.250 
(1.050) 
-4.469 -0.18 
Appearance score    
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Voice 
attractiven
ess 
1.993 
(1.268) 
2.300 
(1.322) 
-4.381 -0.16 
Meta-
emotion 
score 
  
9.538 
(3.568) 
10.437 
(3.123) 
-3.949 -0.15 
 
Note: Significant p values are in bold (p < 0.01). Standard deviations appear in parentheses.  
 
8.9.5.1 Honest versus false appeals 
As the present study utilised two true and two false appeals, judges may 
have detected different implicit cues for truthful and false appeals. In other words, 
judges could have picked up different cues for innocent and guilty appealers. To 
distinguish between judgments made for true appeals and comparing this with 
those made for false appeals and whether these differences are significant between 
both conditions, separate Mann-Whitney Us were conducted. 
For true appeals, significant differences were found for perceived wording, 
with the Audio-only condition reporting a mean of 2.80 (SD = 1.21) and the Audio-
visual condition reporting a mean of 3.09 (SD = 1.06). Significant differences were 
also found for perceived voice attractiveness, with the Audio-only condition 
reporting a mean of 2.15 (SD = 1.18) and the Audio-visual condition reporting a 
mean of 1.90 (SD = 1.32). There were no significant differences found for false 
appeals. Again, effect sizes were very small as indicated in Tables 8 and 9 in the r 
column. 
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Table 8  
Mann Whitney U item scores for false appeals between Audio-only and Audio-visual conditions 
 
 
 False appeals   
 Audio-only means (SD) Audio-visual means (SD) z r 
Innocence score     
Credibility 2.359 (1.257) 2.047 (1.338) 0.066 NA 
Cognition of Source content 
scores     
Plausibility 2.295 (1.266) 2.496 (1.119) -0.328 NA 
Story Sense 2.089 (1.424) 2.322 (0.881) -1.163 NA 
Practice 1.925 (1.058) 1.906 (1.439) 0.214 NA 
Organised  2.750 (1.258) 2.580 (1.130) 0.743 NA 
Well-thought-out 2.034 (1.200) 2.189 (1.207) 0.078 NA 
Wording 2.670 (1.025) 3.090 (1.116) 2.001 NA 
Appearance scores     
Voice attractiveness 1.843 (1.332) 2.259 (1.304) 0.227 NA 
Meta-emotion score 10.164 (3.046) 10.897 (2.925) 0.172 NA 
Note: Significant p values are in bold; p< 0.01. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
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Table 9 
Mann Whitney U item scores for true appeals between Audio-only and Audio-visual condition 
 
 True appeals   
 Audio-only means (SD) Audio-visual means (SD) z r 
Innocence score     
Credibility 1.719 (1.077) 1.441 (1.191) 1.992 NA 
Cognition of Source content 
scores     
Plausibility 1.741 (1.175) 1.667 (1.190) -1.020 NA 
Story Sense 1.879 (1.196) 1.794 (0.836) 0.299 NA 
Practice 3.050 (1.102) 2.950 (1.230) 0.439 NA 
Organised  2.930 (1.179) 2.879 (1.123) -1.703 NA 
Well-thought-out 3.260 (1.142) 3.190 (1.060) -1.538 NA 
Wording 2.800 (1.212) 3.090 (1.060) 4.229 0.17 
Appearance scores     
Voice attractiveness 2.150 (1.181) 1.902 (1.324) -2.970 -0.11 
Meta-emotion score 8.885 (2.861) 7.886 (3.976) 2.230 NA 
Note: Significant p values are in bold; p <0.01. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
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8.9.6 Logistic regression analyses 
Binary logistic regressions were conducted to assess which implicit cues 
judges may have used to predict their explicit veracity judgments within both 
conditions (rather than between conditions). The effect sizes between the 
differences for both conditions were very small in those tests but were useful in 
indicating where differences lie in judgments and whether this was for truthful or 
false appeals. Logistic regressions were carried out to investigate participant 
accuracy as dependent measures for both conditions. Again, predictor variables 
included in regression analyses were derived from an extensive review of the 
literature expounded in the opening chapters of the present thesis. 
In this study, tolerance was greater than .10 for all items, and the variance 
inflation factor was also less than 10 for all items. This suggests that 
multicollinearity was not an issue in this study (meta-emotion, Tolerance = 
0.81, VIF = 1.24; credibility, Tolerance = 0.78, VIF = 1.27; plausibility, Tolerance 
= 0.69, VIF = 1.46; practice, Tolerance = 0.85, VIF = 1.18; voice attractiveness, 
Tolerance = 0.91; VIF = 1.01; organised speech, Tolerance = 0.79; VIF = 1.42; less 
emotions, Tolerance = 0.75; VIF = 1.33; wording, Tolerance = 0.82; VIF = 1.22; 
well-thought-out, Tolerance = 0.91, VIF = 1.10; emotions match, Tolerance = 0.94, 
VIF = 1.10). 
Although VIF values suggest that multicollinearity was not an issue in 
this study, precautions are also taken to reduce false positive findings. False 
positive findings are also synonymous with the fishing and error rate problem, or 
alpha inflation (Parker & Szymanski, 1992). This threat occurs when a high 
number of multiple statistical comparisons are being conducted and the 
possibility of making a Type I error increases with each comparison in attempt to 
test hypotheses and finding a significant effect (Parker & Szymanski, 1992). The 
result presents threats to statistical conclusion validity and drawing accurate 
conclusions about the relationship of the variables studied. To lower this risk of 
false positives and to increase confidence in results, a more stringent cut-off 
point will be employed for the regression analyses (p < 0.01).  
For prediction of explicit decisions in the Audio-only condition, the full 
model indicates that it was able to distinguish between respondents who explicitly 
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reported Guilty from the ones who reported Innocent, with results reported as χ2 
(8, N = 108) = 32.34, p < .001. The model as a whole explained between 18% (Cox 
and Snell R2) and 24% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in veracity judgments, and 
correctly classified 68% of cases. As shown in Table 10, only one independent 
variable made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model for this 
group. This predictor was how well-thought-out judges thought the appeal was, 
with the odds ratio (OR) of 0.63. 
Next, consideration as to which implicit veracity judgments measured in 
the present study contributed to the accuracy of their explicit judgment was also 
made. Another binary logistic regression with the actual accuracy of judges’ 
explicit veracity judgments as the dependent measure in this condition was 
conducted, and the full model indicates that it was able to distinguish between 
respondents who explicitly reported Guilty from the ones who reported Innocent, 
with results reported as χ2 (8, N = 180) = 16.49, p < .05. The model as a whole 
explained between 6% (Cox and Snell R2) and 8% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance 
in accuracy, and correctly classified 69% of cases. As shown in Table 11, only one 
independent variable made a unique statistically significant contribution to the 
model for this condition. They were only accurate by using the implicit judgment 
of whether the overall appearance of the appealer was credible or not (OR = 0.68).  
 For prediction of explicit judgements in the Audio-visual condition, the 
binary logistic regression model indicates that it was able to distinguish between 
respondents who explicitly reported Guilty from the ones who reported Innocent, 
with results reported as χ2 (8, N = 180) = 54.14, p < .005. The model as a whole 
explained between 21% (Cox and Snell R2) and 28% (Nagelkerke R2) of the 
variance in veracity judgments, and correctly classified 73% of cases. As shown in 
Table 10, three independent variables made a unique statistically significant 
contribution to the model for this condition. These predictors were how well-
thought-out they judged the appeal to be (OR = 1.76), how attractive they judged 
the voice of the appealer was (OR = 1.75), and whether they thought the appealer 
worded the appeal in a manner that is pleasant to hear (OR = 1.18).   
Consideration was then given to which implicit veracity judgments 
measured in the present study contributed to the accuracy of explicit judgment in 
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the Audio-visual condition. Another binary logistic regression with the actual 
‘accuracy’ of judges’ explicit veracity judgments as the dependent measure in this 
group was ran. The full model indicates that it was able to distinguish between 
respondents who explicitly reported Guilty from the ones who reported Innocent, 
with results reported as χ2 (8, N = 180) = 15.63, p < .05. The model as a whole 
explained between 7% (Cox and Snell R2) and 9% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance 
in accuracy. There is no straightforward, commonly accepted measure for the fit 
of a regression model (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2015); the answer is governed by the 
aim of a particular study. If the main aim of the study was to determine which 
predictors are statistically significant and whether the changes in the predictors 
have a relationship with the change in the outcome variable, the R2 value is 
virtually completely immaterial (Frost, 2013). A low R2 value is only problematic 
when the study’s aim is to produce precise predictions. Valuable inferences on the 
relationship between the changes in the predictor values being connected with the 
changes in response values can be made even with low R2 values, if statistically 
significant predictors exist (Frost, 2013). The rate of correct classification is an 
alternative method to assess the model’s predictive accuracy. The current model 
correctly classified 63% of cases. A high proportion of correct classification 
indicates that the model works well (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2015). As shown in Table 
11, only one independent variable made a unique statistically significant 
contribution to the model for this condition. This implicit variable was how 
organised the judges thought the appeal was (OR = .58).
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Table 10 
Bootstrapped binary logistics regression models for explicit veracity judgments between Audio-only and Audio-visual condition 
 
 
 Model 1: Audio-only Model 2: Audio-visual 
Variables B (SE) OR 95% C.I. (Lower, Upper) p B (SE) OR 
95% C.I. (Lower, 
Upper) p 
Credibility .249 (.119) 1.282 1.015, 1.619 0.037 .243 (.131) 1.275 .986, 1.649 0.064 
Plausibility .250 (.113) 1.284 1.028, 1.560 0.027 -.131 (.138) 0.877 .670, 1.148 0.339 
Story Sense .083 (.110) 1.087 .876, 1.348 0.448 -.176 (.193) 0.838 .574, 1.224 0.361 
Practice -.132 (.127) 0.876 .682, 1.124 0.298 -.221 (.119) 0.802 .635, 1.012 0.063 
Well-thought-out -.460 (.135) 0.631 .485, .822 0.001 .566 (.133) 1.761 1.356, 2.285 0.000 
Wording .207 (.140) 1.229 .935, 1.617 0.139 .167 (.170) 1.182 .847, 1.651 0.004 
Organised -.096 (.140) 0.909 .690, 1.197 0.496 -.546 (.186) 0.580 .402, .835 0.965 
Voice -.091 (.118) 0.913 .725, 1.150 0.442 .561 (.131) 1.752 1.357, 2.263 0.000 
Meta-emotion .101 (.042) 1.106 1.019, 1.200 0.016 -.123 (.055) 0.884 .793, .986 0.012 
Model 
description 
Model is statistically significant: χ2 = 55.29; df = 9; 
Nagelkerke's R2 = .238; Hosmer-Lemeshow test: χ2 = 8.258; df 
= 8; p = .409     
Model is statistically significant: χ2 = 54.143; df = 8;  
Nagelkerke's R2 = .281; Hosmer-Lemeshow test: χ2 = 10.27;  
df = 8; p = .247    
 
Note: Significant p values are in bold (p < 0.01). Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
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Table 11 
Bootstrapped binary logistic regression models for accurate explicit veracity judgments between Audio-only and Audio-visual 
condition 
 Model 1: Audio-only Model 2: Audio-visual 
Variables B (SE) OR 95% C.I. (Lower, Upper) p B (SE) OR 
95% C.I. (Lower, 
Upper) p 
Credibility -.383 (.121) 0.682 .538, 0.865 0.002 -.103 (.049) 1.108 .769, 1.218 0.780 
Plausibility .146 (.118) 1.158 .919, 1.458 0.213 -.252 (.128) 0.780 .604, .999 0.049 
Story Sense .076 (.113) 1.079 .881, 1.370 0.504 .177 (.180) 1.197 .839, 1.698 0.326 
Practice -.068 (.128) 0.934 .864, 1.346 0.593 .000 (.104) 1.000 .815, 1.230 0.997 
Well-thought-out .128 (.129) 1.137 .883, 1.465 0.320 -.288 (.115) 0.750 .598, .940 0.013 
Wording .053 (.138) 1.055 .804, 1.384 0.699 .167 (.170) 1.188 .847, 1.651 0.326 
Organised .007 (.142) 1.007 .762, 1.330 0.963 -.546 (.186) 0.580 .402, .835 0.003 
Voice .108 (.121) 1.114 .879, 1.412 0.373 -.154 (.186) 0.863 .696, 1.060 0.148 
Meta-emotion -.033 (.042) 0.968 .891, 1.051 0.433 .103 (.049) 1.110 1.001, 1.220 0.036 
Model 
description 
Model is statistically significant: χ2 = 16.49; df = 8; 
Nagelkerke's R2 = .08; Hosmer-Lemeshow test: χ2 = 11.45; df = 
8; p = .178     
Model is statistically significant: χ2 = 15.63; df = 8;  
Nagelkerke's R2 = .088; Hosmer-Lemeshow test: χ2 = 6.11;  
df = 8; p = .635    
 
Note: Significant p values are in bold (p <0.01). Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
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8.9.7 Not-sure answers frequencies 
 As described in the Methods section, not-sure answers for all implicit 
decisions were recorded for the remaining cases retained for analyses. Only 
percentages of 10% difference and higher between both groups. Only percentage 
differences between both conditions that are higher than 10% were reported and 
this able can be found in Appendix J. Audio-only condition found it easier to rate 
perceived overall appealer credibility compared to the Audio-visual condition. 
 
8.10 Discussion 
In the present study, a distinction in explicit lie detection was found 
between both conditions: it seemed harder for participants to detect innocence and 
guilt when they could see the liar. The current study found better detection rates 
both explicitly and implicitly when the visual element of an appeal was removed. 
These results in this study would seem to replicate Bond and DePaulo’s (2006) 
findings that truth-lie judgment accuracy declines when judging visible compared 
to audible lies, albeit in the current chapter this decline pertains to innocence-
guilt judgments. Thinking patterns also appeared to be different for deceptive and 
truthful stimuli. Differences in processing veracity judgments seems to be 
influenced by the actual veracity of the source, showing the benefits of including a 
50/50 ratio of innocent and guilty appealers.  
Explicit veracity judgments were higher than chance level in the Audio-only 
condition when compared with the Audio-visual condition, suggesting that mode 
of presentation for these high-stake scenarios impacted decision processes. 
Looking at explicit innocence-guilt detection rates, judges who were in the Audio-
visual condition reported a total rate of around 54.00%, whereas judges in the 
Audio-only condition reported a rating of nearly 70.00%.  
There does not seem to be an innocence bias present for the Audio-only 
condition, with 72.60% rating for true appeals and 65.70% for false appeals, 
totalling to an overall of 69.20% rating. Overall, an innocence bias was not 
consistently found in the present study. However, the Audio-visual condition 
reported ratings that were similar to lie detection research, with ratings close to 
chance level. For false appeals the judges in this study achieved a rating of 54.90% 
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and for true appeals the percentage was 52.00% totalling to an overall rating of 
53.30%. A breakdown of the overall results can be found in Table 5. In this 
condition, judges achieved higher percentages in detecting guilty appealers than 
innocent ones.  
A difference was revealed in judges’ explicit decision (with a rating of 
72.60% in Audio-only compared to only 52.00% in Audio-visual). This either 
indicates that judges in both conditions were encoding some other implicit cues 
not captured in the questionnaire for only false appeals, or simply none of those 
cues were useful in detection deception for false appeals in this sample. 
Alternatively, this potentially highlights the distinction between explicit and 
implicit judgment processing. While this explanation requires further study, this 
draws attention to the occasion where judges cannot offer an implicit-type 
reasoning when offering an explicit decision to them (and vice versa). A case in 
point; Anderson et al. (1999) noted that participants in their study typically offered 
an implicit-type reasoning when they did not or could not explain with a 
significant explicit one.  
In examining the regression results, judges in the Audio-visual condition 
detected cues such as voice attractiveness that judges in the Audio-only condition 
did not. The results in Table 10 would suggest that innocent appealers were judged 
to have higher voice attractiveness than guilty ones by those in the Audio-visual 
condition. They also seem to have used a higher number of cues compared to the 
Audio-only condition as shown in Table 10. Innocent appealers were judged to 
have presented a more well-thought-out and pleasant-sounding appeal by those in 
the Audio-visual condition. It could again imply that the questionnaire used in 
this study did not capture the actual implicit cues used by judges in the Audio-
only condition. While still speculation at this stage, a possible explanation for the 
poorer performance in detecting innocence and guilt in the Audio-visual condition 
may perhaps be due to an increase in cognitive load when perceiving an added 
visual element. Judges in this condition could have conceivably experienced a 
wider expanse of information elements and/or sources to process, when the 
working memory can only process a limited amount of information pieces. The 
most common method of indirectly investigating cognitive load effects is analysing 
 132 
 
  
performance outcome. In the current study, it can be said that the main 
performance outcome is judges’ explicit veracity judgments.  
One of the limitations in this study is that there was no direct measure of 
cognitive loading, so this hypothesis remains to be tested in future studies. A more 
direct method to objectively measure cognitive loading is the use of a dual-task 
analysis, which posits that when judges has to perform two separate tasks at the 
same time, and particularly if requires the same resources in verbal or visual 
working memory then the available resources would have to be distributed 
between the two tasks (Brünken, Plass & Leutner, 2003). The performance level 
in both tasks would be the outcome variable with the hypothesis being lower 
performance in the dual-task group compared to the single-task one.  Yet another 
method is a self-reported stress level and/or self-reported difficulty of materials 
presented (Brünken et al., 2003). Another limitation of this study is that results 
could of course be idiosyncratic to these video clips, and the small number of videos 
used in the present study is noted. These results would be useful to be confirmed 
by further studies with a higher set of trials and different video clips to increase 
the study’s generalisability.  
In the between-group analyses of judges’ implicit veracity judgments, their 
meta-emotion levels showed a significant difference between both conditions 
shown by Mann Whitney U tests, though with very small effect sizes. Judges in 
the Audio-only condition felt significantly less sympathetic towards the appealers 
in comparison to those in the Audio-visual condition.  As can be seen in their 
explicit judgments, judges were much more accurate in judging an appealer’s 
veracity both true and false (over chance level) in the Audio-only condition as 
compared with their counterparts who hovered around chance level. This conveys 
over to the next point of discussion which is how they felt about the appealer was 
effectively impacted by what they could see. In a sense, they were very much less 
persuaded by the implicit judgment of appearance when they were not able to see 
it. Judges adapted and relied on verbal cues, as suggested by Anderson et al. (1999) 
when visual cues were not available to them.  
Regression results would suggest that presentation format influenced how 
judges thought, highlighting biases of emotional display when a visual element 
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was present. Chi square results would also infer this, although the strength of this 
relationship was weak. One of the reasons the strength of this relationship was 
weak is perhaps due to the length of the clips itself. The appeals presented to 
judges may have been too short; if judges were exposed to a longer stimulus 
material perhaps the strength of this relationship may have been larger and more 
prominent. Additionally, the length of appeal clips used in the present study 
varied considerably (from 34.21 seconds to 160.09 seconds). It is possible that this 
factor could have influenced making innocent-guilty judgments, with the content 
of longer appeals potentially having more influence over judgements and shorter 
ones having less impact (Masip et al., 2009). A fuller discussion as to the reasons 
of why this relationship was weak can be found in Sections 11.6 and 11.7 in 
Chapter 11. Although, it must be acknowledged that recent research by Street and 
Masip (2015) would argue that this is not explained by a time effect but rather due 
to the act of making within-statement comparisons which decreases truth bias. 
In summary, differences in thinking were found for both experimental and 
the present study provided some insight into whether the innocence bias 
hypothesis stands in this type of high-stakes situations. Tentatively, results would 
tend to suggest that the absence of visual input aids the detection of innocence-
guilt.  
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A worldwide study aiming to uncover stereotypes of liars conducted by the 
Global Deception Research Team found that among the top five invalid cues that 
individuals often used to judge deception was ‘speaker incoherence’ (2006, Study 
1). Over 25% of judges from 58 countries around the world held the belief that 
‘deceptive statements are incoherent’. As can be seen from this percentage, a 
very salient and easily accessible cue available for judges to pick up from a 
television appeal is the verbal aspect of what the appealer says, and whether 
their story makes logical sense.  
In the present study, attention is now paid to the Source content – verbal 
cues in particular – as Studies 1 and 2 addressed visual ones (appearance and 
emotional displays). Very few lie detection studies have employed manipulation of 
verbal content in a statement. Reinhard and Sporer (2010), one of the few known 
studies to have exercised manipulation of verbal content, manipulated the 
consistency and plausibility of the transcripts in their study. Implicit judgments 
of appeal believability may be influenced by the subjective impressions of the 
sequencing of a story (which alters the story sense). Canter et al. ’s (2003) work on 
narrative plausibility operated on the assumption that a narrative schema was 
the baseline for how 'true' a story was and provided a foundation for comparison. 
Anything that diverged from this baseline was seen to have a lower plausibility. 
They maintained that for observers to make either implicit or explicit judgments 
there are internal and external factors or attributions that lent to these 
judgments. The internal factor in this study was the appeal structure, which was 
essentially how the appeal was organised and develops. The external factors 
included possible biases and subjective perceptions of these appeal structures and 
appeal sense.  
Participants in Anderson et al. ’s (1999) study, when asked to assess their 
friends’ veracities, generated verbal cues such as story complexity (e.g. ‘The story 
was so vague, I thought it was a lie’) and story flow (e.g. ‘They seemed unsure of 
their own story; it didn’t flow’) and a general category the authors labelled story 
content or structure of the story (e.g. "It was a good story; it all made sense"). 
Similarly, the current study enquires into definitions and pre-existing research on 
    136 
  
 
perceptions of story sense and similar aspects such as story coherence, sense and 
story preparation. 
 
9.1 Definitions of coherence 
 Habermas and Bluck (2000) defined temporal coherence as activities that 
make orderly logic within an occurrence. They described ‘causal coherence’ as the 
ability to connect separate activities into causal sequences. ‘Thematic coherence’ 
was defined as the ability to extract an overarching theme or general message 
from a series of narrated events. Trabasso, Secco and van den Broek (1984) 
theorised that the coherence of a story is dependent on the causal cohesion, 
logically and causally, of the story’s individual events. The more cohesive the 
individual events are, the easier it will be to construct a coherent story. To 
understand a story is an effort to determine the causes that propelled the event, 
and the consequences of the event. The listener learns of the roots and outcomes 
of the event, directing them to an experience of the event in an orderly fashion as 
opposed to incoherent series of events. This association of sequences is where the 
authors claim a listener begins to deduce and generate responses. 
Labov (1972) suggested that a narrative that is temporally ordered lends to 
easy comprehension and remembering. Socially speaking, the author contended 
that a story must contain sufficient coherence to ensure communication of the 
story message to the listener. Stories that do not have a clear temporal structure, 
cause and effect can cause a listener to judge it as incoherent. McAdams (2006) 
contended that an account that abruptly starts at the supposed ending, to the 
beginning, then juxtaposing again forward temporally, can be challenging for a 
listener to track. The anticipation for a complete story is for it to comprise of a 
clear start, central event and finish to the observer. The author wrote that stories 
that illustrate characters without a clear motive, vague plot, no clear cause or 
consequence, or closure can be judged as incoherent as well. 
 
9.2 How does Coherence associate with Judgements of Plausibility and 
Story Sense 
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 In general, stories that are coherent are more likely to be received in a more 
positive light. Dictionaries offer definitions of ‘incoherency’ as a story that is 
incomprehensible and unintelligible, lacking logical and internal consistency 
(“Incoherent,” 2016). As expounded in Chapter 6, Lam (2001) described that in an 
attempt for an observer to conduct a probability assessment of whether someone 
is guilty or innocent, they first try to rule out stories or events that are incoherent 
and do not make sense. Having established the stories that make sense or are 
coherent, they then would assign a degree of plausibility to the stories. Inclusively 
all three variables evaluate implicit components of the general outcome of 
perceived innocence and guilt of the appealer. 
In parallel with Lam (2001)’s findings, Pennington and Hastie (1988) 
found in a mock trial scenario that when evidence was presented in a story 
order making this story easier to construct, nearly four out of five participants 
returned a guilty verdict for the defendant in question. When this evidence was 
presented in witness order which makes it less easy for the story to be 
constructed, only one in three participants returned a judgment of guilt. This 
revealed that the structure and order of stories presented influences decision 
making. The story model is discussed at length in Section 2.3.2 of the current 
thesis.  
In addition, plausibility closely relates to the distribution of pattern in how 
words and even sentences co-occur describing a story. Lapata, McDonald and 
Keller (1999) found that a certain association between words can make precise 
sentences seem more plausible due to the advantages of using those particular 
words. In other words, plausibility is associated with word and sentence coherence; 
altering the conceptual coherence of a story lowers its plausibility. However, while 
stories that make more sense are more likely to be judged as plausible, a speaker 
may still be judged as credible while their story be seen as implausible, make less 
sense and is incoherent. 
Recently, Whelan et al. (2014) found that untruthful appealers more often 
told a story in an illogical or unclear sense than their counterparts. Similarly, 
DePaulo et al. (2003) discovered that the stories that liars tell make less sense and 
is less plausible. For example, liars tend to make inconsistent and ambiguous 
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statements. These literatures aside, the next section reviews the subjective 
perceptions of how much sense liars and truth tellers are assumed to portray. 
 
9.3 Judges’ Cognitive perceptions of Story Content 
In discussing how accurate subjective perceptions of liars and truth tellers 
are in terms of appraising story sense, results from existing studies on observer 
assessments and accuracies were mixed. It should be kept in mind that no studies 
have directly compared incoherent statements to coherent ones in assessing 
perceived veracity judgments, however there are studies comparing the level of 
story preparation. Vrij (2000) predicted that unprepared lies will be easier to 
detect compared to prepared ones, because an unprepared liar has not thought 
through the content and details of their story and may contradict themselves, 
making them easier to be identified. Strömwall, Granhag and Landstrom (2007) 
found that the participants in their study gained higher accuracy for unrehearsed 
stories (56.6%) compared to stories that were prepared (46.1%). Their senders 
were children aged eleven to thirteen and adult participant observers. Bond and 
DePaulo (2006) who examined a meta-analysis of the subjective impressions and 
evaluations of story preparation concluded that prepared stories were seen as 
more honest than those that were unprepared when the same person has given 
both types of statements. However, they also found inconsistent evidence when 
comparing between-subjects studies, where they found that prepared stories were 
less believable than unprepared ones. They further found that accuracy was 
higher for spontaneous stories compared to prepared ones, but only with small 
effect sizes. In other words, they found it was easier to tell the difference 
accurately whether someone is lying or not when the story is unprepared rather 
than prepared. This was attributed in part to the low stakes nature of most of the 
literature reviewed in their meta-analysis. Support for differences in perceived 
verbal cues can be found in Granhag and Strömwall’s (2000) study where the 
authors found that disagreement within their sample as to whether certain 
consecutive statements were consistent or not.  
 An internally coherent story may not always be perceived as coherent by an 
observer and vice versa. Hasson, Simmons and Todorov (2005) proposed that 
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understanding story content does not require believing it. Overall believability can 
be influenced by other factors apart from internal story structure, for example, as 
well. McAdams (2006) wrote that to an atheist, the second coming of Jesus and the 
story of the resurrection is implausible and delusional, yet to many Christians this 
story is perfectly plausible. Subjective impression in appraising the plausibility 
and coherence of a story are subjected to norms and past experiences.   
The concept coherence view posits that when an observer makes a 
plausibility assessment, they tend to relate the sender’s story to their own past 
experience, make inferences from the story, and assess whether this is a good 
match to what they have experienced in the past directly or remotely (Lapata et 
al., 1999). Considering how an observer processes language is useful in 
understanding perceptions and the subsequent biases that may arise when 
encoding speech. Observers approach sentences in English with at least four basic 
assumptions (Bever, 1970) and subsequently devise strategies for dealing with 
what they hear. One of these basic assumptions is that people utter sentences that 
make sense. The listener would then use their knowledge of the world to pick the 
most likely interpretation of the sentence they hear (Aitchison, 2008). Burgoon, 
Jones and Stewart (1975) proposed the language expectancy theory, where the 
authors claimed that what a speaker chooses to say can significantly predict 
whether an observer is successfully convinced. This theory contends that people 
hold expectations as to what they consider normal language in a given situation, 
grounded in psychological and cultural norms of their immediate society, and 
bring these stereotypes into social situations. This means that a sender’s words 
may present inconsistencies with the stereotypes observers carry. Due to this 
violation of expectancies the observer carries, a sender may be seen to be less liked 
or believed, as their language and/or behaviour is inherently less persuasive. 
Similarly, the information processing theory (McGuire, 1968) contended 
that to be persuaded an observer must first attend to and understand a persuasive 
message. If an observer cannot attend to and understand the message, they cannot 
then apply their understanding and knowledge to correctly accept or reject the 
message. Interrupted structures in sentences or phrases offer another difficulty in 
comprehension. 
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The consensus in the literature suggests that a story that depicts events or 
happenings that defy an observer’s understanding of how the world works and 
how human beings typically act, think, feel, and want, may seem to not make 
sense, in that it violates structural norms. The question which then arises in the 
context of television appeals is whether what grievers say can be excused, or 
accepted favourably, if it does not make sense. Or, alternatively, will observers be 
inclined to perceive grieving appealers as liars if their appeal is incoherent and 
interrupted? The language of grief is governed by emotional, psychological and 
social changes. As such, observers could expect, to a certain degree, what a griever 
should and would say, and little research exists on the subjective perceptions of 
language in a high stakes deception context.  
 
9.3.1 Rehearsal and Structure 
The rehearsal of a story can lend to subjective impressions of how credible 
and believable a story is as well. The notion is that the more prepared a story is, 
the more coherent it may sound as it will contain more structure. Lie detection 
research has consistently found that liars always prepare their narratives ahead 
of time before an interview and studies report that a difference in accuracy is 
shown by observers for unprepared statements than prepared statements 
(Granhag, Andersson, Strömwall, & Hartwig, 2004; Vrij et al., 2009). When 
statements are unprepared they can appear incoherent, or at least less coherent. 
On the other hand, Vrij, Leal, Granhag, Mann, Fisher, Hillman and Sperry (2009) 
wrote that preparation can lead to responses that are excessively scripted. 
 One of the criteria in Content Based Criteria Analysis (as introduced in 
Chapter 3) for assessing statement credibility is unstructured reproduction (Vrij, 
2008). Truthful accounts tend have less of a prepared structure, contain less 
chronological content compared to untruthful stories, which are more likely to be 
overly scripted and chronological (e.g., “I did X, then Y happened and Z took 
place”). This is due to the liar memorising details of the account in chronological 
order to keep their story straight (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). The more they 
fabricate, the more they must remember, and liars have difficulties recounting a 
story that is not in chronological order. Vrij (2000) offered that liars may find 
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difficulty in including certain criteria found in CBCA in their stories. For example, 
they may face difficulty in producing an unstructured account, which is typically 
a distinctive feature of a truthful account. Liars are also generally under the 
impression that if they admit a lack of memory or raise doubts about their own 
narratives, they will be seen as less truthful, affecting their credibility. Adams 
(2002) purported that when liars are experiencing stress, deviations from the 
practiced story structure can emerge.  
The discrepancy can be seen here between how liars normally produce and 
relay a fabricated story, which are often chronologically and conceptually coherent 
due to their scripted nature, versus how an observer would encode and judge the 
coherency of a speech, where stories with a clear temporal structure are favourable 
and tend to be judged positively. However, a connection to the coherence of the 
story as well as observer judgments of this cue has yet to be explored in a high 
stakes deception context. 
 
9.4 Sender detectability  
Besides individual differences in appraising coherence, there are also 
individual differences in the ability in telling coherent stories. McAdams (2006) 
wrote that individuals vary in terms of their skill in narrating a story with 
thematic and causal coherence.  The author further maintained that the coherence 
of a story depends upon the storyteller’s ability to refabricate, imagine and 
integrate. The storyteller’s memory of the event and the way they choose to tell of 
the event is notable, as stories that are coherent should have credibility to it too. 
To eliminate this issue, the same appealers will be shown in both high and low 
sense conditions in the present study. 
 
9.5 Other implicit cues 
 Again, implicit cues such as perceived attractiveness and emotions felt by 
participants towards appealers expounded in previous chapters are studied here. 
 
9.6 Key issues to explore 
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 The key issue the present study sets to explore is the effect of reordering 
sentences and words of a coherent story, so that it quickly becomes nonsensical, 
thus potentially reducing its plausibility and intelligibility. A high-stakes sensible 
story is used but its conceptual coherence altered, with the hypotheses that Judges 
exposed to the High Sense condition will achieve higher explicit ratings, higher 
judgments of story plausibility, overall credibility, story sense and emotions felt 
than their counterparts.  
 
9.7 Methods 
9.7.1 Participants 
 The preliminary sample of participants totalled to 181 participants for both 
groups, with 724 cases, as each participant judged four cases of these appeals. 
None of the participants reported ‘Yes’ to question “Do you personally know 
anyone who featured in the appeal you’ve just heard?” and no one reported ‘Yes’ 
to the question “Do you know of the appeal you have just heard i.e. you’ve watched 
or heard it on TV?”. Therefore, none of the participants had any prior knowledge 
of the appealers they listened to but some knew of the cases from watching or 
hearing it on television. Ten participants were removed from this initial sample 
because they failed to record explicit veracity judgments. Participants were 
recruited using a mixture of snowball and opportunity sampling from the UK and 
Europe. They were from varying occupations ranging from bus driver and 
dermatologist to advertising managers and civil servants; as well as 
nationalities/ethnicities (British, Asian, African, Middle Eastern and European).   
 
9.7.2 Material and Procedure 
Granhag et al. (2003) wrote that liars’ stories are usually highly consistent 
due to the contention that liars often prepare a story beforehand. If they do not 
prepare the contents of the fabricated story beforehand they may run the risk of 
being inconsistent especially in a police interview situation. In contrast, Gilovich, 
Savitsky and Medvec (1998) maintained that truth-tellers on the other hand 
prepare their stories less for they hold the view that the truth will be transparent 
without having to practice their story. Because television appeals are mostly 
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prepared beforehand, this element of rehearsal is probably similar across all 
appeals. In the current study, this internal element was edited and manipulated 
to observe what participants’ subjective impressions of story ‘rehearsal’ were and 
how this impacts their veracity assessments. 
 Using a between-subjects experimental design, two sets of press conferences 
will be used in this study. In the first set, judges will be exposed to press 
conferences and interviews in their original format. In the second, the same press 
conferences and interviews will be viewed by a different group of judges, however 
in this condition the appeals were presented with reordered sentences. Sentences 
will not be truncated, but rather restructured to make less sense via Windows 
Movie Maker editing software. The effect of this video editing will be that the 
appealers appear to speak normally but their sentences will not be as coherent 
and make less sense in comparison to the unaltered version. In other words, all 
judges will experience the exact same audio content of the appeals; except one 
group will watch the appeals in a High Sense manner and the other will watch it 
in a Low Sense manner. 
Appeals that are longer in content will be selected (included were two police 
interviews out of the four appeals) so as to ensure sufficient story content. An 
example of a High Sense order of interview that will be used in this study is ‘There 
is a lot of evidence that places me at (the victim)’s house, and there is a reason for 
that, and the reason is that I did see (the victim) the day they passed away. A lot 
of things happened that day, I almost lost my life. There was an argument amongst 
some people, two individuals that one wanted to take my life. The guy with the 
gun was standing near me and I just remember holding my head, closing my eyes. 
He pulled the trigger, and nothing happened, just a click.’ The same interview will 
be rearranged and as a result the Low Sense version of this same interview study 
will be ‘That I did see (the victim) the day they passed away. There is a lot of 
evidence, and the guy with the gun was standing near me, and I just remember 
holding my head and closing my eyes, and there is a reason for that, I almost lost 
my life. There was an argument. A lot of things happened that day, amongst some 
people, two individuals that places me at the victim’s house, that one wanted to 
take my life, and that reason is that he pulled the trigger and nothing happened, 
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just a click.’ Notice that while the appeal here has the same content as the 
unaltered version, it does not flow with ease, grammatical errors are present and 
generally the story makes less logical sense. 
Two genuine appeals and two false appeals will be chosen (these will be the 
same appeals for each set). The first video depicts a female appealer who is guilty, 
the second shows a guilty male appealer, the third shows an innocent female 
appealer, and the fourth shows an innocent male appealer. The videos range from 
34.13 seconds to 160.00 seconds in length, with an average of 95.12 seconds each. 
The general methodology of how the experiment will be conducted is outlined 
under Section 6.3 in Chapter 6.  
To test if there will be a statistically significant relationship between the 
accuracy of judges’ explicit decisions and level of speech coherence they were 
exposed to, a Chi-square will be computed. Logistic regressions for within-group 
analyses will also be carried out to determine which implicit responses judges used 
could predict their accurate explicit decisions. This analysis will be used to explore 
the relationship between explicit and implicit decisions. As with the previous 
chapter, additional regressions were also conducted. Variance inflation factors 
(VIF) will also be analysed to check for multicollinearity (Dart, 2017). All 
bootstrapped models will contain the same twelve independent variables (story 
plausibility, story sense, credibility, practice, well-thought-out, wording, 
organised, lessemotions, emotionsmatched, face attractiveness, voice 
attractiveness and meta-emotion level). As in the previous chapters, the 
bootstrapping process is applied. It is very useful for small sample sizes (Adèr, 
Mellenbergh & Hand, 2008) and works by making extrapolations of a population 
from a sample data. This process samples this data and then makes extrapolations 
about a sample from re-sampled data (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). In the present 
study, this process is repeated 1000 times (Efron, 1979; Miles et al., 1999). 
 
9.7.3 Ground truth 
Appeal 1 shows a guilty female giving her accounts during an interview 
about her murdered boyfriend. Appeal 2 shows a guilty male giving his accounts 
during an interview about his missing granddaughter. Appeal 3 shows an innocent 
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female both directly appealing to the public in the case of their missing daughter. 
Appeal 4 shows an innocent male giving an account of what happened the day his 
wife went missing and directly appeals to the public for information. In all four 
cases, substantial evidence was found to either discredit false appealer’s claims or 
reinforce true appealers’ claims concerning the fate of their relatives. For False 
Appealer 1, various pieces of evidence were presented in court including a gun, 
rented car, phone, friends, camera and palm print DNA. For False Appealer 2, a 
tip from the public and the found body were the main evidence. For True Appealer 
3, again various pieces of evidence were presented including a body that was 
found, DNA evidence (blood stains on clothing and vehicle) and forensic 
entomology reports. For True Appealer 4, his alibi stands and another killer was 
convicted of raping and murdering his wife. 
  
9.8 Results 
9.8.1 Participants 
Because of individual differences in cue appraisal, the question item ‘The 
appealer tells a story that makes sense’ was analysed; only participants’ answers 
that corresponded with the author’s definition of sense level were selected for 
further analysis. This step was necessary to be taken to make sure participants’ 
opinions match the author’s definitions, and that the independent variables are 
truly measuring what they were intended to. This was to verify that judges 
perceived what the author construed as a highly sensible appeal to be actually so, 
and similarly, that an appeal that has low sense was also perceived as such. 
Otherwise, it will be difficult to offer meaningful interpretation of results.  
Furthermore, those who reported ‘not-sure’ to these questions were eliminated.  
The final pool of participants ranged from 17 to 69 years in age (M = 32.11, 
SD = 12.29). 44.6% were male and 55.4% were female, with 219 cases for the High 
Sense condition and 89 cases for the Low Sense condition totalling to 308 cases.  
 
9.8.2 Explicit veracity judgments 
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 As presented in Table 12, judges in the High Sense condition recorded an 
overall rating of almost 62.00% overall, higher than the Low Sense condition at 
49.70%, which was around chance level. 
 
9.8.3 Relationship between level of story sense and explicit ratings 
 Chi-square results were χ2 (2) = 6.551, p < .05. This would seem to suggest 
revealed a statistically significant association between ratings of judges’ explicit 
decisions and perceived level of speech coherence. The research hypothesis that 
differences in accurate explicit veracity decisions were related to different levels 
of perceived coherence in appealer’s speech was supported by this analysis. Phi 
values indicate the strength of this relationship and chosen over Cramer’s V as 
both variables used in the sample are dichotomous (Jones, 2009). The strength of 
association between the variables was small (.156), demonstrating the presence of 
a weak relationship (Real Statistics Using Excel, 2017). 
 
9.8.4 Innocence bias 
 Table 12 distinguishes guilt ratings from innocence ratings. Results do not 
seem to suggest the presence of a consistent innocence bias. While seemingly 
present in the High Sense condition, it was absent in the Low Sense condition. 
Ratings for detecting innocence in the Low Sense condition was unusually low at 
22.70%, whereas guilt detection for this condition was much higher in 
comparison at 76.85%. Of course, caution must be implemented when 
interpreting these results based on low number of video clips shown to judges.  
 
Table 12 
Judgment rates for innocent and guilty appealers for High and Low Sense 
condition
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Appeals High Sense  Low Sense  
False 50.70% 76.85% 
True 72.85% 22.70% 
Total 61.78% 49.78% 
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Table 13 
Mann Whitney U item scores between High and Low Sense conditions 
 High Sense means (SD) 
Low Sense means 
(SD) z r 
Innocence score     
Credibility 2.48 (1.27) 1.39 (0.98) -2.036 -0.12 
Cognition of Source content 
scores     
Plausibility 2.79 (2.84) 1.58 (1.49) -10.513 -0.50 
Story Sense 3.28 (0.45) 1.58 (0.49) -10.880 -0.62 
Practice 2.17 (1.17) 1.90 (1.33) -2.174 NA 
Well-thought-out 2.45 (1.21) 2.35 (1.18) -1.272 -0.07 
Organised 2.59 (1.23) 1.11 (1.44) -5.256 -0.30 
Wording 2.17 (1.29) 1.59 (1.19) -3.047 -0.17 
Emotion scores     
Less Emotions 1.95 (1.07) 2.59 (1.33) -2.501  NA 
Emotions Match 2.32 (1.25) 1.79 (1.21) -6.327  -0.36 
Appearance scores     
Voice attractiveness 2.12 (1.34) 1.62 (1.27) -3.141 -0.18 
Face attractiveness 1.72 (1.42) 1.59 (1.19) -0.350 NA 
Meta-emotion score 15.06 (4.88) 10.27 (3.44) -6.615 -0.38 
Note: Significant p values are in bold; p <0.01. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
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9.8.5 Implicit veracity judgments 
Results for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality (Massey, 1951; 
Smirnov, 1948) indicated that the score distributions deviated significantly from 
a normal distribution (D = .193, p < .005). Due to the between-subjects design of 
the study and the normality not being met, the most appropriate analyses to run 
was the Mann Whitney U test (Field, 2000a). All results can be found in Table 13. 
Cronbach’s alpha for each scale items can be found in Table 14.  
 
Table 14  
Cronbach's alpha coefficients for Study 3 
 
Meta-emotion Cognition Appearance Emotions 
0.74 0.62 0.49 0.35 
 
9.8.5.1 Honest versus false appeals 
As the present study utilised two true and two false appeals, judges may 
have utilised different implicit cues for truthful and false appeals. To distinguish 
between judgments made for true appeals and comparing this with those made for 
false appeals and whether this difference was significant between both conditions, 
further separate Mann-Whitney Us were conducted. 
For truthful appeals, as seen in Table 15, items which were significantly 
different for both group levels are the innocence score, appeal wording, voice 
attractiveness, story plausibility, story sense, overall credibility, emotions-match 
and meta-emotion. For false appeals, as seen in Table 16 significant differences 
were found for the items of whether the appeal sounded organised or not, overall 
innocence score, matched-ness of emotional display and speech content, story 
plausibility, story sense, level of emotional display and level of meta-emotion. 
Again, effect sizes were mostly small. Implications of results are discussed below. 
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Table 15 
Mann Whitney U item scores for true appeals between both conditions 
 
 True appeals    
 High Sense means (SD) Low Sense means (SD) U p r 
Innocence score      
Credibility 2.720 (1.187) 2.154 (1.214) 682.5 0.056 NA 
Cognition of Source content scores     
Plausibility 2.940 (0.985) 1.333 (0.485) 231.0 0.000 -0.38 
Story Sense 3.340 (0.475) 1.556 (1.096) 174.0 0.000 -0.45 
Practice 2.208 (1.198) 2.000 (1.414) 893.0 0.629 NA 
Well-thought-out 2.600 (1.209) 2.692 (1.032) 964.5 0.947 NA 
Organised 2.820 (1.153) 1.923 (1.605) 682.5 0.059 NA 
Wording 2.267 (1.294) 1.692 (1.032) 964.5 0.947 NA 
Emotion scores      
Less Emotions 1.812 (1.049) 1.615 (1.387) 840.5 0.409 NA 
Emotions match 2.363 (1.414) 4.944 (1.349) 192.0 0.000 -0.33 
Appearance scores      
Voice attractiveness 2.127 (1.362) 0.889 (1.023) 653.5 0.000 -0.22 
Face attractiveness 1.440 (1.556) 1.278 (1.074) 1265.5 0.644 NA 
Meta-emotion score 16.073 (4.629) 9.769 (3.854) 287.0 0.000 -0.24 
Note: Significant p values are in bold; p <0.01. Standard deviations appear in 
parentheses. 
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Table 16 
Mann Whitney U item scores for false appeals between both conditions  
 
 False appeals    
 High Sense means (SD) Low Sense means (SD) U p r 
Innocence score      
Credibility 2.154 (1.214) 2.094 (1.329) 1042.5 0.645 NA 
Cognition of Source content scores     
Plausibility 2.493 (1.346) 1.281 (0.457) 468.0 0.000 -0.22 
Story Sense 3.145 (0.355) 1.375 (1.129) 177.0 0.000 -0.21 
Practice 2.087 (1.121) 1.594 (1.388) 851.5 0.057 NA 
Well-thought-out 2.116 (1.145) 2.000 (1.270) 1044.0 0.651 NA 
Organised 2.088 (1.267) 1.625 (0.793) 676.0 0.002 -0.18 
Wording 1.959 (1.254) 1.625 (1.185) 903.0 0.129 NA 
Emotion scores      
Less Emotions 2.232 (1.073) 1.469 (1.218) 703.0 0.003 -0.17 
Emotions match 2.229 (1.216) 3.781 (1.879) 519.5 0.000 -0.22 
Appearance scores      
Voice attractiveness 2.116 (1.323) 1.875 (1.289) 975.0 0.334 NA 
Face attractiveness 2.333 (1.159) 1.774 (1.185) 872.5 0.081 NA 
Meta-emotion score 12.838 (4.711) 9.688 (3.649) 600.5 0.000 -0.21 
Note: Significant p values are in bold; p <0.01. Standard deviations appear in 
parentheses. 
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9.8.6 Logistic regressions for within-group analyses 
 Mann Whitney U tests were useful in indicating where differences lie in 
judgments and whether this was for truthful or false appeals. While differences 
were not found for certain implicit cues, judges in both conditions may still have 
used those cues to come to their explicit judgments. Again, predictor variables 
included in regression analyses were derived from an extensive review of the 
literature expounded in the opening chapters of the present thesis. In this study, 
tolerance was greater than .10 for all items, and the variance inflation factor was 
also less than 10 for all items. This suggested that multicollinearity was not an 
issue in this study (meta-emotion, Tolerance = 0.67, VIF = 1.75; credibility, 
Tolerance = 0.75, VIF = 1.34; plausibility, Tolerance = .63, VIF = 1.20; practice, 
Tolerance = 0.86, VIF = 1.16; voice attractiveness, Tolerance = 0.73; VIF = 1.37; 
organised speech, Tolerance = 0.66; VIF = 1.53; face attractiveness, Tolerance = 
0.83; VIF = 1.20; less emotions, Tolerance = 0.81; VIF = 1.24; wording, Tolerance 
= 0.80; VIF = 1.25; well-thought-out, Tolerance = 0.72, VIF = 1.40; emotions match, 
Tolerance = 0.92, VIF = 1.10; practice, Tolerance = 0.86, VIF = 1.16). Again, here 
a cut-off point of p < 0.01 was used for implicit responses.  
First, implicit veracity judgments used by the High Sense condition judges 
which predicted their explicit veracity judgment, with the full model indicating 
that it was able to distinguish between respondents who explicitly reported Guilty 
from the ones who reported Innocent, with results reported as χ2 (12, N = 308) = 
70.02, p < .005. The model as a whole explained between 33% (Cox and Snell R2) 
and 47% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in veracity judgments, and correctly 
classified 80% of cases. As shown in Table 17, two independent variables made a 
unique statistically significant contribution to the model for this condition. One of 
these predictors was the implicit cue of the appealer’s overall credibility, recording 
an odds ratio (OR) of 2.49 which indicated that respondents who reported 
appealers were overall credible were 2.49 times more likely to give a judgment of 
Innocence to the appealers, controlling for all other factors in the model. The other 
predictor was how well-practised the appeal was perceived by judges (OR = .48). 
Next, consideration as to which implicit veracity judgments measured in 
the present study contributed to the accuracy of their explicit judgment was also 
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made. Another binary logistic regression with the actual accuracy of judges’ 
explicit veracity judgments as the dependent measure in this condition was 
conducted, with the full model indicating that it was able to distinguish between 
respondents who explicitly reported Guilty from the ones who reported Innocent, 
with results reported as χ2 (12, N = 308) = 23.73, p < .05. The model as a whole 
explained between 12% (Cox and Snell R2) and 17% (Nagelkerke R2) of the 
variance in accuracy, and correctly classified 70% of cases. As shown in Table 18, 
none of the independent variables made a unique statistically significant 
contribution to the model for this condition. 
Implicit veracity judgments used by the Low Sense condition judges which 
predicted their explicit veracity judgment with the full model of the binary log 
regression indicating that it was able to distinguish between respondents who 
explicitly reported Guilty from the ones who reported Innocent, with results 
reported as χ2 (8, N = 308) = 24.32, p < 0.05. The model as a whole explained 
between 42% (Cox and Snell R2) and 64% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in 
veracity judgments, and correctly classified 84% of cases. As shown in Table 17, 
none of the independent variables made a unique statistically significant 
contribution to the model for this condition. 
Consideration was then given as to which implicit veracity judgments 
measured in the present study contributed to the accuracy of their explicit 
judgment in the Low Sense condition. A final binary logistic regression with the 
actual accuracy of judges’ explicit veracity judgments as the dependent measure 
in this group was ran, with the full model indicating that it was able to distinguish 
between respondents who explicitly reported Guilty from the ones who reported 
Innocent, with results reported as χ2 (8, N = 308) = 15.44, p < .05. The model as a 
whole explained between 30% (Cox and Snell R2) and 40% (Nagelkerke R2) of the 
variance in accuracy, and correctly classified 75.6% of cases. As shown in Table 
18, no independent variable made a unique and statistically significant 
contribution to this model in this condition. 
    154 
  
Table 17 
Bootstrapped binary logistic regression models for explicit judgments in High and Low Sense conditions 
 
 Model 1: High Sense Model 2: Low Sense 
Variables B (SE) OR 95% C.I. (Lower, Upper) p B (SE) OR 
95% C.I. (Lower, 
Upper) p 
Credibility .914 (.217) 2.495 1.632, 3.816 0.000 -.025 (.726) 0.980 .235, 1.050 0.973 
Plausibility .427 (.202) 1.532 1.032, 2.275 0.034 4.388 (1.264) 2.450 .689, 2.980 0.071 
Story Sense .771 (.642) 2.162 1.614, 2.610 0.230 .291 (1.189) 1.338 .130, 3.730 0.806 
Practice -.717 (.246) 1.532 .301, 1.791 0.004 -.434 (.924) 0.648 .106, 3.961 0.639 
Wording -.271 (.198) 2.612 1.517, 2.924 0.171 -1.404 (1.022) 0.246 .033, 1.819 0.169 
Organised .215 (3.790) 1.240 .813, 1.891 0.318 -.189 (.788) 0.828 .177, 3.882 0.811 
Well-thought-out -.112 (.263) 0.894 .534, 1.498 0.671 -1.028 (.788) 0.358 .076, 1.678 0.192 
Voice .005 (.201) 1.005 .678, 1.489 0.980 -.114 (.729) 0.892 .214, 3.722 0.875 
Face .181 (.176) 1.198 .849, 1.692 0.304 .499 (.690) 1.647 .426, 4.373 0.470 
Emotions Match .187 (.179) 1.206 .739, 1.373 0.296 -.494 (.828) 0.610 .120, 3.094 0.551 
Less Emotions -.432 (.235) 0.649 .410, 1.028 0.065 .381 (.701) 1.464 .371, 4.782 0.586 
Meta-emotion -.035 (.065) 0.965 .849, 1.097 0.588 .422, (.318) 1.525 .818, 4.843 0.185 
Model 
description 
Model is statistically significant: χ2 = 70.02; df = 12; 
Nagelkerke's R2 = .47; Hosmer-Lemeshow test: χ2 = 12.27; df = 
8; p = .14     
Model is statistically significant: χ2 = 24.32; df = 12;  
Nagelkerke's R2 = .64; Hosmer-Lemeshow test: χ2 = .918;  
df = 7; p = .996    
 
Note: Significant p values are in bold; p <0.01. Standard errors appear in parentheses.      
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Table 18 
Bootstrapped binary logistic regression models for accuracy of explicit judgments in High and Low Sense conditions 
 
 Model 1: High Sense Model 2: Low Sense 
Variables B (SE) OR 95% C.I. (Lower, Upper) p B (SE) OR 95% C.I. (Lower, Upper) p 
Credibility .027 (.162) 0.973 .709, 1.337 0.867 .651 (.431) 1.918 .824, 4.466 0.131 
Plausibility .085 (.175) 1.089 .772, 1.536 0.627 1.534 (.996) 2.637 .659, 3.649 0.123 
Story Sense -.464 (.488) 0.629 .241, 1.637 0.342 -.394 (.664) 0.675 .184, 2.477 0.553 
Practice .060 (.162) 1.062 .773, 1.458 0.711 -.535 (.399) 0.586 .268, 1.281 0.180 
Wording .125 (.155) 1.133 .835, 1.536 0.423 .812 (.468) 2.251 .900, 5.632 0.083 
Organised -.116 (.170) 0.891 .638, 1.243 0.496 .790 (.437) 2.204 .936, 5.192 0.071 
Well-thought-out .109 (.190) 1.115 .768, 1.620 0.567 -.352 (.355) 0.703 .351, 1.411 0.322 
Voice -.230 (.157) 0.795 .584, 1.082 0.145 -.873 (.400) 0.418 .191, .914 0.029 
Face .012 (.137) 1.012 .774, 1.323 0.930 .053 (.391) 1.054 .490, 2.269 0.893 
Emotions Match -.053 (.142) 0.948 .717, 1.253 0.708 -.078 (.398) 0.925 .424, 2.018 0.845 
Less Emotions .364 (.186) 1.439 1.000, 2.071 0.050 -.732 (.477) 0.481 .189, 1.226 0.125 
Meta-emotion -.094 (.053) 0.911 .821, 1.010 0.077 .247 (.167) 1.281 .923, 1.776 0.138 
Model 
description 
Model is statistically significant: χ2 = 23.72; df = 12; 
Nagelkerke's R2 = .17; Hosmer-Lemeshow test: χ2 = 12.10; df = 
8; p = .15    
Model is statistically significant: χ2 = 15.435; df = 12; 
Nagelkerke's R2 = .39; Hosmer-Lemeshow test: χ2 = 12.09;  
df = 7; p = .098    
 
Note: Significant p values are in bold; p<0.01. Standard errors appear in 
parentheses.       
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9.8.7 Not-sure answers frequencies 
 Judges who reported ‘not sure’ for the question item pertaining to story 
sense were already removed to ensure only those who were sure were included in 
this study. For the remaining implicit cues, only percentage differences between 
both conditions that are higher than 10% are discussed. This table can be found in 
Appendix K. The High Sense condition found it easier to rate appeal practice and 
perceived plausibility however found it harder to rate the appealers’ facial 
attractiveness.  
 
9.9 Discussion 
 Results of the present study would seem to suggest that when the sense of 
a story was low, judges found it more difficult to accurately judge whether someone 
is innocence or otherwise. Judges displayed were better at telling apart an 
innocent appealer from one who is not when the appeals were presented in a highly 
sensible order, implying that their subjective assessments of how orderly the 
appeal sounds impacted decision processes. This would suggest that judges 
expected (or at least favoured) appealers to sound sensible in their appeal, even 
while holding the knowledge that these appealers were going through an ordeal of 
missing their loved ones.  
 Explicit judgments showed judges in the High Sense condition recorded an 
overall rating of 61.78%, much higher than the Low Sense condition at 49.78%, 
which was around chance level. Judges would seem to regard ‘non-fluent’ 
appealers as less believable and were more drawn to believe ‘articulate’ speakers 
to be credible.  
 The present study seemed to indicate what seems like an innocence bias for 
the High Sense conditions, with a 73.30% rating for true appeals and 50.70% for 
false appeals, totalling to an overall of a 69.20% rating. There was no such bias 
however in the Low Sense condition; instead, what appears to be a guilt bias 
seemed to be present. Essentially, judges performed better and more accurately 
for false appeals than truthful ones. The explicit judgments in the Low Sense 
condition’s innocence detection yielded an unusually low rating. There are a few 
speculative reasons offered for this rating; firstly, this very low rating could be 
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because before this point no research has been carried out on high stakes stimulus 
material manipulated to have extremely low sense in content. Secondly, judges in 
this condition could have likely held a mental shortcut that the statements made 
by innocent appealers would make sense and that speech non-fluency was a cue of 
a false appeal. This heuristic could then have led to the occurrence of a guilt bias. 
This, if could be further replication and verified, would then infer an occurrence of 
an adaptive bias (in the face of limited information of the appealers and the 
emphasised non-diagnostic cue of non-fluent speech) that cannot conceivably be 
explained by other implicit cues. This could be why there were very few cues that 
had an association with explicit veracity decisions in both conditions across the 
board, in the present study. However, all inferences remain tentative and 
provisional at this stage.   
 Consideration was then given to these implicit judgments and their 
relationship with judges’ explicit judgments. While the implicit judgments of 
overall credibility and perceived practice contributed to their explicit judgments, 
none of the implicit judgments used by judges in the High Sense condition 
contributed to accurate judgments. For judges in the High Sense condition, 
appealers were perceived to be more credible if they were innocent, and they were 
perceived to be more practiced if they were guilty. For judges in the Low Sense 
condition, not a single implicit judgment captured by the questionnaire 
significantly contributed to their explicit judgments, neither did any cue 
contribute to their accuracy in their explicit judgments. Here, several questions 
are raised; firstly, how then did judges in the High Sense condition achieve a high 
rating for innocent appealers and how did those in the Low Sense condition 
achieve a high rating for the guilty appealers? Secondly, how did those in the High 
Sense condition achieve a chance level ratings for false appeals and how did those 
in the Low Sense condition attain a low rating for truthful appeals?  
 Several points are discussed. To start off with, the two implicit judgments 
of ‘overall credibility’ and ‘practice’ predicted explicit decisions of judges in the 
High Sense condition. To explain why neither of these implicit cues afforded 
accuracy in their explicit decisions, as far back as the 1930’s, Jackson (1932) 
proposed the term ‘inferior speech’, which was where hesitation pauses do not 
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occur and could mean a rehearsed speech. Unprepared speech is generally 
produced in haste where the speaker has no time to check every little detail in 
their sentences (Aitchison, 2008), whereas a prepared speech would tend to have 
more story flow and coherence with less errors. Aitchison (2008) contends that glib 
and fluent speakers are overvalued, whereas faltering ones are less liked. Judges 
in the High Sense condition perhaps erroneously used the implicit judgment of 
how ‘practiced’ the interviewees appeared for their explicit decisions.  
 Alternatively, no implicit judgments contributed to the predictive value of 
explicit judgments in the High Sense condition. While regression analyses 
showed relationships between certain implicit cues and the dichotomous outcome 
variable of ‘is the appealer guilty or not’ (thereby implying that judges were 
consciously or otherwise detecting some implicit cues and the questionnaire was 
capturing at least some of the cues they are using), none of the cues added to 
accuracy in their explicit veracity decisions. It is possible that while several 
implicit cues were captured, others that judges may have used were not. It is 
also possible that explicit judgments may be arrived at independently of 
conscious implicit judgments, as substantiated by Granhag (2006) and results in 
Anderson et al.’s (1999) study. As a caveat, the regression model for the High 
Sense condition has no predictors contributing to explicit decisions and yet could 
classify 70% of the responses correctly. This potentially demonstrates that, while 
valuable in allowing a speculation of which cues contributes to the guilt-
innocence judgments, the model also has its limitation. One of the drawbacks is 
that the model is potentially overfit. An overfit model is expected to have a 
poorer fit with a new set of data (Frost, 2015). As discussed in the Methods 
section of Chapter 7, nevertheless, the variables included in the model were all 
based on theoretical background and checked for presence of multicollinearity 
(Dart, 2017). Due to the possible issue of overfitting, a researcher should be 
careful to put a heavy emphasis on this set of results as p values and R2 values 
could be misinforming (Frost, 2015). That said, the results would of course still 
necessitate a discussion.  
 Mann Whitney U results also showed significant differences for several 
variables. Judges thought story sense and story plausibility as significantly more 
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coherent in the High Sense condition when compared with their counterparts, both 
with medium effect sizes. An explanation as to why these results emerged is 
perhaps best explained by not only a reliance on different cues when a story is 
truthful and when it is not, but again also dependent on different cues when story 
sense is high versus when it is low. Perhaps individuals in the Low Sense condition 
turned to cognitive heuristics of voice attractiveness because the verbal cue of 
story sense and plausibility could not be deduced from; if they were seeking to use 
this cue they could not, thus having to adapt and resort to other available implicit 
cue short cuts. Judges in the Low Sense condition also thought that emotions 
displayed by the appealer did not match what the appealer was saying more so 
than those in the High Sense condition with a small effect size, although the 
emotions displayed by appealer was not different from those shown to the High 
Sense condition and was not tampered with in accordance to how they matched 
the speech of the appealer.  
Judges displayed significantly lower levels of meta-emotion in the Low 
Sense condition, with a medium effect size. This seems to indicate that perceived 
story sense not only impacted the level of perceived emotional displays, it also 
seemed to have altered how coordinated or synchronised the perceived emotional 
displays seemed to be to a Judge. It also appears to have altered level of meta-
emotion experienced by judges. Then again, it could also be said that judges 
displayed less meta-emotion with Low Sense appeals purely because they 
recognised that the appeals had been edited and thus were simply less genuine. 
 Interestingly, judges in the Low Sense condition also found the appealers’ 
voices significantly less attractive than those in the High Sense condition, with a 
very small effect size however. Although not significant, facial attractiveness was 
perceived to be lower in the Low Sense condition. Literature in this area is scarce, 
mostly dominated by studies on how looks affects personality inferences and not 
vice versa, although Hui and Yam (2011) found in their study using forty-eight 
Chinese participants that their language proficiency displayed significant 
influences on how they were perceived, as well as how attractive they were seen 
to be although the latter comparison was weak. Lange, Zaretsky, Schwarz and 
Euler (2014) applied the sexual selection theory to language, finding that high 
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verbal proficiency increases perceptions of attractiveness. The authors divided 
participants into three groups listening to the same story content but with three 
differing levels of verbal proficiency in terms of lexical, grammatical, and fluency 
structures.  
 When examining not-sure responses in the present study, the percentage of 
not-sure answers for appealer facial attractiveness was 33.8% for the High Sense 
condition whereas it was only 22% for the Low Sense condition; this was perhaps 
because judges in the High Sense condition were not paying much attention to the 
facial attractiveness of the appealer, as they were busy cognitively encoding and 
processing other implicit cues of the verbal (and possibly non-verbal, not captured 
by the present questionnaire used) cues, thus eliciting a higher not-sure responses. 
 In summary, judges evidently found it more challenging detecting innocent 
appealers in the Low Sense condition compared to those who were exposed to the 
High Sense condition. Chi square results would also suggest that there was a 
meaningful relationship between both conditions and subsequent explicit veracity 
assessment. While a fuller discussion as to the reasons of why the chi square 
relationship was weak can be found in Sections 11.6 and 11.7 in Chapter 11, a 
second conjecture as to why this relationship was present but was weak is 
discussed here. This weak relationship is perhaps because some judges were 
aware of the crude and unpolished editing that took place for video clips in the 
Low Sense condition. Judges may have simply realised that an attempt to 
manipulate these video clips have taken place and this may have affected their 
explicit ratings. Editing of the video clips could have been more elegant; the weak 
relationship between conditions and explicit veracity ratings may have reflected 
this, rather than due to the actual variables in and of itself. Other possible 
limitations include the preservation and usage of only judges who agreed with the 
pre-set operational definition of speech sense of this study. This was done by 
asking participants what they thought of the speech sense in the videos. These 
steps were essential for this study to ensure that the selected independent variable 
is really measuring what it was set out to. There is a possibility that some of the 
variables in this study will be correlated and interrelate with each other, however, 
regression analysis cannot reveal much information of this possibility (Boduszek, 
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2017). In future studies, approaches such as path analysis (see Section 11.7.3) in 
combination with factor analysis could be used to explore correlations between 
variables and their interrelationships. This considers any likely mediatory or 
moderator relationships that may exist between the variables. Distinct from 
regression models but comparable to structural equation models, independent 
variables using these approaches can be both causes and effects of other variables 
(i.e., mediation) (Boduszek, 2017).  
 Evidently, replication of results is desired with a higher number of videos. 
Nonetheless, these initial results would infer that level of perceived story sense 
does indeed have an association with how accurate judges were in assessing 
whether the appealers were innocent or guilty. Overall, if the findings from this 
study can be replicated, retested and further explored using different or improved 
methods, they will be extremely relevant to the domain of televised press 
conferences, as most televised appeals are edited by the media before aired. News 
site typically edit portions of appeals and/or interviews, not necessarily following 
a chronological order even. As revealed in the current chapter, editing the content 
of appeals can affect how these appeals are perceived implicitly, how appealers are 
explicitly judged and may impact how investigations are preceded. Differences in 
processing and thinking has not been studied when different levels of coherence 
are presented to participants in high-stakes situations; this study affords a level 
of insight in examining them in such mediums. 
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From the previous chapters, it can now be said that the manner of Source 
presentation does have some level of impact upon observer’s implicit and explicit 
judgments of appealer veracity. In the eyewitness literature, it is known that 
manner of presentation and police conduct during line-ups is crucial in the 
reliability of accurate identifications (Wells, Steblay & Dysart, 2011). Similarly, in 
the context of television appeals, having a member of the police force present or 
having two perpetrators collaboratively appealing together may perhaps increase 
story plausibility and hence the outcome of the veracity judgement by an observer. 
Additionally, statements solicited by police officers may be corrupted by both the 
interviewer and environment of the interview (Shuy, 1998).  
Some television appeals are made with a police agent in the same room, 
which can possibly encourage viewers to adopt an innocence bias mentality and 
thus can hinder police investigation. Having the endorsement of the law 
enforcement agency during the appeal could increase an observer’s confidence that 
the appealer is innocent. Observers may instinctively assume that police handling 
the investigation have eliminated the appealer as a suspect. This begs the question 
of whether the way television appeals and interviews are set up affects the way 
observers judge the innocence of the appealer. Specifically, there are no studies to 
date which investigates if two collaborating false television appealers are more 
successful at deception, as compared to when they appear solo.  
 Lie detection literature in this area is scarce. This present chapter examines 
a scenario where observers assess whether appealers give the impression of being 
more credible appealing alone, or in the presence of a co-appealer. To understand 
how a solo liar may be believed differently from paired liars, it is essential to 
review the literature on cognitive loading and possible mental shortcuts. But first 
the impetus behind the need to study perception of paired liars is discussed.  
 
10.1 The need for studying perception of paired liars 
The study of co-appealing is germane to missing or murdered case 
investigation officers and can aid in the arrest of false appealers, as co-appealing 
may reveal much about the pair (Canter, 2000). For example, in a study of 
plagiarism by Carter (1999), some collaborating plagiarisers were more vulnerable 
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than the others in the group, and this was reflected in the complexity of their 
delegated task.  
In fact, a fair number of television appeals to date feature more than one 
appealer appearing at a time. Table 19 shows the number of appealers who were 
guilty and innocent cross-tabulated with their appeal styles. These 61 appeals 
were collated from several different countries, which include United Kingdom, 
United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The total number of cases 
was more than the number of appealers appearing with co-appealers or others and 
solo appealers as they appear in both styles in certain cases. These appeals are far 
more in number than the selected few used in the present thesis due to limitations 
in obtaining permission from news sites to use some of them for research purposes.   
Additional support for studying paired liars was advocated by Vrij et al. 
(2010) who proposed that it is crucial to study liars and truth tellers in pairs as it 
reflects reality in the criminal world, where criminals usually work in groups or 
networks and not by themselves. Many crimes are planned and committed by 
several offenders working together rather than one person acting alone (Weerman, 
2001). Bruinsma and Bernasco (2004) reported that criminals operating in a large-
scale illegal market are usually close-knit, cohesive and ethnically homogenous 
with a high level of trust between the collaborates. However, the majority who co-
offend do not do so in affiliation with big organised groups, but with one or two co-
offenders (Reiss & Farrington, 1991). 
Research in collective interviewing of lying and truth telling groups have 
recently been of interest. Vrij et al. (2010) emphasised the advantages of 
interviewing liars and truth tellers in pairs. There are several studies outlining 
the benefits of collective interviewing in drawing indicators of deception and 
generating discrepancies between truth-telling and lying pairs. Truth-telling 
pairs were found to interrupt and correct each other at a higher rate (Vrij, Jundi, 
Hope, Hillman, Gahr, Leal, Warmelink, Mann, Vernham & Granhag, 2012), 
exhibited a higher rate of behavioural synchrony in their transaction and were 
more interactive in their verbal transitions (Driskell, Salas & Driskell, 2012). 
Truth-telling pairs also made more eye contact with each other and made more 
eye contact with the interviewer than their counterparts (Jundi, Mann, Hope, 
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Hillman, Warmelink & Gahr, 2013). In their review, Vernham and Vrij (2015) 
established that cues to deception included a shortage of interaction and 
communication between lying individuals. Strömwall, Granhag and Jonsson 
(2003) found that accuracy in detecting pairs of liars and truth-tellers was 
moderate and indicators of truthfulness and lying as presented by these pairs 
were not very high in their accurately distinguishing the two. Von Hippel, Baker, 
Wilson, Brin and Page’s (2015) study consisted of 54 groups of four to six 
individuals working together to arrive at a group verdict, when one individual in 
each group held the role of impairing this decision-making. The authors found 
that while there was a higher accuracy in finding out who this individual was 
once participants were given the information retrospectively that deception had 
taken place, interrogation did little to improve lie detection accuracy. Lastly, 
Granhag, Rangmar and Strömwall (2015) found the strategic use of evidence 
technique was effective in prompting cues to deception for small groups of 
suspects, more so than when evidence is disclosed early. This technique includes 
evidence disclosed later during an interrogation, or when evidence is disclosed 
late with an increased strength and precision during an interrogation. 
So far, the aforementioned studies pertain to research in collaborative 
lying and collective interviewing. A vital missing piece in these studies are 
observer responses and their accuracy in judging co-offending versus solo liars – 
a gap which the current study aims to fill. 
 
Table 19 
Number of appealers across UK, USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia 
cross-tabulated with their appeal styles 
 
Appeal type Guilty Innocent Total 
Paired 3 16 19 
Solo 30 15 45 
Total 32 29 61 
 
10.2 Lack of studies in perception of paired liars 
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Most, if not all, prevailing studies in lie detection accuracy focus on observer 
accuracy when the liar is appearing solo, not in a pair or as a group (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2008; DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Vrij & Mann, 2001; Fay & Middleton, 
1941; Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2004; Kraut, 1980; Vrij, 2000; Fiedler & Walka, 1993; 
Ekman & Friesen, 1974; Meissner & Kassin, 2002; Vrij, Edward & Bull, 2001; 
Ekman, O’Sullivan & Frank, 1999; Miller & Stiff, 1993; Zuckerman, DePaulo & 
Rosenthal, 1981; Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu & Rockwell, 1994).  
While it has been acknowledged that collective interviewing poses a strong 
potential to become a successful method to detect deceit, observers’ affective 
responses and their judgments, in other words veracity judgment accuracy rates, 
of pairs versus solo appealers has previously been an unexplored process. While 
there are research investigating whether groups are better at detecting deception 
(Culhane et al., 2015), no study has looked at whether individuals are better at 
detecting lies when it is presented by a pair of liars or the same pair presented 
solo.  
The only known study to date that has verged upon studying the perception 
of paired liars was conducted by Strömwall, Granhag and Reiman (2002). The 
authors let their participants watch videotaped statements of pairs of suspect 
individuals. These pairs are thought to be complicit and thus both associates were 
interrogated separately, twice. Their study indicated that observers focused more 
on the consistency between both suspects when making their veracity decisions, 
rather than the consistency within each suspect’s statements. To be precise, they 
found that their participants used the cue ‘consistency within pairs of suspects’ 
twice as often as the cue ‘consistency within single suspects’. In the next section, 
we consider the possibility of cognitive loading occurring during perception of 
paired liars.  
 
10.3 Cognitive loading 
When viewing a video comprising of two appealers co-appealing, it is 
possible the participant may undergo an increase in mental processing when 
perceiving both appealers at once, and deciding whether one, or the other, or both, 
are innocent or guilty. Explained in Chapter 8, an increase in cognitive load 
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implies either an increase in the amount of information elements or sources to be 
processed or that a higher demand for processing is consigned for the same amount 
of information coming from the same source (Lavie, 2005; Sweller, 2010). Accuracy 
in task performance diminishes, and memory is impaired when an observer is 
cognitively loaded either visually or through auditory channels (Vredeveldt et al., 
2011; Weaver & Stewart, 2012). In knowledge of this, it is possible that observers 
assign incoming information into categories that are easier and quicker to process 
mentally in favour of rational and objective evaluation of them knowingly or 
unconsciously, which brings us to the next section.  
 
10.4 Pair/contagion bias 
One of the biases observers may subscribe to is the pair/contagion bias, 
introduced in Chapter 2.  As introduced in Section 2.2.2, the contagion heuristic is 
defined as a mental shortcut whereby people identify someone as being of a certain 
trait or impression simply by close relationship with another person who exudes a 
similar trait or impression, and/or when both are perceived in combination with 
each other. A pair bias may arise as a consequence of this heuristic (Ng & Youngs, 
2016). This bias has never been studied in the current context, although hints of 
it have been suggested in literature sporadically (Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Sutter, 
2009; Bornstein et al., 2002). In the current study, it is hypothesised that an 
innocent appealer will be perceived as guiltier by means of observers using a 
contagion heuristic, resulting in a pair bias. 
 
10.5 Other biases in perception of paired liars 
It is unknown whether an innocence bias exists in a collaborative 
deception or guilt setting; all previous studies focus on deception at an 
individualistic level. Similarly, other biases discussed in previous chapters are 
also examined in the current study. Vrij et al. (2010) found that pairs of liars 
worked together to agree on a fabricated and plausible story before an 
anticipated interview. Therefore, it would be of interest to observe if paired liars 
are perceived to prepare appeals differently than if they were shown solo. 
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10.6 Key issues to explore 
 In light of this, the current study aims to explore questions such as ‘when 
a liar who presumably exudes negativity and a sense of ‘danger’ to beware of is 
paired with an innocent appealer who presumably emanates positivity, will 
negativity or positivity dominate when both entities combine? The general 
question then reflected is whether group or paired deception is more successful 
than solo deception. In co-offending, the inquiry is raised as to whether co-
offending is more successful than solo offending (Weerman, 2001). The hypotheses 
of this study include: a) two appealers appealing together will be perceived to be 
more believable and their story more robust in plausibility than those appearing 
solo, b) a false appealer appealing with an honest appealer will appear more 
believable than when appearing solo, and c) the innocence bias will more likely be 
present in the paired versus solo setting. 
 
10.7 Methods 
10.7.1 Participants 
The preliminary sample of participants totalled to 175 participants for both 
conditions, with 700 cases as each participant judged four cases of these appeals. 
None of the participants personally knew any of the featured appealers in this 
study but some reported knowledge of certain appeals from watching or hearing it 
on television. They were recruited using a mixture of snowball and opportunity 
sampling from the UK and Europe. They were from varying occupations ranging 
from prison officer to company director to farmer to psychologist to radio DJ and 
more; as well as nationalities/ethnicities (British, Asian, African, Scandinavian, 
Middle Eastern, European and American). 
 
10.7.2 Material and Procedure 
Two pairs of appeals will be chosen for the purposes of the present study. 
The first pair appeal will contain two guilty appealers, and the other a guilty 
appealer and an innocent appealer. The content of the videos are a mixture of press 
conference and interviews. One male and one female will be chosen for each level 
of emotionality so as to balance for any gender effects. For the Paired condition, 
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the videos will be shown to participants in their original form. For the Solo 
condition, the same videos will be edited so that the content of the appeal remains 
the same as the Paired condition but only showing one appealer at a time without 
altering any footage. Thus, both conditions will watch the exact same appeal 
content. Judges will be divided into two condition levels, where one level watched 
Paired appeals and the other Solo appeals. Video clips for the Paired condition 
ranged from 34.60 seconds to 37.64 seconds while video clips for the Solo condition 
ranged from 13.65 seconds to 19.93 seconds. It should be mentioned that it is 
difficult to find appeals consisting of two guilty appealers appearing together in 
the same video frame; consequently, this effect will be achieved through editing 
these appeals in order that the appealers appear sequentially. In contrast, the 
innocent and guilty pair will appear simultaneously and hence will not require 
extensive editing to achieve this effect.  
This is a between-group design so all participants will experience the same 
four videos in a non-randomised order, with the predictor variable being Paired or 
Solo appealers and outcome variable being implicit assessments and explicit 
assignment of veracity. The advantage of using a between-subjects design is the 
ability to determine not only what implicit decisions were used by participants, 
but also what generated and predicted accurate explicit decisions. In addition, this 
design controls for appeal content, in that both conditions are exposed to the same 
appealers with the same appeal context, thus there is no issue of sender 
detectability here. ‘Not-sure’ responses for all implicit decisions were recorded for 
the remaining cases retained for analyses. 
 Analyses will be run for explicit decision to determine accuracy rates and if 
a innocence-guilt bias occurred. As for implicit responses, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test for normality (Massey, 1951; Smirnov, 1948) will be conducted, and because 
the K-S test show non-normal data a Mann Whitney U test for within-subjects 
cases will be conducted. The same methods of analysing results in previous 
chapters will be conducted in this study.  
 
10.7.3 Ground truth 
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Only cases where a substantial amount of evidence was obtained to place 
false appealers beyond reasonable doubt were used in this study, thus establishing 
ground truth. Appealer 2 was found guilty of perverting the course of justice by 
providing a false alibi for Appealer 1. Appealer 3 was convicted of murdering his 
stepdaughter with evidence of the body being found and a bloody t-shirt belonging 
to the victim within the property grounds of the appealer. Appealer 4 has been 
established innocent by the court of any crime in the murder of her stepdaughter. 
 
10.8 Results 
10.8.1 Participants 
After removing cases where participants had knowledge of the appeals, 168 
participants (557 cases) remain for analysis, with 71 participants (225 cases) for 
the Paired condition and 97 participants (331 cases) for the Solo condition. As some 
participants knew of more than one out of the four appeal cases, the total number 
of cases may be lower than the overall number of participants. The final pool of 
participants ranged from 16 to 72 years in age (M = 33.96, SD = 12.62).  
 
10.8.2 Explicit veracity judgments 
 In the present study, rates of interest were between appealers appearing 
with a co-appealer (Paired condition) as compared to when appear by themselves 
(Solo condition). As seen in Table 20, the overall rating reported by judges in the 
Solo condition was 59.80%, higher than chance level. The judges who watched 
Paired appealers performed below chance level at 44.20%. 
 
Table 20 
Judgment rates of explicit decisions for Paired and Solo conditions 
 
Appealer Co-appealer 
Guilt Ratings 
Paired 
Guilt Ratings 
Solo 
Guilty male Guilty female 36.40% 66.30% 
Guilty female Guilty male 29.50% 55.70% 
Guilty male Innocent female 51.50% 48.60% 
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Innocence 
Ratings Paired 
Innocence 
Ratings Solo 
Innocent female Guilty male 59.40% 65.60% 
    
Total   44.20% 59.80% 
 
10.8.3 Relationship between explicit rates and source presentation (Paired or Solo) 
 Chi-square results were χ2 (1) = 10.430, p < .05. This revealed that there 
was a statistically significant association between ratings of judges’ explicit 
decisions and whether appealers are presented as pairs or solo. The research 
hypothesis that differences in accurate explicit veracity decisions were related to 
whether appealers were presented with a co-appealer or by themselves was 
supported by this analysis. Phi values indicate the strength of this relationship 
and chosen over Cramer’s V as both variables used in the sample are dichotomous 
(Jones, 2009). The strength of association between the variables was .137, 
indicating a weak relationship (Davis, 1971).  
 
10.8.4 Innocence bias 
 Analysing the breakdown by each appealer again, Table 20 distinguishes 
guilt accuracies from innocence accuracies. Un-bolded percentages represent 
accuracies below chance level and the bolded values represent accuracies above 
chance level. An innocence bias was not reliably evident in either condition. While 
it appeared to be more evident for the Paired condition, the results did not indicate 
a consistent bias for the guilty male appealing with an innocent female. An 
innocence bias was not apparent in the Solo condition, as some guilt accuracies 
were well beyond chance level. Results would suggest the innocence bias is not 
consistent in the present study. 
 
10.8.5 Implicit veracity judgments 
 Results for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality (Massey, 1951; 
Smirnov, 1948) indicated that the score distributions deviated significantly from 
a normal distribution (D = .102, p < .005). Thus, non-parametric tests were applied 
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to assess observer judgments other than just dichotomous judgments of ‘guilty’ 
and ‘innocent’. Mann Whitney U test scores can be found in Table 22.  
 Cronbach’s alpha for each scale items can be found in Table 21. Implications 
are considered in the Discussion section and reviewed in depth in Chapter 11 
under Sections 11.6 and 11.7. 
 
Table 21 
Cronbach's alpha coefficients for Study 4 
 
Meta-emotion Cognition Appearance Emotions 
0.63 0.58 0.39 0.37 
 
 
 The implicit cue of story plausibility was perceived to be significantly higher 
in the Paired condition (M = 2.10, SD = 1.31) compared to the Solo condition (M = 
1.82, SD = 1.36). The same pattern can be seen for the implicit cue of story sense 
with the Paired condition recording a mean of 1.92 (SD = 1.39) and the Solo 
condition recording a mean of 1.69 (SD = 1.34). Judges who viewed the appealers 
as a Pair felt that the combined appeals were significantly higher in plausibility 
that the accounts of what happened the day the victim went missing and the plea  
 
Table 22 
Mann Whitney U item scores for Paired and Solo conditions 
  Paired means  Solo means Z R 
Innocence score     
Credibility 1.85 (1.32) 1.93 (1.20) -0.536 NA 
Cognition of Source content 
scores    
Plausibility 2.10 (1.31) 1.82 (1.36) -2.222 NA 
Story Sense 1.92 (1.39) 1.69 (1.34) -1.990 -0.15 
Practice 1.57 (1.10) 1.87 (1.08) -3.102 -0.23 
Well-thought-out 1.81 (1.20) 2.02 (1.20) -2.145 NA 
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Organised 1.88 (1.19) 1.83 (1.19) -0.203 NA 
Wording 1.63 (1.15) 1.65 (1.15) -0.507 NA 
Emotion scores     
Less Emotion 1.79 (1.25) 1.89 (1.23) -0.997 NA 
Emotions Match 2.10 (1.36) 2.06 (1.31) -0.456 NA 
Appearance scores     
Face attractiveness 1.14 (1.04) 1.62 (1.14) -4.351 -0.18 
Voice attractiveness  1.64 (1.25) 1.80 (1.20) -1.568 NA 
Meta-emotion score 9.74 (4.50) 9.25 (3.76) -1.658 NA 
 
Note: Significant p values are in bold; p <0.01. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
 
 
for the return of the victim had taken place. Additionally, judges in this condition 
felt that the accounts given made significantly more sense. As for preparation 
scores, judges viewed the appealers presented as a couple as less practiced and 
less well-thought-out implying that they seemed less rehearsed and therefore 
possibly more ‘genuine’. Similarly, overall, judges viewed the appealers presented 
as a couple as less credible than those who viewed them presented individually. 
Remarkably, both conditions did not record any significant differences in either 
the perception of emotive implicit cues or the meta-emotion bias. Thus, both 
groups felt that the emotions displayed by the appealers were alike whether 
appealers were shown together or singularly. There were no significant differences 
to how sympathetic as they felt when shown the appealers as a Pair or as Solo 
members.  
 
10.8.6 Logistic regression analyses 
In this study, tolerance was greater than .10 for all items, and the variance 
inflation factor was also less than 10 for all items. This suggested that 
multicollinearity was not an issue in this study (meta-emotion, Tolerance = 
0.73, VIF = 1.37; credibility, Tolerance = 0.82, VIF = 1.22; plausibility, Tolerance 
= 0.76, VIF = 1.31; practice, Tolerance = 0.85, VIF = 1.18; voice attractiveness, 
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Tolerance = 0.82; VIF = 1.22; organised speech, Tolerance = 0.82; VIF = 1.21; face 
attractiveness, Tolerance = 0.89; VIF = 1.12; less emotions, Tolerance = 0.87; VIF 
= 1.15; wording, Tolerance = 0.88; VIF = 1.13; well-thought-out, Tolerance = 0.81, 
VIF = 1.23; emotions match, Tolerance = 0.83, VIF = 1.21; practice, Tolerance = 
0.85, VIF = 1.18). To reduce Type 1 error and increase level of confidence in results, 
the more stringent cut-off level of 'p < 0.01' will be used. 
First, consideration was given to the Paired condition as to which implicit 
veracity judgments they may have consciously or otherwise used towards to their 
explicit one. The binary logistic regression model indicates that it was able to 
distinguish between respondents who explicitly reported Guilty from the ones who 
reported Innocent, with results reported as χ2 (12, N = 168) = 63.51, p < .005. The 
model as a whole explained between 32% (Cox and Snell R2) and 43% (Nagelkerke 
R2) of the variance in veracity judgments, and correctly classified 78% of cases. As 
shown in Table 23, two of the independent variables made a unique statistically 
significant contribution to the model for the Paired condition. These were 
judgments perceived voice attractiveness (OR = 1.99) and matched-ness of 
emotions (OR = 1.74).  
For the Solo condition, the full model indicates that it was able to 
distinguish between respondents who explicitly reported Guilty from the ones who 
reported Innocent, with results reported as χ2 (8, N = 168) = 68.465, p < .005. The 
model as a whole explained between 19% (Cox and Snell R2) and 25% (Nagelkerke 
R2) of the variance in veracity judgments, and correctly classified 69% of cases. As 
shown in Table 23, two independent variables made a unique statistically 
significant contribution to the model for this condition. The stronger predictor was 
perceived overall credibility (OR = 1.49), followed by how well-thought-out they 
judged the appeals to be (OR = 0.69). 
 Consideration was then given to the Paired condition as to which implicit 
veracity judgments accurately supported their explicit one. Another binary logistic 
regression with the actual accuracy of judges’ explicit veracity judgments as the 
dependent measure in this group was conducted. The model indicates that it was 
able to distinguish between respondents who explicitly reported Guilty from the 
ones who reported Innocent, with results reported as χ2 (8, N = 168) = 15.63, p < 
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.005. The model as a whole explained between 7% (Cox and Snell R2) and 9% 
(Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in accuracy, and correctly classified 63% of cases. 
As shown in Table 24, no independent variables made a unique statistically 
significant contribution to the model for this condition with a cut-off point of p < 
0.01.  
As for which implicit veracity judgments measured in the present study 
may have contributed to the accuracy of their explicit judgment in the Solo 
condition, the full model indicates that it was able to distinguish between 
respondents who explicitly reported Guilty from the ones who reported Innocent, 
with results reported as χ2 (12, N = 168) = 22.795, p < .005. The model as a whole 
explained between 7% (Cox and Snell R2) and 9% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance 
in veracity judgments, and correctly classified 65% of cases. As shown in Table 24, 
one independent variable made a unique statistically significant contribution to 
the model for this condition. This implicit variable was perceived story plausibility 
(OR = 1.29).
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Table 23 
Bootstrapped binary logistic regression models for explicit judgments between Paired and Solo conditions 
 
 Model 1: Paired Model 2: Solo 
Variables B (SE) OR 95% C.I. (Lower, Upper) p B (SE) OR 
95% C.I. (Lower, 
Upper) p 
Credibility .392 (.167) 1.480 1.066, 2.055 0.019 .403 (.113) 1.496 1.198, 1.868 0.000 
Plausibility .198 (.177) 1.219 .861, 1.726 0.265 .057 (.102) 0.944 .774, 1.130 0.574 
Story Sense .306 (.165) 1.358 .984, 1.875 0.063 .077 (.103) 1.080 .882, 1.323 0.456 
Practice .210 (.208) 1.234 .821, 1.853 0.312 -.296 (.124) 0.743 .583, .948 0.017 
Wording .100 (.195) 1.106 .755, 1.619 0.606 -.197 (.115) 0.821 .655, 1.029 0.087 
Well-thought-out -.404 (.215) 0.668 .438, 1.018 0.061 -.362 (.113) 0.695 .556, .868 0.001 
Organised -.120 (.211) 0.887 .586, 1.334 0.569 .044 (.114) 1.045 .835, 1.307 0.700 
Face -.167 (.200) 0.404 .572, 1.252 0.404 .066 (.118) 1.068 .848, 1.344 0.576 
Voice .691 (.192) 1.996 1.370, 2.908 0.000 .212 (.115) 1.236 .987, 1.547 0.065 
Less Emotions -.015 (.184) 0.985 .687, 1.414 0.936 0.109 (.108) 0.897 .725, 1.109 0.314 
Emotions Match .556 (.166) 1.744 1.258, 2.416 0.001 .180 (.101) 1.197 .982, 1.459 0.075 
Meta-emotion -.054 (.057) 0.947 .847, 1.060 0.345 .070 (.039) 1.072 .994, 1.157 0.071 
Model 
description 
Model is statistically significant: χ2 = 63.51; df = 12; 
Nagelkerke's R2 = .43; Hosmer-Lemeshow test: χ2 = 1.159; df = 
8; p = .997    
Model is statistically significant: χ2 = 68.465; df = 12; 
Nagelkerke's R2 = .26; Hosmer-Lemeshow test: χ2 = 6.750;  
df = 8; p = .564    
 
Note: Significant p values are in bold; p <0.01. Standard errors appear in 
parentheses.       
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Table 24 
Bootstrapped binary logistic regression models for Accurate explicit jdugments between Paired and Solo conditions 
 Model 1: Paired Model 2: Solo 
Variables B (SE) OR 95% C.I. (Lower, Upper) p B (SE) OR 95% C.I. (Lower, Upper) p 
Credibility .039 (.145) 1.039 .782, 1.382 0.790 -.038 (.109) 0.962 .777, 1.192 0.725 
Plausibility .273 (.164) 1.314 .952, 1.813 0.097 .257 (.098) 1.293 1.067, 1.567 0.009 
Story Sense .045 (.151) 1.046 .777, 1.407 0.768 .076 (.100) 1.079 .886, 1.313 0.451 
Practice -.146 (.179) 0.864 .608, 1.228 0.416 -.023 (.119) 0.978 .774, 1.235 0.850 
Wording .048 (.170) 1.049 .752, 1.463 0.778 -.077 (.108) 1.003 .748, 1.145 0.476 
Well-thought-out .028 (.169) 1.028 .738, 1.432 0.870 .055 (.108) 1.057 .855, 1.307 0.609 
Organised -.217 (.182) 0.805 .563, 1.151 0.234 -.074 (.106) 0.929 .755, 1.143 0.486 
Face -.287 (.174) 0.751 .534, 1.055 0.099 .003 (.111) 1.003 .807, 1.246 0.979 
Voice .326 (.158) 1.386 1.018, 1.887 0.380 .245 (.109) 1.277 1.031, 1.582 0.025 
Less Emotions -.040 (.152) 0.961 .713, 1.295 0.793 -.133 (.103) 0.875 .715, 1.071 0.197 
Emotions Match .076 (.140) 1.079 .820, 1.420 0.857 .164 (.097) 1.178 .975, 1.424 0.090 
Meta-emotion -.099 (.049) 0.906 .823, .997 0.044 -.013 (.036) 0.987 .920, 1.059 0.987 
Model 
description 
Model is statistically significant: χ2 = 14.72; df = 12; 
Nagelkerke's R2 = .12; Hosmer-Lemeshow test: χ2 = 8.065; df = 
8; p = .427    
Model is statistically significant: χ2 = 22.795; df = 12; 
Nagelkerke's R2 = .092; Hosmer-Lemeshow test: χ2 = 6.754;  
df = 8; p = .563    
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Significant p values are in bold; p <0.01. Standard errors appear in parentheses.       
179 
 
 
10.8.7 Not-sure answers percentages 
 Only percentage differences between both conditions that are higher than 
10% are discussed. This table can be found in Appendix L. The Paired condition 
found it harder to rate perceived appeal practice and perceived face 
attractiveness of the appealer than did the Solo condition. 
 
10.9 Discussion 
Most existing lie detection research has focused on subjective veracity 
assessments of individual liars and truth tellers, when in fact deception can and 
often does occur with more than one liar in a situation. Therefore, the present 
chapter pursued to fill this gap with the expectation to reveal differences in 
underlying cognitive processes for both conditions with innocence-guilt verdicts. 
Two appealers appealing together were judged to be more believable and their 
story more robust in plausibility than those appearing solo. A false appealer 
appealing with an honest appealer appeared more believable than when appearing 
solo, and the innocence bias seems to be more pronounced in the paired versus solo 
setting (thus not consistently evident in both conditions).  
Underlying differences in mental processing were implied via regression 
analyses. Main results of the present study would suggest that co-appealing duped 
observers more successfully than when the same appealer was presented solo, in 
this sample. Judges were more accurate in judging the sender’s innocence or guilt 
when the appealer appeared alone without a co-appealer. When a guilty appealer 
was paired with a fellow guilty co-appealer, judges tended to assign more ratings 
of innocence to both appealers than when they were both presented alone. This 
indicates that innocence can be falsified when two liars corroborate and validate 
each other, as Vrij et al. (2010) speculated. Liars will work together to come up 
with a plausible story. This strengthens the lie, duping an observer into believing 
a fictitious story that seems to be truthful. When a story is plausible and is backed 
up by another and not just one of them, it appears that the plausibility of the story 
increases, at least in the context of the appeals chosen in the present study. 
However, this situation was reversed when an innocent appealer is paired 
with a guilty co-appealer. Judges in this study tend to assign slightly lower ratings 
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of innocence to the innocent appealer than when this appealer appears alone, 
inferring a negativity bias (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). The results revealed a 
difference in the interplay between the guilty pair and that between guilty and 
innocent pair. For the guilty pair, there was a large difference in ratings whereas 
for the pair containing one guilty and one innocent appealer, the innocent appealer 
was more accurately judged when appearing alone and the guilty one is more 
accurately judged as ‘guilty’ appearing with his innocent wife (though the 
magnitude of this percentage difference was only around 3.00%). It may be 
beneficial for a guilty appealer to co-appeal with an innocent appealer as the 
present study found, although the percentage of this difference is very small (see 
Table 20).  
A few explanations are provided for these results. Judges in the Paired 
condition may have performed less well in their explicit judgments due to cognitive 
loading, when they had to pay attention to two appealers at once in making their 
assessments. In the Paired condition, judges may have perhaps been inundated 
with extra auditory and visual stimuli that the Solo condition did not experience. 
As introduced in the literature review, the limited ability for our working memory 
to hold chunks of information and let alone process them conceivably decreased 
participant accuracy of judging coupled high stakes lies (Cowan, 2001).  
In reality, the guilty pair in the present study presumably rehearsed their 
story before being interviewed by the media. As introduced in Section 6.2.2.3, Vrij 
et al. (2010) contended that pairs of liars tend to rehearse their stories before an 
interview. The authors found that while giving more vague answers compared to 
truth tellers, pairs of liars anticipated and prepared answers for possible questions 
they would be asked about. Well-prepared liars are harder to detect than those 
who are not (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). Interestingly, results in Table 23 would 
suggest that for judges in the Solo condition, appealers were perceived to have 
higher credibility when they were innocent and their appeals were perceived to be 
not thought-out very well if they were guilty. For those in the Paired condition, 
appealers were perceived to have a more appealing voice and a higher matched-
ness of emotions with the appeal content if the appealers were innocent. 
Additionally, Table 24 would suggest that for judges in the Solo condition, innocent 
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appealers were perceived to have more plausible stories and this would appear to 
be an ‘accurate’ cue judges have used for this condition. 
Although vastly conjecture at this stage, a reasonable explanation is that 
appealers appearing as a pair presumably reinforced judges’ beliefs that this 
pairing itself was perhaps an indicator that they were more likely to be innocent. 
Alternately, when judges were not exposed to both appealers appealing together, 
this ‘pair bias’ was ostensibly not made available to them to then use as an 
indicator of guilt and innocence, compelling them to look for other available cues 
such as verbal cues (i.e. how credible overall the appealer appeared and how well-
thought-out the appeal seemed to be) in making their veracity decisions. 
Mann Whitney U results would show several significant differences. A 
significant result was discovered for appeal sense between the Paired and Solo 
condition, with a small effect, but was not significant for overall appealer 
credibility. Judges found that the stories made more sense when pairs of 
appealers were presented together rather than separately. A remark here is that 
that the Paired condition’s appeals may have made more sense simply because 
there is more information available on the particular case. Judges performed less 
accurately when the appeals presumably made more sense (when more 
information was present) as they were presented as a joint effort. This seems to 
suggest the occurrence of an innocence bias in the presence of another induced 
bias – the pair bias. The innocence bias was not reflected when the pair bias was 
not present. Additionally, results did not seem to suggest a meta-emotion bias in 
the current sample. This implies that judges did not rely on the cues of emotional 
display and their own sympathetic reactions to come to their veracity decisions. 
As a tentative conclusion, results from the present study would tend to 
suggest that how appeals are presented (i.e. whether appealers were presented 
solo or whether the same ones were presented with another) can alter how they 
are perceived. This inference was suggested by explicit veracity decisions, 
regression analyses and Mann Whitney U tests between Solo and Paired 
conditions. The manner of presentation seems to impact what implicit cues are 
consciously or unconsciously detected, and this also seem to initiate differences 
in underlying cognitive processing. Chi square results also suggest that a 
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relationship exists between how the appeals were presented and judges’ 
assessments of whether appealers were innocent or guilty. A full discussion as to 
why this relationship may be significant but weak can be found in sections 11.6 
and 11.7 in Chapter 11.  Limitations include using a mixture of edited videos 
that appeared simultaneously and sequentially, which could have confounded 
results. These difficulties are inherent in working with real world stimulus 
material. Additionally, the usage of only a pair of liars and a pair consisting of a 
truthteller and a liar (low number of stimulus videos shown to Judges) connotes 
that the results (and subsequent interpretation in this study could be 
idiosyncratic and only relevant to the videos used here.  
Nevertheless, subject to further replication with a higher number of videos 
and dependent on further clarification as to the differences in cognitive processes 
between the two conditions, these findings are particularly germane to the area 
of televised press conferences. It raises questions of the potential importance in 
paying attention to the number of appealers pleading for a case. On a broader 
spectrum, clear guidelines as to how to carry out these press conferences in 
partnership with the media are not yet available to most law enforcement 
agencies around the world. The present study reiterated that guidelines and 
protocols are much needed to moderate biases while ensuring effective 
investigation in a missing and murdered relatives’ cases. Moreover, this chapter 
establishes a foundation for further studies to be conducted. For example, the 
finding that judges in the Paired condition performing less well in their explicit 
judgments with the suggestion that this may be due to cognitive loading could 
perhaps be empirically tested by presenting these videos to judges in a 
sequential order rather than a simultaneous order.  
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FINDINGS 
11.1 Observers’ explicit judgments 
 Issues considered in the present thesis were 1) whether judges were able to 
assess innocence and guilt in these appeals with a higher accuracy in one condition 
than the other, 2) whether variances in underlying cognitive processes lie across 
different experimentally manipulated conditions, 3) whether biases were present 
in these different conditions and 4) if so, which conditions are these biases more 
likely to surface.  
 Study 1 presented only truthful appeals to judges in a within-subjects 
experimental design. A difference is seen between both conditions. Highly 
Emotional appeals reported a veracity rating of 56.00%, whereas Low Emotional 
appeals reported a rating of 40.60%. Study 1 highlighted the limitations of using 
only appealers who are innocent in the sample. In addition to not being able to 
study a guilt bias, by using only truthful appeals it could not be determined from 
logistic regression whether results are predicting accuracy, or simply what implicit 
judgments the judges used for the appeal videos. A between-subjects design was 
employed for Study 2 not only so that a guilt bias can also be investigated, but also 
to control for the issue of sender detectability (to moderate for outcomes resulting 
from content differences). 
 In Study 2, a difference was seen in explicit judgments for different Source 
presentations, with 65.70% rating for false appeals the Audio-only condition 
compared to 54.90% in the Audio-visual condition. Innocence detection was 72.60% 
(much higher than chance level) in the Audio-only condition compared to 52.00% 
in Audio-visual condition (approximately at chance level). Study 2 inferred a 
visual bias, whereby being able to see the appearance of an appealer influenced 
veracity judgment assessments.  
 Results from Study 3 would suggest a story-sense bias. The High Sense 
condition recorded a total accuracy rating of 62.00% whereas the Low Sense 
condition yielded a total accuracy rating of 44.9%. Judges in general considered 
non-sensible appeals to be less convincing and tended to favour ‘articulate’ 
speakers more in judging them to be more innocent. The explicit judgments in the 
Low Sense condition innocence detection yielded a low accuracy rating. Judges 
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here perhaps held the (mistaken) mental short cut that because the appeal was so 
nonsensical and conceptually incoherent that the appealers most likely fabricated 
the appeal. A strong guilt bias was evident in the Low Sense condition for both 
innocence and guilt explicit accuracy ratings. This is further expounded in Section 
11.4 below. 
 Results from Study 4 would suggest a pair bias. This study found that co-
appealers were more successful in duping observers in contrast to when the same 
appealer is presented solo in this sample. Judges were biased into believing two 
guilty appealers when they co-appealed together (with an accuracy rating of 
44.20%), whereas they were less biased and hence more accurate in judging the 
same appealers when they were presented solo with an accuracy rate above chance 
level at nearly 60.00%. 
 Across all four studies differences in accuracies were found between both 
conditions judges were assigned to, suggesting different underlying cognitive 
processing transpired when observers are shown similar appeals that were 
carefully manipulated. The highest rating of ‘accuracy’ was yielded for judges in 
the High Sense group, at 72.85%. When compared with truth-lie detection, these 
ratings are unusual in lie detection research in general (though similar to the 
percentages recorded in higher stakes research in lie detection such in Vrij et al.’s 
(2006) study with police officers. In fact, Vrij and Mann (2001) showed police 
officers television appeals and their participants only yielded an overall accuracy 
rating of 50%.  
 The lowest ‘accuracy’ rating was yielded for the group of judges who 
watched appeals with Low Sense, at 22.70%. What seems like a guilt bias was 
76.85% accuracy for the Low Sense condition as well. The lowest total accuracy 
was recorded by judges who watched appeals with low levels of emotionality in 
Study 1, and the highest was recorded by the Audio-only condition in Study 2. A 
summary of explicit veracity ratings is presented in Table 25 below. 
  
11.2 Explicit veracity judgments across Studies 1 to 4 
Table 25 
Overall explicit accuracy rates by conditions across Studies 1 to 4 
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Study Conditions Innocence rates Guilt rates Total rates 
1 High Emotionality 56.00% NA 56.00% 
 Low Emotionality 40.60% NA 40.60% 
2 Audio-only 72.60% 65.70% 69.20% 
 Audio-visual 52.00% 54.90% 53.45% 
3 High Sense 72.85% 50.70% 61.78% 
 Low Sense 22.70% 76.85% 49.78% 
4 Paired 59.40% 39.13% 49.27% 
 Solo 65.60% 56.87% 61.24% 
*Percentages higher than chance level appear in bold  
 
Study 1 was not indicative of an innocence bias, as all appeals were honest 
and yet not all the accuracy ratings yielded were above 50.00%. Study 2 also 
reported no such bias for the Audio-only condition, with 72.60% accuracy for true 
appeals and 65.70% for false appeals. However, the Audio-visual condition 
reported ratings that are similar to the general research with accuracies close to 
chance level. This group would seem to display an innocence bias. Again, Study 
3’s results were not indicative of a consistent innocence bias; it was not present in 
the Low Sense condition. Finally, in Study 4, while it appears to be more evident 
for the Paired condition, the results did not indicate a consistent innocence bias 
for the guilty male appealing with an innocent female. The innocence bias claim 
was not present in the Solo condition, as some guilt accuracies were well beyond 
chance level.  
 Results from Studies 1 to 4 would suggest that the innocence bias is 
potentially merely a methodological construct of how experiments are set up and 
what cues become perceptible or important to judges. The inconsistency of the 
innocence-guilt bias across all four studies (more absent than present) would tend 
to infer that the occurrence of this bias is possibly only a by-product of and/or is 
naturally contingent upon the existence of certain other biases and/or when other 
biases are not as salient. The possibility of an innocence bias has not been studied 
using this high-stakes scenarios, let alone in controlled experimental designs 
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where the stimulus material was manipulated. For example, the likelihood that it 
occurs has never been studied in a collaborative deception setting (i.e. Paired 
versus Solo). Therefore, it must be stated that any conclusions should remain 
tentative at this stage as further examination into the processes of how people 
make innocence-guilt decisions and how this interrelates with the concept of truth-
lie judgments needs to be made. What is interesting is that, for example, Study 3 
would suggest that judges are noting different cues for guilty and innocent 
appealers and awarding different ratings of innocence and guilt for each. This 
would seem to infer that thinking processes are different for when a sender is 
guilty or innocent.  
While it is recognised that the explicit question asked here pertains to a 
judgment of guilt or innocence of the appealer and not the truthfulness or 
deception of the appealer and both measures are not identical, there are 
conceivably overlaps between the two assessments in the present thesis. While a 
judgment of innocence-guilt and a judgment of truth-lie are not entirely 
identical, in the context of judging a brief video such as in the present thesis it 
appears that the two are linked. In other words, it would be difficult for a person 
watching a video in which the subject implies their innocence to make their 
decision whether this subject is guilty without thinking that the subject was 
lying. Guilt in this context refers to the appealer being culpable of being involved 
in the murder or disappearance of the relative they are appealing for, and the 
assumption of guilt lies on the belief that they have in fact been culpable and 
therefore are lying in their appeal.  
Because the explicit question in this thesis asked was ‘does the appealer 
seem guilty or not guilty of being culpable in the murder/disappearance of their 
relative’ a judge must then use what they are given to make a decision, in this 
situation being the appeal video itself. In other cases, such as in an interrogation 
or in a jury trial, other forms of evidence or information about the case can be 
used to determine judgments of guilt or innocence apart from what the suspect 
says and how they behave. Therefore, while of course conjecture at this stage, in 
the present context it is reasonable to assume that the judgment of 
innocence/guilt interrelates with a truth/lie judgment. To believe that the 
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appealer is guilty in this context indicates that the appealer has in some way or 
form been in involved in foul play, and therefore they are lying when giving an 
account during the press conference. They are guilty of holding the knowledge of 
what happened to their relatives (i.e. if they murdered or kidnapped them), and 
therefore are insincere in their pleas when asking for the relative to turn 
themselves in or seeking help from the public for tips. While judges were not 
being asked to assess deception per se, they may very likely incorporate it during 
decision-making.   
 
11.3 Guilt bias  
 In Study 3, judges displayed what seems a guilt bias. The possibility of this 
bias has never been compared when different levels of sense are presented in high 
stake situations; this study affords a level of insight into the likelihood of its 
presence in such mediums. As can be seen across the four experimental studies 
where certain cues are manipulated and accented, the innocence or guilt bias 
either ‘surfaced’ or was ‘non-existent’ within different manipulations in conditions. 
The resulting innocence and guilt biases in the present thesis can perhaps be 
understood as a manifestation of an educated and rational deduction that satiates 
the deficiency of low or no diagnostic cues. While initially implied as an error, for 
example as suggested in Chapter 2, and/or that they highlight the wrong cues as 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the findings from this thesis led to an alternative 
conclusion. Although these were originally thought of as biases, as they are often 
referred to in some literature (Levine, 2014; McCornack & Levine, 1990; Levine & 
McCornack, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Peace & Sinclair, 2012; Paunonen, 
2006; Ekman et al., 1999; Forgas, 1995; Doss, 2002; Operario & Fiske, 1999) it 
became clear that these are not errors in any strict sense but rather, most likely, 
decisions that are adaptive (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Street, 2015).  
Borrowing from lie detection literature, the ALIED account argues that 
individuals will depend more heavily on context-general information when 
individuating cues have low diagnostic value or are not diagnostic at all. The 
solitary use of context-general information may result in biases in decision 
making. This account proposes that individuals are adaptive in making 
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judgments that are informed. When uncertain, context-general information helps 
people to make decisions (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Simon, 1990). Street 
(2015) proposes that as there is less diagnostic individuating information 
available, context influences decision making more. They adapt what they use to 
form their decisions, but this is not based on a ‘predisposition’ to using their 
knowledge of context either (Brunswik, 1952). The ALIED account argues that 
individuals will depend more heavily on context-general information when 
individuating cues have low diagnostic value or are not diagnostic at all. The 
solitary use of context-general information may result in biases in decision 
making.  
 The ALIED approach may help shed light as to why judges sometimes 
displayed a supposed ‘innocence bias’ and at times a ‘guilt ‘bias’ just as readily. 
Street (2015) maintains that the ease at which the truth and lie biases can be 
employed is at odds with their very claim. The ALIED approach claims that the 
presence and direction of these biases are all dependent on context. Just like the 
truth bias, the tendency to disbelieve a statement or sender can be observed just 
as rapidly and effortlessly, because the lie bias is also not a cognitive default 
(Street, 2015). It claims that biased responses, rather than being ubiquitous, are 
adaptive and amenable to reflect an understanding of the given context. If there 
was cognitive bias in believing others are always honest, a quick and effective 
default towards disbelieving others cannot occur just as quickly. While this is still 
very much conjecture at this stage, the hypothesised innocence and guilt ‘biases’ 
are most likely either mere results of methodological constructs, or are remnants 
from an adaptive decision-making mode in the face of low or unhelpful information 
about the source. 
 
11.4 Implicit judgments across all studies  
 The second general objective of the current thesis was to consider the role 
of implicit veracity judgments in the high-stakes scenarios of television appeals 
and how they relate to explicit judgments. The aim of this section is to discuss 
these results from Studies 1 to 4.  
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11.4.1 Overall credibility 
Table 26 
Differences between conditions for Overall Credibility across Studies 1 to 4 
 
Study Conditions Means (SD) Z R Test 
1 
High Emotionality 2.22 (1.39) 
-2.482 -0.24 Wilcoxon's Rank Low Emotionality 1.40 (1.14) 
2 
Audio-only 2.05 (1.21) 
-2.118 -0.08 Mann Whitney U Audio-visual 1.78 (1.31) 
3 
High Sense 2.48 (1.27) 
-2.036 -0.12 Mann Whitney U Low Sense 1.39 (0.98) 
4 
Paired 1.85 (1.32) 
-5.36 NA Mann Whitney U Solo 1.93 (1.20) 
Note: Significant p values are in bold (p < 0.01).  
 
 First, a review of the responses given to the question “Is the appealer 
credible overall?’ is considered. It can be seen from Table 26 that two out of four 
studies recorded a significant difference in responses for the question of appealer 
credibility across conditions. Table 29 shows judgments predicting judges’ explicit 
decisions and Table 30 shows the prediction as to how accurate they were in their 
explicit judgments across all experimental conditions. The following paragraphs 
discuss each study and the biases they pertain to in detail. 
 
11.4.2 Emotional bias error 
 In Study 1, the results would tend to suggest that judges did not use any of 
the cues provided in the questionnaire to make their explicit decisions. While their 
explicit decisions would seemingly reveal that they valued highly salient 
emotional displays, this was not reflected in their thinking patterns using the 
implicit cues in the questionnaire. This potentially highlights the division between 
explicit and implicit judgment processing, where on occasions judges cannot or do 
not identify implicit cues, however, can make a correct explicit judgment. 
Alternatively, it is possible that explicit judgments may be arrived at 
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independently of conscious implicit judgments, as put forward by Granhag (2006) 
and as suggested by the results in Anderson et al.’s (1999) study. 
This study provided preliminary insight into an observer’s expectations of 
how an appealer should display an appropriate amount of emotional intensity and 
quality. At this stage, this study was unable to uncover what differences in 
thinking patterns might exist when observers watch these videos, at least with 
the current questionnaire used. Explicit decisions would suggest with highly 
emotional appeals, judges seemingly used the level of emotion displayed and 
gauged whether this was an appropriate level for the situation of a missing or 
murdered relatives’ case, to judge whether they are explicitly guilty or not. Both 
highly emotional appeals contain spoken emotions and mental states such as ‘fear’, 
‘love’, ‘miss you terribly’, whereas appeals with low emotional content chosen for 
this study did not contain verbalised emotions. Participants in this study perhaps 
registered the availability of these spoken emotions as a verbal cue, nonetheless 
this inference remains to be tested.   While tentative at this point and necessitates 
further research, literature would also suggest that the presence of emotions 
reduces cognitive attention and reduces the capability for deep information 
processing (Wilder, Simon & Faith, 1996).  
 
11.4.3 Appearance bias error  
 Study 2 was built on the premise of Mann et al. (2004) who found that 
people who were more accurate in truth and lie detection utilised verbal cues such 
as vague reply and contradictions in the story. Those who were poorer lie detectors 
mentioned more visual cues. In other words, people who paid closer attention to 
what the sender said performed better and more accurately. In this study, the 
expectation was that by eliminating a channel of source presentation where errors 
will be deterred from occurring, judges would be more accurate in their explicit 
decisions as they would pay more attention to diagnostic verbal implicit cues.  
 The results in this study would suggest that judges in the Audio-visual 
condition paid attention to more verbal cues in number, they were less accurate in 
their explicit decisions. They may have experienced cognitive overload in 
comparison to judges the Audio-only condition as they not only have audio data to 
192 
 
 
process but also visual data. In this study, a clearer indication of differences in 
thinking patterns was found compared to Study 1.  Essentially, thinking was 
different when Source presentation was manipulated, and thinking was again 
different for deceptive and truthful stimuli (which shows a benefit of including 
both types of stimuli).  
 
11.4.4 Cognition in coherent speech bias error 
 While Studies 1 and 2 concerned manipulations of visual cues, Study 3 
examined manipulations of verbal cues. The results from this study would seem 
to suggest that judges valued and favoured a sensible speech over one that was 
not logical in terms of story progression. Taking into consideration that most 
appealers, whether true or false, would probably prepare before appearing on 
national television, judges in this study appeared to hold the (mistaken) belief that 
an appeal that is practiced was more believable.  
 Judges would seem to have resorted to the heuristic of a ‘guilt bias’ when 
unable to assimilate or understand speech easily. Judges ultimately mistrusted 
stories that did not make sense, contrary to the evidence in the literature which 
suggests that liars tend to practice their stories before interviews. Care in 
generalisation of results needs to be taken as only those who corresponded with 
the present author’s definitions of high and low coherence were kept for analyses.  
 
11.4.5 Pair or contagion bias 
 The number of appeal cases selected for the purposes of this study was 
notably small (as was for Studies 1 to 3). Difficulty remains in being able to find 
cases where only one guilty appealer is verbally appealing with another innocent 
appealer or both guilty appealers are featured, where participants have no prior 
knowledge of the case. For this reason, firm conclusions cannot be made at this 
stage. However, the results from this study indicated a difference in underlying 
cognitive processes when judges were shown two appealers in comparison to when 
they were shown the same ones appearing solo. Implicit judgments revealed 
different cues were paid attention to for both conditions, in theory showing 
differences in thought processes for each. If able to be replicated with a higher 
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number of videos, this has bearings for how appeals should be televised and how 
the police should conduct investigation for these cases. In future studies, perhaps 
a pair of innocent co-appealers should also be added and a larger number of these 
appeals should be considered if possible.  
 
11.5 Effect sizes across Studies 1 to 4 
 A summary of effect sizes, r, can be found in Table 27 for all four 
experimental studies. Cohen (1988) recommended that an effect size of 0.2 is a 
small one, 0.5 signifies a medium effect size and 0.8 denotes a large effect size. 
While in Study 1 (Chapter 7) and Study 3 (Chapter 9), effect sizes of Mann 
Whitney U tests were mostly substantial, effect sizes were low in Study 2 (Chapter 
8) and 4 (Chapter 10).  
 Despite the fact studies two and four showed small effect sizes, they 
demonstrated a real effect if not only observed through careful study. Although it 
was hoped that by using high-stakes situations these cues will be easier to detect 
and while real effects were found it was not expected that effect sizes would be 
small. The small effect sizes could be due to the low internal validity of the 
questionnaire used, as the questionnaire may not be capturing what it set out to 
measure. If the appropriate questions were asked that actually measure the scale 
of what it was supposed to measure, perhaps bigger effect sizes would have been 
found. A discussion of how to further develop the questionnaire can be found in 
the next section. 
 The choice of statistical tests in Studies 1 to 4 could also have contributed 
sensitivity in detecting differences in effect sizes. While non-parametric tests 
maintain fewer assumptions than their parametric counterparts, they have less 
statistical power compared to their parametric counterparts. If the statistical 
power of a test is low, it is more unlikely that the test can detect a difference even 
if the different was really present. This increases Type II error where a true 
hypothesis is falsely rejected (Mumby, 2002). Thus, the Mann Whitney U’s and 
Wilcoxon Rank tests conducted in Studies 1 to 4 failed to detect a real effect. As 
such, effect sizes in these experimental studies may have been under-represented 
by a non-parametric statistical procedure (Price, 2000).  
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Table 27 
Summary of effect sizes for significant implicit cues across Studies 1 to 4 
 
Study Test Variables Effect size 
1 Wilcoxon’s Rank between 
High and Low Emotionality 
conditions 
Credibility -0.24 
 Plausibility -0.34 
  Story Sense -0.20 
  Less Emotions -0.54 
  Emotions Match -0.44 
  Meta-emotion -0.42 
2 Mann Whitney U between 
Audio-only and Audio-visual 
conditions 
Wording -0.18 
 
Voice 
Attractiveness -0.16 
  Meta-emotion -0.15 
    
3 Mann Whitney U between 
High and Low Sense 
conditions 
Credibility -0.12 
 Plausibility -0.50 
  Story Sense -0.62 
  Well-thought-out -0.07 
  Emotions Match -0.36 
  Organised -0.30 
  Wording -0.17 
  Meta-emotion -0.38 
  
Voice 
Attractiveness -0.18 
    
 Mann Whitney U between 
Paired and Solo conditions 
tab  
4 Story Sense -0.15 
  Practice -0.23 
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Face 
attractiveness -0.18 
 
11.6 Validity across Studies 1 to 4 
11.6.1 Internal validity 
 Internal validity is defined as how well the experiments in a study were 
conducted. This includes how well the experiments were designed, if variables 
were operationally defined well, the method of measurement of variables, what 
variables were measured and what were not. Internal validity can also refer to the 
level of confidence in arriving at the conclusion that the result of the outcome 
variable was accredited exclusively to the predictor variable and not attributable 
to confounding or extraneous ones (Huitt, Hummel & Kaeck, 1999). 
 To measure internal reliability and how meaningful the data gathering 
processes have been (the internal consistency of the current questionnaire), 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for each scale was calculated for each study. An 
acceptable cut-off point for this coefficient is 0.7 (DeVellis, 2003). Table 28 shows 
the coefficients for each scale item as delineated in Chapter 6 where question items 
were combined together into separate facets. All items in each facet appear to be 
in the same direction.  
The Cronbach’s alpha for the facet of Appearance and Emotions were at an 
unacceptable level for all studies. This suggests a flaw in the choice of question 
items for these facets, drastically reducing scores and differences in implicit 
variables and helps explain low effect sizes mentioned above. 
 
Table 28 
Cronbach's alpha coefficients for each scale items 
 
Studies Meta-emotion Cognition Appearance Emotions 
Study 1 0.74 0.47 0.30 0.54 
Study 2 0.56 0.35 NA NA 
Study 3 0.74 0.62 0.49 0.35 
Study 4 0.63 0.58 0.39 0.37 
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These differences could have been better captured with questions that 
actually measure the scale of Appearance, Emotions and Cognition of source 
content. This also posits that differences actually due to treatment conditions 
(independent variables for each of the four studies) could be much larger than the 
levels found in the present thesis. It can also be seen from Table 28 that the alpha 
coefficients for the facet of Meta-emotion is acceptable for Studies 1 and 3, however 
questionable for Studies 2 and 4. Therefore, it appears that in Studies 1 and 3 the 
measure of judges’ meta-emotions were valid and justifiable. Concurrently, it was 
previously discussed that Studies 1 and 3 showed relatively acceptable effect sizes 
that were higher than those displayed in Studies 2 and 4. Nonetheless, all results 
should be construed with caution rather than leniency, and err towards a more 
stringent interpretation.  
  
11.7 Discussion 
 One of the main challenges in constructing a questionnaire to measure 
implicit cues lies in the fact that it is a definition that is complex to capture, with 
a lack of previously identified perimeters and limits to the concept. It is 
acknowledged that to know where on the continuum of systematic to automatic 
these items are situated in terms of cognitive processing is an inherently difficult 
task. Fundamentally, implicit cues are inherently difficult to quantify. 
Researchers in the field of lie detection have acknowledged that certain variables 
or cues remain impossible to be captured objectively such as the variable of ‘how 
forthcoming a sender seems to be’ (Granhag, 2006). As established, it becomes 
problematic to claim high internal validity when it cannot be said with confidence 
that the difference that effects of outcome variables were due strictly to the causes 
(Validity in scientific investigation, 2016).  
 That said, a probability exists that sometimes, explicit judgments may be 
arrived at independently of conscious implicit judgments (i.e. Study 3), and as 
revealed in Anderson et al. ’s (1999) study. There may also be a conscious or 
unconscious transference between explicit and implicit judgments but at times, 
or for certain senders/statements these two do not associate (and not because 
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judges cannot access this information even when asked directly, or that the 
questionnaire is not capturing cues that judges may have used). To elaborate on 
this, there exists a possibility where judges could be more accurate on a lot more 
implicit judgments, however, this does not transfer into their explicit decisions 
and the same can be said vice versa. They may achieve high accuracy in their 
guilt-innocence judgments but either 1) cannot provide an implicit reason or a 
cue as to how they arrived at this judgment, 2) not understand the meaning of 
their own assessments (Anderson et al., 1999), and/or 3) at times there may 
simply be no association between explicit and implicit decisions. Judges may 
detect an implicit cue but they may not have actually used it to make their 
explicit decision, or even reason to do so. Judges can detect a valid and diagnostic 
cue but not be convinced enough by it to expressly judge the sender accurately. 
This highlights the potential division between explicit and implicit judgment 
processing, where on particular occasions judges cannot or do not identify 
implicit cues, however, can make a correct explicit judgment effortlessly (or vice 
versa). At this point, we cannot know which of these reasons are true until we 
either 1) ask judges directly, as the current questionnaire may not be capturing 
their thinking patterns and process very well 2) rule out the unconscious 
transference between the explicit and implicit decisions and the unconscious 
decision-making process that potentially guides certain implicit decisions, or 3) 
allow judges to arrive at both types of decisions by themselves at their own pace. 
What could be tentatively concluded at this stage is that there exists a possibility 
of a relationship between the explicit and the implicit processes. Figure 2 
presents a workable visual representation of the complex relationship between 
the variables of explicit and implicit judgments and the associated underlying 
mental processes from the current understanding and construal from Studies 1 
to 4.  
The results of the experimental studies in the present thesis would seem 
to indicate that response biases themselves show little indication of being pre-
selected. While the present thesis started off with the presumption that response 
biases are often errors in judgment, it becomes clearer from the results obtained 
that these responses are adaptive decisions (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Street, 
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2015). Results from Part 1 challenged the ubiquity of any default response biases 
(i.e. truth bias claim) (Levine, 2014; McCornack & Levine, 1990; Levine & 
McCornack, 2001) as well as the presence of an innocence or guilt bias. 
It should also be acknowledged as a limitation that while participants 
were given instructions before they began watching the videos in all studies, a 
distinction between credibility and veracity would be useful to be explored 
further and delineated in future studies as participants could have admittedly 
confused one term for the other.  
 
Figure 2 
Relationship between explicit and implicit judgments and the associated 
underlying mental processes 
 
11.7.1 Suggestions for improvements in questionnaire content 
 A component that was clearly lacking in the current questionnaire was non-
verbal cues. While a select few questions fell into this category, particularly the 
facet of Emotions (i.e. ‘The appealer’s emotions do not seem to match their appeal’ 
and ‘The appealer displays less emotions than appropriate’, more questions 
pertaining to non-verbal aspect must be included. Although the choice was made 
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to include only two question items relating to Emotions to reduce the number of 
variables subjected to regression analyses and to counter for maturation effects so 
as to shorten the overall length of the study, ultimately the number of items in 
this facet was perhaps too low. It is recommended that items with higher 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients be kept for future construction of an improved 
questionnaire and more questions be added pertaining to the facets of Emotions. 
A good basis is Ten Brinke and Porter’s (2011) study where the authors found 
several emotional expressions to reliably distinguish truthful appealers from 
deceptive ones. Truthful appealers appeared ‘distressed’ and ‘sad’ whereas 
deceptive appealers showed more ‘disgust’.  
 The same is said for the facet of Appearance. For example, tone of voice can 
be included in addition to voice attractiveness, as research has shown that it is a 
good source of observing leakages in comparison to the face as it is more difficult 
to control (Zuckerman et al., 1982). Reinhard and Sporer (2010) included the items 
‘(The sender) is very attractive’/ ‘beautiful’/ ‘healthy-looking’/ and ‘likable’ in their 
lie detection study, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .73. While the item ‘attractive’ is 
already in the current questionnaire, the items ‘healthy-looking’, ‘likable’ and 
‘good-looking’ could be added to future questionnaire.  
 Initial reliability analysis and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) are 
recommended in the early stages in future studies (Yale, 2013). In the present 
thesis, it was not feasible for Cronbach’s alpha to be conducted after each study as 
data for all four studies were collected at the same time, and thus improvements 
to the questionnaire could not be made in time. 
 As seen in Table 28, Cognition of Source content displayed a varied range 
of alpha coefficients; all unacceptable values. The alpha coefficient was the highest 
for Study 3, presenting a potential for question items in this facet to be 
reconstructed. The items included in this facet were very similar to those included 
in Reinhard and Sporer’s (2010) measure of statement content perception in their 
study. Their measure included five items: plausibility, consistency, coherency, 
structure and specificity, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .85. Two out of five of these 
concepts were measured in Cognition of Source content, namely plausibility and 
structure (organisation)0 
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 Future question items in this facet could include statement consistency and 
specificity.   
 A third category to be kept in mind is that certain variables that fall neither 
in the verbal nor non-verbal category such as ‘the sender seems forthcoming’ 
(Granhag, 2006). The focus of the present thesis weighed more towards verbal cues 
of lie detection, as research shows that verbal cues are more commonly 
acknowledged as the more diagnostic indicator of lie detection compared to 
nonverbal ones. There exists a stronger positive relationship between verbal cues 
and lie detection accuracy (Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010). However, in hindsight, 
non-verbal cues should have also been considered equally as much simply because 
judges may have relied on them in making their veracity decisions.  
It is recognised that there are a much higher number of implicit cues 
compared to only a single explicit cue. Because including a higher number of 
implicit cues itself gives them a far higher likelihood for some to return 
significant values and therefore be more discriminative, this cautions against 
automatically accepting that these implicit cues are superior. One way to 
sidestep this issue would be to use a different method in attaining information of 
implicit cues, which also gives both explicit and implicit cues a more equivalent 
chance being discriminative. One such method is the think-aloud protocol, where 
the researcher can still access participants’ thought processes such as what they 
are thinking and feeling however this would not be predefined allowing 
participants to arrive at these cognitive processes on their own (Ericsson, 1996; 
Okada & Simon, 1997).  
 
11.7.2 Predictive value of questionnaire 
 Predictive validity is how much a score on a scale or instrument predicts 
and correlates with scores from another test score (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). 
While the current thesis did not precisely measure predictive validity using the 
current questionnaire and compared it with another criterion measure, the 
predictive value of the implicit portion was investigated in relation to the explicit 
measure of appealer veracity. Thus, the results of interest were the predictive 
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value of implicit responses towards explicit ones within the same questionnaire 
(not with another criterion measure).   
 The conundrum of identifying ‘Which comes first - explicit judgments or 
implicit ones?’ remains. While the answer to this question tends to be found 
through rigorous literature review of the topic, very few existing research papers 
have actually explored the explicit/implicit connection. Granhag (2006) argued 
that certain intuitive decisions are usually difficult to verbally substantiate apart 
from expressing ‘It was a gut feeling’; ‘I went with my hunch’. It remains 
problematic, at least for some judges, to verbally explain certain explicit decisions 
to implicit detection methods. While efforts have been made to understand this 
relationship, it has been recognised that to answer this question is a difficult feat.  
 This topic is not exactly new, though existing research studies tend to 
isolate explicit and implicit components of lie detection and examine them 
separately rather than study the link between the two. For example, Vrij et al. 
(2001) separated explicit and implicit lie detection where one group of police 
officers were asked to assess video clips explicitly (whether the suspect is guilty or 
not guilty) and the other were asked to do so implicitly (whether the suspect 
seemed to ‘think hard’). Other studies that isolated explicit from implicit 
components in lie detection research include research by Landström et al. (2005), 
Hurd and Noller (1988) and Anderson et al. (1999).  
In the present thesis, the likelihood is that explicit veracity judgments 
affected implicit ones, as the dichotomous ‘Is the appealer guilty or innocent’ was 
asked first. That said, judges were allowed to watch the video clips multiple 
times and changes in explicit answers were allowed (although the number of 
times appeals were watched and changes in explicit answers were both not 
recorded). It was observed that many judges did indeed change their explicit 
answers, some up to several times, indicating possible interplay between explicit 
and implicit components of processing.  
 Granhag (2006) stressed that sometimes it is beneficial for the researcher 
purely to be familiar with judges’ assessments of everything else apart from 
explicit veracity judgments. The aim of this thesis was never to investigate 
whether implicit or explicit assessments were the cause or effect, or whether 
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judges answered implicit cues in the questionnaire consciously or unconsciously, 
but to discern if a relationship exists between implicit and explicit veracity 
judgments. Still, to fully comprehend this relationship it is now clear that the 
conundrum of ‘which comes first’ (in which situation) cannot be eluded. 
 Since regression can be used as a prediction analysis, it was thus was 
chosen as the method of analysis in Studies 1 to 4. Rather than regarding the 
independent variables as having a causal relationship with the dependent variable 
(herein lies the problem to claiming high internal validity), the aim of this 
prediction analysis was to develop models that make predictions of judges’ explicit 
decisions based on the observed values of implicit cues.  
 Table 29 shows which implicit judgments help predict judges’ explicit 
judgments, as well as when these explicit decisions are accurate (Table 30). 
Implicit judgments used differed between experimental conditions, accounting for 
individual variability and most likely due to distinctiveness of cue saliency in the 
appeals shown. The regression results from four consecutive studies showed that 
there exist correlations between the dichotomous dependent variable of explicit 
judgments and the continuous independent variables of implicit decisions, 
revealing different thought and encoding processes in different experimental 
conditions.  
 Many of the cues judges used across Studies 1 to 4 were not diagnostic of 
accurate explicit decisions. This implied that inaccuracies in cognitive processes 
occurred at a high rate. For example, there is a likelihood that judges used the 
salient cue of emotional display to make innocence-guilt judgments in Study 1, 
whereas a closely related cue with higher validity in predicting the innocence of 
an appealer would be spoken emotional words instead (see Chapter 12). 
 
11.7.3 Suggestions for future analyses 
 The present thesis postulates and indicates, to some level, this link between 
implicit and explicit components through the combination of regression analysis, 
Mann Whitney U tests, Wilcoxon Rank tests and chi square throughout Studies 1 
to 4. The treatment conditions in each study in Part 2 showed differences between 
means and variances in veracity judgments. The next step in future research 
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would be to know the extent of this relationship (thereby subsequently solving the 
internal validity issue, or at least reducing its threat). Of course, there may also 
be other extraneous factors that contribute to change in the outcome variable.  
Confounding factors and alternative causes stand in contributing to this change 
(Huitt et al., 1999).  
 To account for these extraneous variables, different methodologies for 
analysis must be considered in future studies. To capture the complexities of 
extraneous variables and the intricacy of the explicit/implicit relationship, a 
statistical method that may be better able to capture this concept is path analysis. 
While regression analysis was useful in the present thesis to highlight the 
relationship between the two, path models will allow a stipulation of a model based 
estimates of the magnitude and significance of hypothesised causal connections 
between sets of variables (Suhr, 2008). Path analysis may also elucidate the 
magnitude of which explicit lie detection contains an implicit part, and the 
likewise the level of implicit lie detection comprising an explicit portion when 
examined in a case by case basis. In fact, this may not be the case at all. In some 
cases, perhaps only explicit processing takes place and in some others only implicit 
processing occurs. Path models will be useful in ascertaining the direct and 
indirect effects within this complex relationship (Stage, Carter & Nora, 2004). In 
the sample path diagram found below in Figure 3, exogenous variables EX1 and 
EX2 are shown as covariates. They both have a direct and indirect effect through 
EN1 on EN2 (both endogenous variables).  
One of the benefits of path models is that alternative models are 
conceivable. For example, one variable may not have a direct effect and only an 
indirect one. The goodness of fit of these models can then be compared statistically 
(Wright 1921; Wright, 1934). Disturbance terms take into account random errors 
and measurement errors, which refers to the difference between an observed value 
and its true value (Dodge, 2003; Taylor, 1999). 
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Figure 3 
Example of a path model with exogenous variables, endogenous variables and 
disturbance terms 
 
11.7.4 Advantages of the current questionnaire  
 While the current questionnaire used in the present thesis holds limited 
internal validity, there were also several advantages. One of these advantages has 
already been discussed at length in the section of ‘Predictive value’ that can be 
found above.  
 Another clear advantage of the current questionnaire was the inclusion of 
both object-level and meta-level dimensions in the measure. According to Granhag 
(2006) and Nelson (2002), on the object-level dimension implicit decisions are the 
product of a Judge’s perception of the sender, such as ‘the appealer sounds like 
they have had a lot of practice’. On the meta-level, these decisions are a product of 
their reflection on their own cognitions or emotions. DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, 
Lindsay and Muhlenbruck (1997) have also included meta-level questions in their 
study, where they reported that participants have a higher confidence level when 
judging truthful statements compared to lies, even though the correlation between 
their confidence level and actual accuracy in judging both truths and lies were low.  
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 Secondly, all operational definitions used in the current questionnaire were 
based on careful literature review on theories that go beyond lie detection 
research. Considering the suggestion that certain implicit cues are difficult to be 
linked with theoretical approaches available in lie detection research (Granhag, 
2006), every effort was made to link each question to existing theories, all of which 
are elaborated at length in the introductory chapters. 
 A joint advantage with exercising a standardised questionnaire is the 
ability to control and curtail the parameters of inclusion (as well as preclusion of 
misapplications) of what comprises an ‘implicit’ measure. For example, a 
participant using the think-aloud method could name ‘thinking hard’ as one of the 
cues they used to arrive at their explicit veracity decision. Granhag (2006) 
recommended that the cue of ‘thinking hard’ should be excluded from the 
parameters of implicit deception detection as it categorically lies within the 
cognitive load framework. Careful selection of questions to be included in the 
current questionnaire precludes inclusion of criteria that misrepresent implicit 
mechanisms deception detection.  
 Thirdly, while a wealth of information was inaccessible as an open-choice 
questionnaire was not adopted (such as think aloud protocols), using a 
standardised questionnaire allowed standardisation of answers. The advantage of 
using a standardised questionnaire was that it was a relatively quick and practical 
way to gather a lot of information from a large sample in a short duration. Using 
a standardised questionnaire reduced subjectivity and data handling time during 
coding and analysing. 
 Using a questionnaire also mitigated the retrieval problem as Anderson et 
al. (1999) suggested. The authors advised that participants could have difficulty 
in either the retrieval of the memories of the cues used or in the reporting of these 
cues. For example, it is possible participants retrieve memories of a sender’s verbal 
cues comparatively more so than recollections of the sender’s visual cues, even if 
they actually utilised the visual cues more to make their ultimate veracity 
judgments of the sender. As follows, the predictive value of implicit questions was 
useful as it allowed a prediction of which cues related to judges’ explicit decisions 
206 
 
 
whether it was used knowingly or unknowingly. Anderson et al. (1999) cautioned 
against discounting the likelihood and complications of difficulties in cue retrieval.   
 Another benefit of the current questionnaire was that a ‘not sure’ option 
was also allocated for participants to choose. This option allowed judges to select 
that they were undecided on their perception of a specific implicit question item. 
This can generate a higher degree of accurate data and increase the number of 
definite responses. By allowing this option, the researcher has the option of 
retaining only those responses by participants who were very certain of their 
responses to achieve more meaningful results and the subsequent interpretation 
of results. 
 Yet another advantage of the current questionnaire’s brief length was that 
this possibly countered against maturation effects that could have further 
jeopardises the experimental studies’ internal validity. Internal validity is 
threatened when participants perform better or worse as a result of maturation 
and not because of the predictor variable (Isaac & Michael, 1971). Maturation 
effects refer to any naturally occurring circumstances resulting from time elapsing 
by, such as boredom, tiredness and lack of motivation to complete the 
questionnaire. The brief nature of the questionnaire ensured that judges did not 
take more than 45 minutes to complete it. 
 
11.8 Conclusion 
 The absence of a consistent innocence bias in Studies 1 to 4 showed more 
support for the ALIED theory over the Spinozan rationale (Gilbert et al., 1990), 
with the former inferring that judges make informed judgments based on 
experience and make educated guesses in the face of low or un-useful 
information. This informed deduction was a source of response biases that 
surfaced (Street, 2015). 
It is acknowledged that a truth bias is not synonymous with an innocence 
bias and the inter-relationship between the two biases needs further study. 
Further investigation into how people process, encode and manage information 
and how that translates to them making a guilt-innocence and/or a truth-lie 
judgment can either support these initial suggestions or challenge them. As 
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reiterated throughout this thesis, it is very likely people will consider 
impressions of truth-lie in some form en route to making an innocence-guilt 
judgment of a person, especially in the current context where judges receive very 
little of other evidence of the case and information about the appealers. However, 
at this point in time this possible interrelationship and their nuances are yet to 
be researched and further developed.  
What is interesting is that, for example, Study 3 points to people picking 
up different cues for guilty and innocent appealers and awarding different 
ratings of innocence and guilt for each. Thinking processes seem to be different 
for when a sender is guilty or innocent. Results from Study 2, while needing 
further trials and replication, also seem to infer that there are differences in the 
thinking process depending on how the Source is presented (i.e. audio-only 
versus audio-visually), and this could also affect explicit judgments. If this 
conjecture is true, this has important bearings on how television appeals are 
presented and aired, as how they are presented can elicit or hinder these biases 
which result from ‘rules of thumb’ that people possibly can rely on.   
While the implicit portion of the questionnaire may lack internal validity, 
explicit veracity judgments were not affected by the questionnaire as it was a 
standalone question. Additionally, chi square results infer that there are 
associations between manipulated conditions and explicit veracity assessment 
accuracy across the board from Studies 1 to 4. A possibility for moderate ratings 
of innocence-guilt judgments is that editing of video clips in certain conditions 
may not have been very elegant and polished, and judges may have detected this. 
For example, it could have been noticeable to judges that video clips in the Low 
Sense condition in Study 3 were modified due to a rearrangement of video 
frames. Their responses may have been influenced accordingly, again 
contributing to a weak effect size in the relationship between conditions and 
explicit accuracy ratings. It is also possible that there could be simply other 
factors that would have contributed to larger effect sizes other than the ones 
manipulated and tested across Studies 1 to 4.  
 An alternative likelihood is that these factors tested across Studies 1 to 4 
would have always shown a weak significance when considered on their own. 
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DePaulo et al. (2003) found that out of 158 cues they examined most cues, when 
considered independently, showed either no association or only weak ones to 
deception. Of recent the need for a multiple cue approach to lie detection has been 
recognised (Whelan, 2014; Hartwig & Bond, 2014; Burgoon, personal 
communication, 25th August, 2015; ten Brinke & Porter, 2012; Vrij & Mann, 2004). 
Hence, the possibility exists that considering multiple factors or cues tested across 
Studies 1 to 4 collectively would yield higher accuracies than recorded in the 
present thesis.  
 Reliable verbal indicators in the specific context of television appeals are 
still yet unknown. In light of this, the next chapter sought to investigate 
multivariate and reliable indicators of innocence and guilt in television appeals.
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Table 29 
Significant implicit judgments used by judges across Studies 1 to 4 
 
Condition Sense Credibility Plausibility Practice Well-thought-out 
Less 
Emotions Emotions Match Face Voice Organised Wording 
Meta-
emotion 
High Emotionality             
Low Emotionality             
Audio-only     0.001        
Audio-visual     0.000    0.000  0.004  
High Sense  0.000  0.004         
Low Sense             
Paired       0.001  0.000    
Solo  0.000   0.001        
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Table 30 
Significant accurate implicit judgments used by judges across Studies 1 to 4 
 
 
Condition Sense Credibility Plausibility Practice 
Well-thought-
out 
Less 
Emotions 
Emotions 
Match Face Voice Organised Wording 
Meta-
emotion 
High Emotionality             
Low Emotionality             
Audio-only  0.002           
Audio-visual          0.003   
High Sense             
Low Sense             
Paired             
Solo   0.009          
             
 
 
 
  
 
211 
 
 
 
part 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ObjeCtIve verbal Cue analYSIS 
  
 
212 
 
 
CHapter 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ObjeCtIve verbal IndICatOrS OF 
trutHFul and deCeptIve televISIOn 
appealS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
213 
 
 
As expounded in Chapter 3 verbal content analysis shows much potential 
in discerning lies from truthful statements. The current study tests the hypothesis 
that verbal indicators differentiate high-stakes true from false statements. This 
study also draws from the wider grief literature as the basis for a content analysis 
of the television statements. Hypotheses concerning different linguistic markers 
for false from true appeals are drawn from literature on the underlying 
psychosocial and emotional changes which accompany it and its manifestation in 
language. Furthermore, as expounded in Chapter 3, the examination of verbal 
cues in relation to each other is also lacking in existing lie detection research; the 
present study seeks to employ a methodological approach that will include even 
cues with very low frequency counts in analyses.  
 
12.1 Verbal cues to deception in high stakes conditions 
 As Vrij et al. (2010)  have pointed out, whilst training manuals emphasise 
non-verbal indicators for detecting deception, a growing body of research indicates 
that verbal cues can distinguish liars from truth tellers (Harpster et al., 2009; ten 
Brinke et al., 2012; deTurck & Miller, 1985).  Indeed,  participants who rely solely 
on nonverbal cues in making their veracity judgments have been shown to achieve  
a lower accuracy rate than those who use verbal cues  (Burgoon et al., 2008; 
DePaulo & Morris, 2004).  
 
12.2 Language aspects of grief and related emotional states 
 The crucial emotional state of television appeals relates to the distress and 
grief the appealer is (apparently) feeling when making the appeal.  This therefore 
offers a context for considering potential cues to deception.  
 Pennebaker et al. (2003) demonstrated that the content of speech is 
contingent upon the emotional state of the speaker; when an individual is grieving, 
there is a tendency to communicate in a particular manner. Stress, trauma and 
psychological disruptions can affect how one speaks, and the language chosen, 
whether consciously or unconsciously. Words hold the capability to reveal and 
expose cognitive and social constructs of a speaker (Pennebaker et al., 2003; 
McAdams, 2006). Tausczik and Pennebaker (2010) report that the language a 
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person uses is linked to cognitive, personality and social constructs within an 
individual at that point in time.  
 Content analysis of linguistic markers is not a new method and has been in 
development for decades, as in the study of Gottschalk and Gleser (1969) where 
samples were transcribed and sentences segregated into phrases. These phrases 
were assessed to reveal thematic content reflecting the speaker’s emotional, 
psychological and cognitive conditions. The story an appealer chooses to verbalise, 
or omit to verbalise, may point to their psychosocial and emotional preoccupations 
at that point in time. The manifestation of these preoccupations after the murder 
or disappearance of a significant other in language, of whether finding the victim 
is at the foremost importance to the appealer or the cover-up of the crime, gives 
rise to hypothesised linguistic markers of true and false appeals. Thus, it is 
hypothesised that what is said in television appeals will indicate whether finding 
the victim is at the foremost importance to the appealer (with associated grief and 
emotional states), or the cover-up of the crime. The present study investigates the 
underlying preoccupations of an appealer. It is this which may provide the clue as 
to who is guilty and who is innocent.  
 
12.2.1 Language in assessing psychosocial and emotional changes post-loss 
 Grief produces psychological, emotional and social change within an 
individual (Vance et al., 1994) which manifests in their language (Pennebaker et 
al., 2003). These changes include altered relationships with society and changes 
in roles within the family of the victim. A study by Sprang, McNeill and Wright 
(1989) examining the mental health changes of those who experienced a violent 
death of a significant other reveals reactions that accompany grief include shock, 
denial, isolation, emotional release, guilt, anger, resentment, depression, 
acceptance, resolution and adaptation. The authors report that socially, the violent 
death puts forward changes in religious beliefs and social support systems they 
depend on post-loss. In a murder or missing person case, the relative who has 
recently suffered a loss due to sudden, violent circumstances will indeed undergo 
changes in their emotions, whether it is anger towards the killer or abductor, pain 
due to the inability to accept that the victim is no longer present or depressive 
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episodes. This in turn, will affect the language that they use to speak, which 
underlines their foremost anxieties and upheavals. Literature on reactions post-
loss has never been paralleled and referenced to cases of television appealers in 
available studies, which hold vast potential for comparison and association.   
 
12.3 Language areas in assessing changes post-loss 
12.3.1 Changes in psychological intimacy  
 Studies indicate that a typical response to grief is a preoccupation with the 
loss or separation from the victim.  For instance, Maciejewski, Zhang, Block and 
Prigerson (2007) report that focused yearning for the dead person was the most 
frequent negative psychological response. Klass’s (2006) theory of continuing 
bonds with the bereaved, and Field and Filanosky’s (2010) externalized 
expressions, such as delusions that the deceased is alive, also both point to the 
griever still being attached and wanting to be connected to the bereaved. Shuchter 
and Zisook (1988) write that grievers sometimes experience visual and sometimes 
auditory hallucination such as dreaming of the deceased, looking out for them in 
a crowd, and continuing to speak with them, striving not to sever relationship with 
the bereaved. Consequently, in the current study it is possible that if a televised 
appealer is truly grief-stricken, thoughts of the victim’s existence will dominate in 
what they say even to the point of envisaging the victim’s presence. 
In addition to (or in place of, if victim is no longer known to be alive) 
thoughts of the victim’s presence, reminiscence about the deceased’s death is 
common (Rosenblatt & Elde, 1990). This involves talking about personal memories 
of the griever. Keeping count of anniversaries such as birthdays, death days, 
divorce date, or the day they went through a loss is also frequently part of the 
grieving process as Engel (1975) noted. A genuine appealer would thus potentially 
incorporate into the appeal a count of days since the victim disappeared or was 
murdered. 
 
12.3.2 Changes in psychological distancing 
In contrast to wanting psychological intimacy, someone who must feign a 
loss is hypothesised to speak less of the victim they murdered or kidnapped may 
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instead focus either on pleading their supposed innocence or distancing 
themselves from the victims. Harpster et al. (2009) posit the cue of ‘minimising’, 
where fake 911 callers use words like ‘just’ to diminish their connection in and 
distance themselves from the circumstance.  Davis et al. (2005) report that liars 
in their sample tended to utter ‘I don’t know’ more often than truth-tellers. Ten 
Brinke and Porter (2011) suggest that this is an effort by liars to distance 
themselves psychologically or reduce the need to develop invented accounts. They 
found that liars tend to use more tentative words compared to truth-tellers. 
A reference to others is a potential cue for a dishonest appeal (Knapp, Hart 
& Denis, 1974). Stirman and Pennebaker (2001) report that suicidal and 
depressed individuals refer to others less and tend to self-focus. Harpster et al. 
(2009) indicate that in 911 calls a deceptive caller tends to shift blame to the victim 
or someone else. Additionally, a true appealer may use less conditional words 
when talking about a missing victim coming home, because to them this is a direct 
wish. In contrast, a false appealer would insert more conditional markers, 
including conjunctions, when referring to the victim coming home, because 
presumably they are aware that is not a possibility.    
 
12.3.3 Changes in emotional release or reserve  
Besides psychological distancing or intimacy, changes in emotions can also 
be studied via language in high stakes lies. Evidence comes from various research 
efforts from lie detection and grief literature. CBCA’s Criterion 12, ‘subjective 
mental state’, is defined as when a person expresses what they are thinking and/or 
their emotions during the event, in their statement (Granhag, et al., 2015). The 
Reality Monitoring (RM; Sporer, 1997) criterion of ‘affect’ and SCAN (Sapir, 2005) 
criterion of ‘emotions’ are related to Criterion 12. 
In the grief literature, Freud (1917) asserts that a bereaved person has to 
work through their grief by reviewing thoughts and memories of the deceased. 
Shear and Mulhare (2008) state that acute grief, the initial reaction to loss, 
manifests in emotional symptoms such as meaninglessness, emotional lability and 
apathy.  
217 
 
 
Whelan et al. (2014), using high stakes video footage of public appeals, find 
that honest appealers refer to norms of emotions or behaviour which includes 
violations, such as ‘How could anyone do this?’ Ten Brinke and Porter (2012) found 
that honest appealers are more emotionally positive than deceptive ones, however 
the authors did not include emotional lability or apathy in their classification. 
They find that honest appealers express more pain than deceptive ones. Whelan 
et al. (2014) also discovered in their study that honest appealers expressed more 
hope in finding their missing relatives in cases where the body has not been found 
yet, as unlike a false appealer who murdered the victim they do not yet know that 
whether the victim is alive or otherwise.   
 The mention of expletives should be considered as well. Sprang et al. (1989) 
state that individuals typically report anger and resentment towards the killer 
whose family member has been murdered. Kubler-Ross’s (2005) grieving model 
includes anger as one of its stages. Kitson and Zyzanski (1987) find that widowers 
in her sample reported both anger and grief. Those who experienced an unexpected 
death experienced higher levels of anger. Research has also identified that when 
an individual is angry they usually care less about being polite because their 
preoccupation is to seek the victim’s return or find the killer. Harpster et al.’s 
(2009) report that some 911 callers did not care to sound polite during the 
emergency call and swore on the phone (e.g., “What the f*** is taking them so 
long!”). Politeness is seen as a cue to hoax callers, because a genuine caller’s 
paramount objective is to seek immediate aid. However, Van Swol et al. (2011) 
find seemingly contradictory evidence that on average, liars used more swear 
words than did truth-tellers especially in cases where the recipients voiced 
suspicions. The seemingly different results could potentially be related to the high-
pressure of the situation in Harpster et al.’s (2009) study versus the lower-stress 
situation in Van Swol’s et al. (2011). The former is an unexpected, high-anxiety 
situation that does not allow for much preparation. The latter is less so, no life 
being at stake. Because television appeals are typically high-pressure situations 
in which the respondent has some preparation it is proposed that it is false 
appealers who will swear more in an attempt to simulate emotion.  
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12.3.4 Social changes 
The death or disappearance of a loved one will also produce changes socially, 
such as turning to a higher agency and going to prayer locations to buffer the 
negative event, and this in turn may possibly be captured in language. For 
example, it has been shown that high use of positive religious coping may 
safeguard the deleterious effects of the situation (Bjork & Thurman, 2007). While 
not all truthful appealers are religious or at least spiritual, deceptive appealers 
may find it hard to turn to a higher power or may not be aware of the behaviours 
of a truly grieving individual. 
This, again, may possibly be observed in the language used. Stone and 
Pennebaker (2002) observed that during and immediately after a disaster, 
individuals gather together and cooperate. After the death of Princess Diana, the 
use of ‘we’ instead of ‘I’ increased by 100% in online chat groups for a period of a 
week. Cohn, Mehl and Pennebaker (2001) found that people were more socially 
engaged and communally involved in the immediate aftermath of the September 
11 tragedy.  
From lie detection literature, Bond et al.’s (2014) meta-analysis report the 
indirect measure of ‘cooperation’ to be the strongest determinant of accurate lie 
detection. Inbau et al. (2001) posited that liars are not as cooperative compared to 
truth-tellers. However, in Vrij’s (2005) experiment, the author did not find that 
cooperation was related to lying or truth-telling. This may be because of 
cooperation was measured as participants’ inclination to give an account of what 
transpired during the incident, which is rather different from the current study’s 
interest. 
In the present context, the family of the victim may rely on the local 
community for support in finding the body or in finding the abductor if the victim 
is missing. They may use the television appeal as a strategy for getting help from 
community to find their loved ones. While a false appealer may feign converging 
with the community to gain help, it either may not be to their advantage to do so, 
or it may not come naturally to them to do so. Social aspects of the language in 
terms of reliance on others by television appealers warrant being studied.   
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12.3.5 Movement-related changes 
 Movement in speech is a potential cue as yet unexplored in television 
appeals. Verbal activity here can be seen as words that give a compelling sense of 
motivation, hypothesised as typical of a person who really wants a murder or 
missing case solved. Genuinely honest relatives would be expected to exude a 
sense of urgency in their plea (Harpster et al., 2009) in finding the missing person, 
the body or the killer or abductor. This drive for action may potentially be present 
in the genuine appealer’s speech, meriting a study on movement-related words or 
phrases in the current context. Vrij and Mann (2004) state that liars tend to be 
more passive and less involved compared to truth-tellers.  In the present study, an 
appealer for missing or murdered relative instinctively calls for either activation 
of a target to find the missing person, change the predicament, and find the body 
if the relative is murdered and/or find the killer or abductor of the relative.  
 
12.3.6 Tense changes 
 The tense used by appealers may also be an indicator of how truthful they 
are. A false appealer who has to feign that the victim might still be alive while 
knowing that he or she murdered them is hypothesised to speak less of the victim 
in the present tense. Kastor (1994) reports that Susan Smith, who killed her two 
sons, used the past tense when speaking of them, before it was known that they 
were murdered and not just missing. Harpster et al. (2009) posit that fake 911 
callers tend to accept the death of their loved ones at a higher rate (i.e., pronounce 
that they are dead) and tend not to be in the denial stage even in the knowledge 
of the death, compared to true callers. A true caller is less likely to declare their 
relative’s mortality when this relative’s actual state is unknown. Even when their 
relative’s mortality is known, the authors state that true callers often deny this 
knowledge, still wanting to ‘save the lives’ of their relative.  
 Ebesu and Miller (1994) who observed college students enacting mock-
interview scenarios report that their participants acting as liars used less present 
tense words. However, in a rather different study Dulaney (1982) show 
contradictory results. Lying participants in this study utilised fewer past tense 
words. These differences in results may be a function of context and how the 
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experiment was constructed methodologically. In Dulaney’s (1982) study, the 
nature of the lie was ‘deceit by omission’, while in Ebesu and Miller’s (1994) study 
participants told a direct lie. Participants could either choose to inform the 
experimenters whether they cheated or not and those who did not were considered 
liars. This is a prime example of the importance in examining context-specific cues 
where while the cue itself may occur in general, the direction in which the cue 
emerges given a specific context may change. In the present high-stakes situation, 
deceptive appealers may be more likely to use the past tense regarding the victim, 
regardless of whether it is known that they are missing or murdered. 
  
12.3.7 Grammatical changes 
 The attempted control approach posits that liars may attempt to control 
their behaviour to prevent deceptive cue leakages (Vrij, 2004). Ironically, by its 
very nature this attempt can give rise to deceptive cues (DePaulo & Kirkendol, 
1989). The four-factor theory (Zuckerman et al., 1981) and Interpersonal 
Deception Theory (IDT; Buller & Burgoon, 1994) postulate that liars may leak 
certain cues when strategically trying to overcontrol their behaviour, particularly 
in situations demanding higher cognitive load.  These cues include increased 
speech errors in the form of grammatical mistakes (Zuckerman et al., 1981).  An 
increase in cognitive load may cause more speech errors (Goldman-Eisler, 1968). 
Besides tense changes, grammatical errors may be expected of deceptive 
individuals. Davis, Markus, Walters, Vorus and Connors (2005), Vrij and Mann 
(2001) and Whelan et al. (2014) find liars tended to commit higher levels of error 
in speech, such as grammatical errors and words or sentences that were not 
complete.   
 
12.3.8 Chronological changes 
 The form and structure of a story told is another attribute of language of 
relevance. CBCA hypothesises that statements delivered in a non-chronological 
temporal order, where the production is unstructured, are inclined to be more 
truthful (Vrij, 2005a). Vrij et al. (2010) assert that liars tend to give accounts in a 
chronological and rehearsed order such as ‘I did this, then this happened, then I 
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did this’. Whether or not appealers verbalise events in the form of ‘I did this, and 
then this happened, after that this took place’ could potentially suggest 
preparation of speech in a pre-arranged chronological order, indicating a false 
appeal.  
  In addition, DePaulo and Morris (2004) stressed that liars show a tendency 
towards repetition of words and phrases in the same sentence more so than their 
truthful counterparts. They concluded that the reason for repeating words and 
phrases were to stall for time as liars undergo a cognitive load when being 
questioned or interviewed. Harpster et al. (2009) also found deceptive 911 callers 
resorted to repetition significantly more so than truthful callers.  
 
12.4 The current study 
 These possible changes in language discussed serves as areas to explore, 
with televised appeals presenting a suitable platform to do so. In the present study 
based on the theoretical frameworks discussed above, it is argued that distinctive 
linguistic markers, stemming from differences in the underlying preoccupations of 
a truthful versus deceptive appealer, can provide indications as to who may be 
truly grieving (a true appeal) from a false appealer. Psychological, social and 
emotional changes after the murder or disappearance of a significant other are 
theorised to affect the language of appeals, indicating their preoccupations of 
either finding the victim and pushing forward an investigation or hiding the truth 
to get away with murder. Dissimilarities between genuine from false narratives 
revealed in and by these spoken appeals are examined, alongside differences social 
and affective processes or preoccupations of the appealers. Based on previous 
research efforts, it is hypothesized that certain variables will gravitate towards 
genuine appealers, and likewise for false appealers. 
 
12.5 Methodology 
12.5.1 Developing content variables 
To reiterate, eight language areas were reviewed in the literature as 
presented above. These pertained to speech content, form and structure to 
comprehensively investigate the underlying preoccupations of a television 
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appealer. To test and measure the hypotheses concerning appeal veracity with 
these language areas, it was necessary to generate criteria for classifying each 
appeal as true or false. Hence, a dictionary of words based on the literature, 
hypothesised to distinguish true from false appeals will be selected and each of 
them expounded in the following section. A summary of the dictionary can be 
found in Appendix M and empirical support for each area from existing literature 
on grief and lie detection can be found in Appendix N. Considerable justification 
directed the decision to select the following sixteen variables under the eight 
language areas drawing on studies of verbal aspects of grief and emotion. These 
variables were selected to specify a sample from the different language areas that 
may unearth the underlying preoccupations of appealers, and therefore provide 
clues in distinguishing a true appealer from a false one. Each language area 
contains distinct content categories to be simultaneously analysed. These 
variables serve as measurable outcomes of either a desire for intimacy with and 
finding the victim or distancing and the cover-up of the crime.  
 
Area 1: Psychological distancing  
As shown in literature, suicidal and depressed individuals were less prone 
to reference people other than themselves, again self-focusing rather than other-
focused whereas lying individuals are slow to own any statement in an attempt to 
reduce any possibility of personal culpability (Harpster et al., 2009; Knapp et al., 
1974; Stirman & Pennebaker; 2001). As such, references to others are 
hypothesised as a potential cue for a dishonest appeal.  
To measure psychological distancing, the presence of words, phrases and/or 
any reference to ‘somebody’ or ‘someone else’ including the attempts to lead 
culpability from the self, such as ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I didn’t do’ will be included in 
the dictionary (Granhag et al., 2015; Davis et al., 2005). This is expected to capture 
self-distancing from any activity that can be done to find the victim. To avert 
committing to a lie, liars tend to use tentative language such as ‘maybe’ and 
‘perhaps’ (ten Brinke & Porter, 2012; Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & Richards, 
2003; Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Twitchell, 2004). Another way to self-
distance language is through using conditional markers (Harpster et al., 2009). 
223 
 
 
Thus, the presence of words depicting conjunctions such as ‘if’ and ‘but’ will be 
recorded. Here, a true appealer is hypothesised to use less conditional words 
specifically when talking about the victim coming home if they are missing, 
because to them, there are no conditions or repercussions regarding their desire 
for the victim to return home. In contrast, a false appealer would probably insert 
more conditional markers when wanting the victim to come home. 
 
Area 2: Psychological intimacy 
Arguably, expressing phrases and/or any reference of wanting to be close to 
the victim is the measurable outcome of a desire for psychological intimacy. Based 
on the literature introduced earlier which includes Maciejewski et al. (2007) 
findings on focused yearning, Klass’s (2006) theory of continuing bonds with the 
bereaved, Field and Filanosky’s (2010) and Shuchter and Zisook’s (1988) findings 
on hallucinations connected to the deceased, the hypothesis here is that more 
truthful appealers will include such words and phrases as a manifestation of 
wanting to be closer to the victim, compared to deceptive appealers. These include 
variables such as imagining the victim, for example, which captures the 
attachment to the bereaved and fixation towards the victim, where the appealer 
fantasises about what victim would be doing if they were with them, imagines 
what they are going through, or wonder about their condition. True appealers 
would probably also keep count of anniversaries and/or days since their relatives 
went missing or was murdered (Engel, 1975), hence the presence of words 
depicting ‘keeping count’ will be recorded. 
 
Area 3: Social changes 
From the literature reviewed it is known that going through grief may 
propel social changes in several aspects that lead to changes in speech content. 
These aspects include, but are not limited to, convergence towards religiosity and 
a greater reliance on communality. To measure these social changes, the presence 
of words, phrases and/or any reference to religion and reliance on the community 
are taken to characterise the manifestation. People use religion as a buffer to cope 
with a negative event (Bjork & Thurman, 2007). There is also increased 
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cooperation between people (Stone & Pennebaker, 2002) and increased social 
engagement (Cohn et al., 2001) in the aftermath of a negative event. In the lie 
detection literature, liars appear to not be as cooperative as truth-tellers (Vrij & 
Mann, 2004). Perceived cooperation seems to be one of the most promising implicit 
cue in detecting deception (Bond et al., 2014, DePaulo et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 
1999).  
Religiosity was chosen to depict any declaration of faith, the mention of 
prayer or the declaration of a higher power. Communality applies to the verbal 
declaration of cooperation with the community and hopes to measure the social 
change of relying on the local community in helping find the victim and/or killer, 
as well as the change in reliance on the community for support. While it is possible 
that false appealers may display a presence of these variables (as they may go 
through a change in their social activities), it is the hypothesis of this study that 
the presence of these variables would be indicative of a truthful appeal. As 
discussed in the literature review this may be due to a natural regression towards 
these changes post-loss compared to a false appealer, who may or may not have 
knowledge of how to behave deceitfully in the aftermath of a murder or 
disappearance. 
 
Area 4: Emotional changes 
Evidence for references to emotion post-loss comes from various research 
efforts discussed above. True appealers are hypothesised to verbally declare 
certain emotions or the lack of it, as the death or disappearance of a loved one 
sparks either a release or reserve in their emotions and this runs its course in 
their appeal content, without them having to put on an act or remember to do so 
(Granhag, et al., 2015; Sporer, 1997; Sapir, 2005). It is expected that the same 
pattern will emerge when considering the language of television appealers as 
indicated by Whelan et al. (2014) who found that truthful appealers mentioned 
violation of emotional norms, uttered more hope and affection towards the victims 
and ten Brinke and Porter (2012) who found that honest appealers are more 
emotionally positive than deceptive ones. In the present study, rather than 
measuring violations of emotional norms or valence, the present researcher seeks 
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to quantify the presence of words, phrases and/or any reference of emotions, the 
lack of emotions, the utterance of a lack of emotion, states of mind and utterances 
of affection towards the victim as a measure of possible emotional changes. It is 
hypothesised that these include measuring the presence of spoken emotions, lack 
of emotions, hopefulness and missing the victim.  
 In contrast, it is hypothesised that more false appealers will include 
expletives in an attempt to simulate emotion (Harpster et al., 2009; Van Swol et 
al., 2011). 
 
Area 5: Changes in movement 
A drive for action or the lack of may potentially resonate in an appealer’s 
speech. Vrij and Mann’s (2004) paper suggested that liars appear to be more 
passive and Harpster et al.’s (2009) research reported that genuine 911 caller 
would exude a sense of urgency in their plea for help. Similarly, in this study it is 
expected that a genuine family member will try to actively and urgently move an 
investigation forward and this drive for action may potentially be present in the 
genuine appealer’s speech. To quantify movement, ‘activity’ was chosen to 
measure any declaration of motion-related words or phrases suggesting activity, 
direction and a desire for change. It is hypothesised that more true appealers 
would mention more progressive phrases or words such as “If anybody knows 
anything, let us know”, “forward”, “call for search” and “looking”, compared to false 
appealers.  
 
Area 6: Changes in tense  
Lie detection research found that liars tend to use different amounts of past 
tense words compared with truth-tellers, depending on the context of the study, 
inferring that this area is worth exploring in terms of the current context of this 
study particularly concerning the missing relative (Dulaney, 1982; Ebesu & 
Miller, 1994; Harpster et al., 2009). To measure this, the presence of present tense 
when talking about the victim hopes to quantify the tense used by the appealers 
in the phrase or sentence regarding the victim specifically. It is hypothesised that 
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more truthful appealers will use present tense words in this context compared to 
false appealers, regardless of whether the victim is still alive or otherwise. 
 
Area 7: Changes in grammar 
 Because a change in grammar may also be expected (such as infelicities 
and errors) of deceptive individuals (Davis et al., 2005; Whelan et al., 2014; 
Zuckerman et al., 1981; Goldman-Eisler, 1968; Vrij & Mann, 2001; Whelan et al., 
2014) perhaps due to increased cognitive load on maintaining the deception, the 
presence of grammatical error(s) is hypothesised to appear more often in deceptive 
appeals compared to truthful ones. 
 
Area 8: Changes in form and structure  
  Statements delivered in a non-chronological temporal order, where the 
production is unstructured, are inclined to be more truthful (Vrij, 2005a; Vrij et 
al., 2010). The form and structure of an appeal may be another area of language 
that may indicate appeal veracity. The presence or absence of whether the 
appealer refers to the event which took place is predicted to quantify this pre-
meditated rehearsal. This is to test the hypothesis that a higher number of false 
appeals will incorporate this type of appeal structure. In addition, following 
Harpster et al.’s (2009) definition of repetition, any words or phrases that are used 
thrice or more in succession in the same sentence will be considered as repetition, 
excluding ‘uhms’ and ‘ahs’. False appealers are hypothesised to reveal more 
repetition in their appeals compared to their truthful counterparts (Harpster et 
al., 2009; DePaulo & Morris, 2004). 
 All that the appealers said in every appeal was transcribed. Only spoken 
words, synonyms or phrases that were clearly discernible and were not easily 
misconstrued were included for analyses. Each of the 17 content categories derived 
were coded dichotomously to generate variables that indicated their presence or 
absence in a particular appeal. Previous research using naturally occurring 
aspects of behaviour in a criminal context has indicated that any distinctions more 
refined than presence-absence dichotomies are likely to be unreliable (e.g. Canter 
& Heritage, 1990). While application of content variables was based on a reading 
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of the transcripts, this was verified by a second coder blind to the ground truth of 
the appeal videos who completed the variable coding of 10 videos (25%) to assess 
inter-rater reliability. 
 Content variables derived from literature, as shown in Appendix M, were 
subsequently applied to the transcripts. In doing so, none of the appeals 
contained any mention of the hypothesised cues ‘expletives’ (i.e., none of the 
transcripts contained any swear words) and ‘repetition’. Thus, both variables 
were excluded from further analyses. The final content dictionary contained 15 
variables.  
 
12.5.2 Video selection and ground truth 
 The present study utilised 39 (23 innocent appealers and 16 guilty) video 
recordings of individuals appealing during television press conferences for the 
return of their relative, to search for what happened, and to find the killer or 
abductor of their relative. They consisted of 18 female pleaders and 21 male 
pleaders. They were drawn from the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, 
New Zealand and Australia.  There were 19 direct and 20 indirect appeals used 
(see Appendix O) indicating the number of innocent appealers and guilty ones gave 
direct and indirect appeals. Cases were selected based on ground truth, where it 
is known that the appealers were either truly guilty or innocent on unequivocal 
evidence. 
Appendix H provides a list of evidence used for deceptive and honest 
appeals drawing on ten Brinke and Porter’s (2012) list, enhanced by Whelan et al. 
(2014). In cases where the appealers were deceptive, all appealers were convicted 
of their relatives’ deaths. In cases where the appealers were truthful, someone else 
was sentenced for the death of the appealers’ relative for 20 of these cases, and the 
appealer was not implicated with evidence of foul play for the other three innocent 
cases.  
 
12.6 A Partial Order of Genuine and False Appealers with Base 
Coordinates (POSAC) 
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 Due to the small sample size, the usual statistics normally applied for this 
kind of data in lie detection literature as in the case of Whelan et al. (2014) may 
overinflate p-values, running the risk of rendering it non-generalisable. This 
method also overlooks variables with low frequency counts. Parametric tests lack 
power where sample size is small. If used, the subsequent results hold 
questionable assumptions that may need additional review. While useful for larger 
samples, parametric tests relying on traditional statistical measures that cannot 
effectively discriminate outcome are perhaps less fitting with the current sample 
and the general aim of this study.  
 Shye (1978) provided this by calculating base co-ordinates in his Partially 
Ordered Scalogram Analysis with Co-ordinates (POSAC) which is now available 
in the HUDAP 8 statistical package.  POSAC analysis works by ranking data in a 
two-dimensional space. This method works well when data is categorical and for 
variables that have been observed on a scale where only ranking is important 
(Metric and non-metric scaling, n.d.). Since POSAC is an ordinal scaling 
(nonmetric) procedure, it makes no assumptions of the data and can be applied to 
analyse language patterns of these television appealers. The advantage of this 
method is that it enables observations of language patterns and variables to be 
studied simultaneously, reducing the likelihood of Type I and II errors. POSAC 
was chosen as it makes the best use of the existing structure of multivariate data. 
It achieves this by searching for patterns and examining the fundamental internal 
organisation of the data while doing little to simplify and reduce assumptions of 
linearity and distribution normality. The latter runs the risk of neglecting 
important aspects that may arise to be significant.  
 Another clear advantage of using POSAC is the ability to study several 
language areas simultaneously. Proponents have begun to realise that a multi-cue 
approach is necessary in lie detection methodology rather than comparing the 
mean frequency of one cue at a time to distinguish liars from truth tellers (Ekman 
et al., 1991; Leal et al., 2010; ten Brinke & Porter, 2012; Vrij & Mann, 2004). 
Instead of analysing variables one-dimensionally and focusing only on singular 
cues at a time, the current study uses POSAC to observe several language areas 
simultaneously and maps how these variables interrelate with each other. This 
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form of multi-dimensional scaling allows the exploration of relationships between 
ordered variables to reveal any underlying structure. Further, this method of 
analysis encompasses even the variables with the lowest occurrences.  
 With many variables to consider and a small sample size, POSAC was 
conducted in the current study. POSAC uses a similar underlying calculation as 
principal component analysis (PCA). However, while PCA involves a weighted 
element of the variables using a procedure that is subjective, POSAC relies instead 
on locating variables by utilising only their partial order (Raveh & Landau, 1993). 
Consequently, this makes POSAC more systematic, less arbitrary and more robust 
to its data in comparison to PCA. Using POSAC as a method of analysis for the 
current sample increases our knowledge of collective language areas in its ability 
to distinguish truthful appealers from false ones in televised appeals.  
For the present analysis eight language areas discussed above were created 
with 15 variables to quantify these areas under each category. POSAC was 
conducted to establish how the eight aspects when combined, could distinguish 
genuine from false appeals (Shye, 1978). If any of the variables assigned to an 
aspect occurred for a video then that aspect was assigned a value of 1, otherwise 
it is given 0. In the current study, the factor regulating the order and uniformity 
of these variables in direction and implication are verbal indicators of 
truthfulness. To ensure all aspects were consistent in their direction and 
implication, aspects that pertain to false appeals are inversely coded, i.e. their 
absence is given a score of 1. Here the language areas of self-centeredness, 
grammatical errors and chronology are reverse ordered. This means that all 
variables will measure the same hypothesis in the same direction (Griffel, 1999).  
Consequently, any video that contained all eight indicators of truthfulness would 
have a profile of 11111111; a video with no indicators would show a profile of 
00000000. POSAC arranges profiles by positioning aspects that are greater than 
other profiles towards the right side of the solution. This positioning allows 
profiles to be compared to each other. For example, 00101101 is comparable to 
00001101, but not to 11011000.  00101101 is quantitatively the same as 11011000 
because the 1’s add up to 4 in both cases, but they are qualitatively different. 
POSAC finds the best two-dimensional solution for all existing profiles. All 
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possible variations, i.e., 28 which are 256, are considered though the assumption 
is that far fewer variations will be present and it will be possible to represent them 
in a two-dimensional configuration. 
In this configuration, then, each unique profile will be represented as a 
point that can be identified and labelled. The location of the points indicates the 
partial order among the profiles. Integrated within the POSAC software are 
partitionings, which are built on what is known as ‘monotonicity coefficients’. 
These are computed for each variable (Shye et al., 1994) in terms of regions that 
are applied for analysis (HUDAP; Amar & Toledano, 2001). These coefficients 
determine how accurate a representation this partition or division is between 
appeal cases. While a coefficient of 1.0 represents a perfect division where all cases 
with the same variable score can be found on one side of this division, coefficients 
exceeding 0.8 is satisfactory (Shye et al., 1994). A lower coefficient indicates a 
lower chance this division truly discriminates between cases. 
The X and Y division partitions the solution according to the X and Y axes. 
When multiple variables form a similar division, a pattern emerges. Another type 
of division that runs along the diagonal axis is the J division (Taylor, 2002). This 
is known as the Joint (J) axis because it encapsulates the ‘joint’ score of the total 
number of 1’s in the profile. In this study, this would be the main quantitative axis 
determined by the joint combination of all eight language aspects. The most 
truthful profiles will be found in the north-east part of the plot, and the least 
truthful profiles will be found in the south west corner. Hence, it is hypothesised 
with a line drawn across the J axis that the north-east corner (region 3 on Figure 
6) will contain most genuine appeals and that the south west corner (region 1 on 
Figure 6) will contain most false appeals. Profiles with the same score on a verbal 
variable are located nearer in space to each other than profiles with different 
scores on this variable.  
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Figure 4 
X axis on POSAC solution 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
Y axis on POSAC solution 
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Figure 6 
J axis on POSAC solution 
 
An independent samples t-test will be conducted on J scores to compare 
genuine and false profiles to observe if score differences are statistically 
significant. These three different types of partitioning are shown in Figures 4, 5 
and 6. 
 
12.7 Results 
12.7.1 Differences between genuine and false appeals  
 The dichotomously-coded presence or absence of each action unit was 
substantially reliable; (Kappa = .61-1.0, p < .001, 79- 86% agreement; Cohen, 1960; 
Landis & Koch, 1977). The frequency of each of the 15 variables for genuine and 
false appeals is reported in Appendix A. Although 39 videos are a far larger 
number than in previous studies, for statistical analysis a group of 23 compared 
with 16 provides only limited statistical power. It is therefore instructive at this 
stage to briefly consider the differences in frequencies of the variables between the 
two groups. Firstly, 65% of innocent appealers appeared alone in comparison to 
only 13% who appeared with another family member or relative. 
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Honest appeals had high frequencies for the use of the victim’s name in the 
present tense. A higher number of truthful appealers kept count of time since the 
disappearance or death of their relative (27%) versus 6% for false appealers. 
Genuine appealers never use the conjunctions ‘if’ and ‘or’ regarding victim, and 
the phrase ‘I didn’t do it’. This may be because they were not accused. 
The only variable that had a frequency higher than 50%, at 88%, was the 
variable Passive for deceptive appealers.  A higher proportion of false appealers 
were subject to grammatical and syntax structure errors in their appeal (41%) 
compared to 18% of truthful appealers. Likewise, false appealers were more likely 
to mention ‘I don’t know’ in their appeal.  False appealers never mentioned 
‘religion ’, ‘hope, misses and ‘imagining the victim’.  
 
12.7.2 Results of POSAC 
             As explained above, each profile is illustrated as a point in the POSAC 
solution. Points of profiles that are comparable will be found on a line that slopes 
positively in the joint direction, or x + y (Rebhun, 2012). POSAC then computes a 
coefficient of goodness-of-fit for the representation of the partial order identifying 
how well the program correctly represents the proportion of profile pairs. Figure 
7 displays a two-dimensional POSAC solution with a coefficient of correct 
representation of 0.96. If a POSAC perfectly represents items in its plots then this 
measure of correct presentation will be 1. This means that 100% of the profiles are 
placed in the correct regions of the solution (Taylor, 2002), indicating the best 
goodness-of-fit (Shye, 1985). Shye (1985) stated that a coefficient of 0.80 and over 
is desirable for meaningful interpretation of results. In the current study, results 
indicate that 96% of profile pairs are correctly represented, and this goodness-of-
fit measure is more than satisfactory (Borg & Shye, 1995). The interpretation of 
the underlying system that gives rise to these variations provides insight into the 
linguistic features used by appealers when pleading for their relatives’ return. 
This interpretation relies on how each of the features partitions the overall 
POSAC solution. Figure 7 provides the POSAC diagram of the 39 appeals in this 
sample across the eight aspects. Here an increase in eight language aspects runs 
from the lower left (i.e., 00000000) to the upper right corner (i.e., 11111111). In 
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order, the aspects running from left to right are self-centred, tense, victim-centred, 
social, emotional, grammar, chronology and movement. Thus, a profile of 
11111111 indicates no presence of self-centredness, using present tense when 
talking about the victim, is victim-centred, incorporates social and emotional 
aspects in the appeal, with no mention of chronology and no grammatical errors, 
and is active in moving the investigation forward. 
 In the present case, there are 25 unique profiles across the 39 different 
appeals. The strong association between all the eight language categories and the 
J axis indicates that the variables are actually ordered in the same direction with 
the same meaning, according to appeal veracity (Raveh & Landau, 1993). 
 The POSAC program gives the coefficients of weak monotonicity coefficients 
of the 8 variables with the two main axes, X and Y, shown in Appendix P. Victim-
centredness is correlated with the X axis monotonically (0.82), while self-
centredness is correlated (0.91) with the Y axis, as seen by the factor loading of 
each variable. The emotional aspect is perfectly correlated with the Y axis (1.00), 
and chronology is correlated with this axis as well (0.86). The aspect of movement 
in language is almost perfectly correlated with the X axis (0.99). Present-tense 
(0.86) and social aspects of appeal language (0.80) are correlated with the X axis 
as well. The measures of monotonicity between each observed variable and the 
eight language categories indicate that appeals with relatively high (low) self-
centredness, chronology and emotional aspects in appeals on the top (bottom) side 
of Figure 7, where a high monotonicity association is seen with the Y axis. Appeals 
that have a relatively high (low) movement-related words, social aspects, 
grammatical errors and victim-centred-ness are located at the right (left) side of 
the same figure. The right-hand side region will contain active and emotional 
appeals whereas the left will contain passive and less emotional appeals. 
 
 12.7.2.1 The X-axis: Movement 
 The underlying structure of POSAC is best ascertained by defining the X 
and Y axes (Borg & Shye, 1995).  Appendix P shows that the aspect most 
associated with the X axis is that of ‘movement’, which has a loading of 0.99. Figure 
7a shows this partitioning of the POSAC space. This shows that indication of 
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desired action is a major factor underlying all the other aspects. This fits with the 
central assumption that the false appealer knows such action is fruitless, or indeed 
potentially dangerous in revealing his/her own culpability. 
Exploring appeals with this axis in mind, a majority of appeals towards the 
right-hand side of Figure 7a contain the aspect of activity, and a majority of them 
are true appeals whereas on the left-hand side of the same figure the truthful 
appeal profiles feature mostly only on the top-left region. In the bottom-left region, 
there are two appeals that feature the same profile of 00000110, where minor 
grammatical errors and chronology are present in their appeal. These appeals are 
marked with a triangle on Figure 7a, where one appeal is true and the other false. 
Present in both appeals are any language aspects of self-centredness, and absent 
in these appeals is the usage the present tense when talking about the victim. The 
lack of present tense is justifiable in the truthful appeal as the victim is already  
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Figure 7 
Two-dimensional POSAC solution 
 
dead; however the use of past tense in the false appeal raises caution as the victim 
is still alive and only kidnapped. The appeals also lack of social and emotional 
aspects of language. This appeal is situated in this region as it lacks any movement 
in finding the victim’s killer, as well as a lacking a clear social and emotional 
element in the appeal.  
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Note: X partitioning loading coefficient = 0.99 
Figure 7a 
Partitioned item diagram for the aspect of movement with frequencies of profiles 
 
 
 
False appeals 
Genuine appeals 
Mix of false and genuine appeals 
238 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Note: Y partitioning loading coefficient = 1.00 
Figure 7b 
Partitioned item diagram for the aspect of emotions with numbered frequencies of 
profiles 
 
12.7.2.2 The Y-axis: Emotional  
 
 
False appeals 
Genuine appeals 
Mix of false and genuine appeals 
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 The vertical axis as shown in Figure 7b is created by the aspect of emotions, 
having a loading of 1.00 on the Y axis. Further towards the top side of the 
partitioning the appeal profiles are indicative of truthful ones. This therefore 
indicates that emotional expression is orthogonal to action in distinguishing 
between appeals. Focusing further on profiles of appeals with this axis in mind, 
the bottom-most left region of Figure 7b contains three appeals that are devoid of 
any emotional aspect, including hope and missing the victim. As hypothesised, 
these appeals also contain aspects of chronology and grammatical errors. In 
contrast, the appeal profile on the topmost-right region contains spoken emotions, 
as well as showing indicators of activity and social aspects as hypothesised.  
 In the mixed profile on the bottom-left region of Figure 7b the false 
appealer’s statements was devoid of any mention of emotion and so was the true 
appealer’s. Coupled with a lack of movement and social aspects of the appeal this 
appeal, the truthful appeal seemed to contain elements of a false appeal. Within 
the top-right region of Figure 7a, it can be seen that six profiles show a pattern of 
11001110. These profiles contain a mix of truthful appeals and false appeals. 
Emotional aspects of language are present in all six appeals with this profile. 
Together with the self-centredness aspect absent, no grammatical errors and 
chronology present the false appeals with this profile show aspects of a truthful 
appeal by including spoken emotions. The false appealers also speak of the victim 
in present tense (all but two appeals with this profile contain cases where the 
victim is not yet known to be dead, and thus still considered alive) while two hold 
knowledge that the victim is indeed dead.   
 
12.7.2.3 The J axis: Appeal veracity  
 The POSAC analysis does not directly incorporate appeal veracity. 
However, because each of the appeals is represented in the output it is possible to 
identify which ones are genuine, and which not.  These are indicated in Figure 7c. 
It can be seen there that the J axis, the diagonal from bottom left to top right, 
reflects appeal truthfulness. A line can be drawn across the J axis that has 
virtually all the genuine appeals in the top right of the line, and all except one of 
the false appeals to its bottom left.  
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 Each video, as represented in the POSAC output, has a value on the J axis. 
The line that distinguishes nearly all the truthful from nearly all the false appeals  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: J partitioning loading coefficient = 0.95 
Figure 7c 
Partitioned item diagram for appeal veracity with frequencies of profiles 
 
 
 
False appeals 
Genuine appeals 
Mix of false and genuine appeals 
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can be drawn at J = 100. Appeals with a value greater than this tend to be true, 
those less than 100 tend to be false. An independent samples t-test was carried 
out on these J scores comparing genuine and false profiles. A highly significant 
difference was found; t (22) = 5.23, p < .0001. Genuine appealers scored higher (M 
= 124.72, SD =32.56) than false appealers (M = 56.94, SD = 27.24). The magnitude 
of the difference in means (67.78, 95% CI: 40.9 to 94.7) is large (eta squared = .53). 
 
12.8 Discussion 
A person who has never actually gone through bereavement has to fake 
grieving. Even if they successfully feign emotions in their non-verbal expressions, 
their speech has the capability of revealing aspects of their true emotional state 
which they may not be aware of, as shown by results of the current study. 
Furthermore, the genuineness of the desire to find the victim and/or the culprit is 
implicit in what the appealer says. As shown in Figures 7a and 7b, these two axes 
of emotion and active movement underlie the six other aspects of appeals derived 
from the existing literature and the consideration of what psychological processes 
are relevant to discriminating between genuine and false television appeals. 
Genuine appealers are significantly more in touch with their emotions, even 
if they are experiencing emotional apathy, and are more significantly likely to 
publicly state them. They are more cognisant of their mental state, be it true grief 
regarding the situation, being at peace, or completely devoid of emotions. The 
deficiency of emotional words and even emotional lability revealed in false 
appealers is highlighted; complementing the behavioural cues reported by others 
(ten Brinke & Porter, 2011).  
Significantly more true appealers talked about the victim in the present 
tense, whether they are missing or dead, reiterating hope for their return. While 
it is acknowledged that there may be appealers who are not spiritual, believing in 
a higher power or powers (i.e. they are atheist or agnostic), honest appealers are 
significantly more likely to rely on belief systems to sustain them and are 
significantly more hopeful, an aspect of genuine appeals not previously identified. 
Although emotional aspects, such as those found in the present study, have 
been acknowledged as important in detecting deception, other context specific 
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aspects have also emerged as relevant. Of particular interest are victim-oriented 
comments especially, the emphasis on bringing the victim home, if there is a 
chance they might still be alive, or catching the killer. What were characterised 
here as ‘movement’ related words have not been explored in previous studies. 
Because of the focus of the television appeals studied, the urgency in wanting 
relatives back has a particular significance and has a much lower in frequency for 
deceptive appealers. 
Deceptive appeals are generally self-oriented, using distancing language, 
denial of involvement, blaming others and setting conditions to the return of the 
victim. This verbal distancing is echoed in more conditional clauses containing the 
conjunctions of ‘if’ and ‘or’ regarding the victim coming home, such as ‘If you can’t 
come home’. These conjunctions tellingly create a disruption in the sentence, 
breaking the flow of their narratives. True appealers in this sample never used 
these conditional clauses or conjunctions.  
Distinct differences in an appeal statement is revealed between truthtellers 
and liars, where truthful appealers show a higher tendency to imagine the victim. 
This implies that genuine appealers are more likely to be highly fixated with the 
missing or murdered victim. The verbalised imagining about the victim and 
yearning to be close to their murdered or missing relative is entirely absent in 
false appeals within this sample (see Appendix A).  
False appealers are significantly more likely to refer back to the event, and 
talk about the situation during their press conference or interview statements, 
frequently in sequential order. This is an interesting attempt to reveal something 
they know to be true as part of creating a false narrative. 
 
12.9 Conclusion and implications  
 Distinctive differences in verbalisations separate genuine appeals from 
those that are not. Truthful appealers reveal various coping styles missing from 
lying appealers’ narratives. Taken together the eight aspects of what is said in 
television appeals provide a highly significant discrimination between genuine 
and false appeals. By utilising a novel multi-dimensional scaling analysis on 
dichotomous variables it was found that a score could be generated that could be 
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used to assign videos to genuine or false categories with an extremely high degree 
of accuracy. 
The underlying psychological processes that give rise to the differences in 
verbalisations relate directly to the specific context of these appeals. Genuine 
appealers are preoccupied with the victim. They are using their presence at a 
televised press conference to generate action that will be of value. Emotionally 
they still think of the missing relative as being alive and yearn to continue the 
bond they had with them. False appeals are being used to exonerate the appealer 
by attributing agency away from themselves, denying committing the crime, 
retelling of the crime events (presumably fabricated), and a general passivity.   
The results demonstrate the value of elaborating cues to deception that 
derive directly from the specific context in which the truth/deception is being 
generated. For whilst in the present study some of the significant differences, 
notably those relating to emotion, may have generic value across a range of 
situations, most of the differences take their meaning directly from the events 
being described. 
The 39 videos used in the present study are still relatively few in number 
for statistical analysis. Further validation of the results found here with other 
examples is therefore of great importance. 
As a verification of the results of the study, content analysis in future 
studies should be carried out in total ignorance of the truthfulness or otherwise. 
That was not possible in the present study, by necessity, because of the need to 
establish ground truth as the basis for selecting the videos. Although in the 
present case the second rater, who contributed to the inter-rater reliability 
assessment, was ignorant of the truthfulness of the videos.  
Generating new cues derived from grief theories that relate directly to the 
context of the appeal, and producing profiles of appeals across a number of aspects 
analysed by POSAC all provide novel possibilities for future studies in a wide 
variety of different circumstances. They show that speech differences can be 
identified that distinguish between honest and deceptive appealers with a very 
high degree of reliability. 
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general dISCuSSIOn and 
COnCluSIOnS 
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The purpose of this final chapter is to summarise and present an overall 
discussion of the results found in the current thesis. While it is known that lie 
detection accuracy is poor, it is not known whether the same accuracy would 
persist if people are asked to make innocence-guilt judgments. Additionally, efforts 
in understanding the cognitive perceptions that underlie judges’ accuracy rates 
are lacking in this type of veracity judgment. As expounded in Chapter 1, existing 
explanations as to why we perform so poorly in accurately detecting innocence-
guilt have not been systematically reviewed and categorised into an operational 
framework. A visual framework of where errors may lie is introduced in Figure 1 
(Chapter 1). Currently, it is inferred that the concepts of truth bias and innocence 
bias would overlap, however this remains to be further studied and extricated. In 
the present thesis, both truth-lie judgments and innocence-guilt judgments 
warranted a discussion as they have been previously interchangeably used 
(Kassin & Fong, 1999; Inbau et al., 1986). Logically, there would seem to be a 
relationship between the two in the current context, especially given that 
participants in Part 2 were not privy to any other forms of evidence or information 
about the appealers. While conjecture, it seems that they would most probably 
have to rely on whether they think the appealers are lying or not to judge their 
innocence or guilt.   
 As given emphasis throughout the present thesis, one of the foremost 
methodological validation in using a very specific context is that the saliency and 
production of cues are dependent upon a range of situational factors (Porter & ten 
Brinke, 2010) therefore cues that are salient in one situation may not be so in 
another. Not having a contextual focus high stakes research scenario runs the risk 
of precluding certain cues from appearing. Apart from the small pool of research 
that investigated high stakes scenarios, most lacked a context-specific approach 
(Harpster et al., 2009; Reynolds & Rendler, 2010). Several authors put forward 
the view that this lack of context-specific approach may have promoted to the 
seemingly inconsistent discoveries in high stakes lie detection literature (DePaulo 
et al., 2003; Ten Brinke & Porter, 2012; Mann et al., 2002; Whelan et al., 2014) as 
well as counteracted context-specific cues from being discovered. By utilising a 
methodological approach which allowed not only using frequency counts in 
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investigating the cues to deception but also in examining cues in relation with 
each other, the findings (expounded below) propose that using a context-specific 
approach facilitated the findings of novel cues that were formerly not capable of 
being identified. 
 One of the central objectives of the current thesis was to examine what 
effect using ecologically valid high-stakes stimulus materials has on the accuracy 
of judges in detecting innocence and guilt across several experimentally 
manipulated conditions, thereby observing different biases and heuristics that 
may surface in each condition. In order to elicit differences in responses across 
conditions (associated with differences in underlying mental processes) 
manipulations were implemented by accentuating (or minimising) different cues 
across conditions in Studies 1 to 4. These manipulations were grounded upon 
theoretical bases and substantiating arguments all expounded in the opening 
chapters of this thesis. 
 
13.1 OVERARCHING THEORETICAL ARGUMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
 This section reviews current theories that account for all the issues this 
thesis has explored. Most existing theories discussed in the present thesis would 
best explain a truth-lie judgment and subsequently the concept of the truth/lie 
bias and truth/lie default. However, as aforementioned they warrant a discussion 
nevertheless as logically there would seem to be an overlap between these concepts 
and innocence-guilt decisions especially in the current context.  
The Spinozan model asserts that individuals have no other option but to 
initially accept incoming information as truthful by default (Gilbert, 1991). While 
it can be re-examined later, this initial truth bias in this model is non-adaptive, 
inflexible and cannot be substituted with another way of thinking even after being 
alerted (Gilbert et al., 1990). The truth default theory (TDT; Levine, 2014) includes 
this Spinozan model in its tenets. It proposes that people either assume 
truthfulness after failing to actively bring to mind the likelihood that they may be 
lied to, or they assume truthfulness as a default thinking mode when failing to 
find adequate indication to confirm deceit (Levine, 2014). On the contrary, the 
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ALIED model states that it does not always require greater mental effort to 
consider the possibility of deceit, as TDT claims (Richter, Schroeder & Wohrmann, 
2009; Street & Richardson, 2014; Hasson et al., 2005).  
 Levine (2014) argued against his original depiction of the truth bias as a 
non-adaptive cognitive distortion (McCornack & Levine, 1990) and recently 
asserted that both the truth default and truth bias are practical and adaptive in 
helping one make accurate veracity judgments. While ALIED shares this adaptive 
perspective, it claims that there are no set cognitive defaults, rather, response 
biases stem from the same underlying process. That is, there is no truth default 
as there is no lie default. ALIED goes further to contend that in particular 
situations it is more cognitively taxing to assume truthfulness, for instance when 
made suspicious (Street, 2015; Levine & McCornack, 1991; McCornack & Levine, 
1990; Stiff, Kim & Ramesh, 1992; Toris & DePaulo, 1985). Whether it takes more 
effort to trust or distrust depends on the congruency of the incoming information 
with the observer’s beliefs, understanding and past experience (Ng & Youngs, 
2016; Street, 2015; Lane & Harris, 2014; Gervais & Henrich, 2010; Woolley & 
Ghossainy, 2013). 
 The ALIED approach stems from Brunswik’s (1952) theory that individuals 
adapt the type of information they utilise to make a decision instead of always 
relying on their understanding of the general context. ALIED advocates that 
individuals endeavour to make veracity decisions of a sender or statement by 
utilising information from or about the specific statement or sender itself, as 
opposed to general information about statements or senders (Street, 2015). 
However, it is not always that information about a statement or sender is available 
or if available, the diagnostic value of these cues may be low.  
 In the present thesis, the expectation was that by using material from high 
stakes Sources the diagnostic value of cues will be higher. However, because the 
stimulus materials were very short, information available to judges about the 
appealers and appeal circumstances were partial and limited. In the deficiency of 
information about the Source, there is a possibility that judges seemed to have 
relied on context-general information to come to their veracity decisions, even 
more so when certain cues were experimentally accented (or minimised) across 
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conditions. The reliance on context-general information was expected to, in turn, 
affect accuracy of veracity decisions. Because each experimental condition was 
manipulated it was also expected that differences in reliance on context-general 
information would be observed (through implicit and explicit lie detection 
measures) and this will also be reflected in accuracy rates. The ALIED model 
would provide the best explanation for the results achieved in the present thesis, 
at this stage.  
 ALIED acknowledges that one of its limitations is that it offers no claim on 
how individuals choose and incorporate these context-general cues. In fact, ALIED 
does little to elaborate on these cues themselves. The theory loosely mentions that 
these context-general cues include social norms, individual relationships and 
emotional aspects (Street, 2015). While Street (2015) discussed the truth and lie 
bias in depth, little is mentioned about the affective facet – neither did the author 
dispute its existence. The present thesis posits that meta-emotion biases can also 
arise in the face of limited information about the Source as a result of affective 
heuristics, even more so in a context where emotional outpour of appealers is 
highly anticipated such as that in television appeals. Response biases pertaining 
to emotions can be understood as a usage and elaboration of Street’s (2015) ALIED 
model.  
Granhag (2006) alleged that the dual process theory is less applicable in 
lie detection, as he stresses that the mutual exclusivity concerning the explicit 
and implicit is questionable. It should be noted that there are many classes of 
dual process models (Evans, 2007; Street & Masip, 2015). One class is known as 
the ‘default-interventionist’, where these models claim that heuristic processing 
is the default processing mode (Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993). 
However, this can be interrupted by analytic processing if and when enough time 
is offered (Evans, 2007). Another class, called the ‘parallel-competition’, is where 
both System 1 and 2 take effect concurrently. That said, if there is only limited 
time offered the resulting judgment is more prone to be built on heuristic 
processing. These two classes claim that analytic processing comes after 
heuristic processing (Street & Masip, 2015; Sloman, 1996; Sloman, 2002). Lastly, 
the ‘pre-emptive conflict resolution’ class claims that either System 1 or 2 is 
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selected from the beginning and analytical processes take place when more effort 
in processing is required (Evans, 2007).  
 In response to the premise of there being an interaction between the two 
systems, several researchers propose a singular-system model where the implicit 
and the explicit processes operate on a continuum (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002; 
Farah, 1994; O’Brien & Opie, 1999). Cleeremans (2006) contended that both 
conscious and unconscious information processing arises from the same 
underlying system, and that consciousness ought to be regarded as a gradient on 
a continuum. The dynamic gradient account (DGC) of consciousness contrasts dual 
processes by advocating a singular system framework (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 
2002).  
 Another contention against the dual process model is that the dichotomy 
does not satisfactorily explain or encompass the breadth of cognitive routes found 
in research on mental reasoning. Moshman (2000) argued that the dichotomy of 
System 1 and System 2 overlooks an important distinction between automatic and 
implicit processing. The author contends that, for example, rule-based processing 
can be automatic and explicit processing can encompass the conscious use of 
heuristics. Hence, Moshman (2000) suggested two additional mental processes on 
top of System 1 (automatic heuristic processing) and System 2 (explicit rule-based 
processing), the automatic rule-based processing and explicit heuristic processing. 
These models highlight alternative theories that assume that the conscious and 
unconscious are aspects of more than only two systems or one interactive system.  
 Figure 2 exhibits a culmination of all theories reviewed in this section 
pertaining to this thesis. At this stage, the hypothesis underlying Figure 2 is that 
consciousness operates on a continuum and is interactive with the unconscious; 
the two ‘sub-systems’ work in concert. The results from the experimental studies 
in the present thesis found little evidence for any default response that is pre-
selected where people will always be innocence-biased or guilt-biased. This is akin 
to a truth default (Levine, 2014) in lie detection research.  Further support for 
other abovementioned models (truth default, ALIED, dual-system, multi-system 
and single-system) can be further verified if the role of the unconscious is clarified.  
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In relation to the framework presented in Figure 1 (Chapter 1), while 
preliminary, results from the present thesis is most consistent with ALIED’s 
claims that there are no set cognitive defaults. Rather, at present they seem to 
infer that response biases stem from the same underlying process. The results 
from Studies 1 to 4 at present challenged the initial assumption at the beginning 
of this thesis that judges will always draw on heuristics (which always leads to 
‘biases’) to determine veracity.  Evidently, it must be acknowledged that the 
number of videos shown in Studies 1 to 4 were low and thus any interpretation of 
the results must be made with caution. However, these results set valuable 
groundwork for further studies to either further support or challenge these 
initial suggestions, and to increase our understanding of the workable 
representation set out in Figure 2.  
 The novel aspect of the present thesis was that it included a grief paradigm, 
when previous research predominantly focused solely on the lying process. Before 
considering what subjective perceptions and expectations observers hold, the 
present thesis first explored what was the norm behaviour in a given situation. In 
the current context, truthful television appeals are made by individuals who are 
in distress and grieving either the momentary loss of a missing relative or the 
permanent passing of one murdered. This consequently proposed a framework for 
studying expected indicators of a deceptive appeal. While of course grief can be 
displayed through physiology and behavioural actions, verbal aspects were chosen 
to be focused on in the current thesis as speech content has been demonstrated to 
indicate the foremost importance and mental states of the appealer; whether it is 
finding the victim urgently or fervently attempting to cover up a crime 
(Pennebaker et al., 2003). When norm behaviour of a specific context is known, 
deviations from the norm hypothetically serve as a red flag towards the occurrence 
of deception.  
 As shown in the literature review set out in the opening chapters, the lying 
process is ultimately context specific and previous research efforts have not been 
able to focus on a model of expected content before. Considering the normative 
behaviour and responses in a unique high stakes situation allowed the present 
thesis to build a framework based on the expected verbal content. 
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13.2 Grief theories as a context in studying deception 
 Models and theories of grief explain that grief is the outward presentation 
of inner feelings and mental states, sometimes indicating presence of clinical 
symptoms in accordance to bereavement (Rosenblatt, 1988; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Overall 1) research over the past several decades implies that 
an archetypal reaction to grief and/or distress is a fixation upon the loss or 
separation from the victim and the detachment from a loved one. Grievers usually 
want to continue this bond and keep ties by being preoccupied in terms of thinking 
about them, writing about them, remembering them, make a meaning of the loss, 
imagining them, keeping count of the days since the victim left them (Lindemann, 
1944; Hogan & DeSantis, 1992). 2) True grievers and individuals in distress 
experience an emotional release or reserve, where they either experience a parade 
of emotions in reaction to the loss as manifested in emotional symptoms, or 
emotional lability and apathy towards the situation (Moyle Wright & Hogan, 2008; 
Shear & Mulhare, 2008). 3) In times of distress, the need for others and social 
cooperation increases to alleviate the pain and/or distress of the loss. The loss of a 
loved one, whether temporary or permanent, will also create social changes. They 
may turn to a higher agency such as God or a higher power to assume 
responsibility of their outcome, as well as to serve as a buffer for the pain and loss 
(Bjork & Thurman, 2007; Stone & Pennebaker, 2002). They may also experience 
stress, anxiety and depression amongst other family members as a change within 
the family structure will take place, as members attempt to communally 
compensate for and balance the loss. 4) Because emotional energy is invested in 
the victim a person in distress and/or grief will immediately want to find and 
secure their loved ones again (initially evident by the fact that they want to 
publicly appeal for their return, although verbal aspects will also show this 
urgency) or to urgently find their killer to remedy the loss they feel, as only finding 
them will alleviate their grief, the sooner the better. They would want to execute 
firm plans and rally the community in helping their cause, driving a sense of action 
to speedily change the situation. 5) Grievers express hope and tend to speak in the 
present tense. From a grief theory perspective, this conveys hope in being able to 
find the missing relative again in cases where a body of the victim has not been 
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found yet. This also signifies not having the knowledge of what actually happened 
to the victim.  
 One of the main premises of Part 2 in the current thesis was that while grief 
can be simulated, a deceptive griever may not know truly what a true griever 
would go through and may even contra-indicate certain deceptive cues themselves. 
They may find it hard to turn to a higher power, for example, as they would not 
aware of the behaviours of a truly grieving individual. A true griever would have 
invested emotional energy in the victim for many years, and when this loss is real 
the grief that overcomes them is often challenging to imitate, however keeping in 
mind the caveat that false appealers may also truly feel grief for the loss of their 
loved one, where they may have killed them in a spur of a moment and later come 
to regret their actions. Contraindications, for example, includes blatant denial in 
distancing themselves from involvement in the crime and assigning agency away 
from themselves (Davis et al., 2005; ten Brinke & Porter, 2011) and using 
conditional markers when talking about a missing victim coming home, perhaps 
aware that there is no likelihood for return.  
 
13.3 Perceptions and expectations of grievers 
 Research on perceptions of grief has shown that people view levels and types 
of grievers’ emotional expression as important, and favour certain styles of grief 
coping. Existing research tells us that people tend to favour an unfounded grief 
stage model where a firm expression of grief such as crying is expected with an 
unsupported time period, despite the fact that observers also hold the knowledge 
that grievers may experience variations in emotional expressions and knowing 
that grief responses cannot be generalized (Breen & O’Connor, 2007; Costa & 
Stewart, 2007; Penman et al., 2013). While holding the assumption that responses 
departing from the norm are not necessarily pathological, observers still favour 
the ‘norm’. Research also tells us that emotional display and level of emotional 
expressions are substantially expected by judges in grieving and/or distressed 
individuals (Costa & Stewart, 2007).  
 Burgoon et al. (1975) proposed the language expectancy theory, a subset of 
expectancy violation theory, where the authors claimed what a speaker chooses to 
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say can significantly predict whether an observer is successfully convinced. This 
theory contends that people hold expectations as to what they consider normal 
language in a given situation, grounded in psychological and cultural norms of 
their immediate society, and bring these stereotypes into social situations. This 
means that a sender’s words (and non-verbal behaviour) may be inconsistent with 
the stereotypes judges carry. Due to this violation of expectancies the observer 
carries, a sender may be seen to be less liked and even believed as their language 
and/or behaviour is inherently less persuasive. In the context of the present thesis, 
as discussed the language of grief is governed by emotional, psychological and 
social changes. As such, expectancies in the language of a griever will follow. 
Judges could and do expect, to a certain degree, what a griever should and would 
say. 
 While theories and models of grief exists (yet never served as a theoretical 
basis in studying high stakes deception), little is also known of perceptions and 
expectations of television appealers should behave.  
  
13.4 Implicit and explicit decisions  
 Assessing implicit statements in the present thesis was to assist in 
determining a Judge’s rating of anything relating to the appealer apart from ‘do 
you think he/she is guilty or innocent?’ The notion is that lying can be judged by 
perceivers in different implicit ways by asking universal questions, such as of ‘do 
you want to marry him?’ whereby an implicit measurement of the explicit notion 
of ‘trust’ is taking place, rather than asking ‘do you trust him?’ (ten Brinke, 
personal communication, 26th August, 2015). There is nothing ‘hidden’ about 
implicit judgments, and one might even go as far as to say that there is no division 
between implicit judgments being superior to explicit ones either, at least some of 
the time. Furthermore, certain explicit decisions cannot be explained by implicit 
decisions and implicit decisions cannot be explained by explicit ones (Granhag, 
2006).   
 As shown in the series of experimental studies in the present thesis, explicit 
decisions were proven useful and recorded accuracies better than chance level in 
some circumstances perhaps due to the manipulation (saliency) of certain Source 
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characteristics and not necessarily due to the high stakes nature of the Source. 
Measuring both implicit and explicit veracity judgments allowed the exploration 
of the relationship between which of these cues participants utilised to form their 
judgments, and how this relates to their explicit veracity decisions.  
 Further, it allowed the investigation as to which cues predicted accurate 
explicit decisions. The aim to do so revealed fundamental complexities between 
the two concepts. Throughout Studies 1 to 4, it was discovered judges can identify 
accurate implicit judgments that potentially leads to correct explicit judgments, 
but they may still not accurately judge an appealer to be innocent or otherwise in 
their explicit decisions. This showed that they may not know the meaning of their 
decisions, and that accurately identifying implicit cues does not necessarily 
translate towards accurate explicit decisions. Thus, while there seems to be a 
relationship, this is still vastly conjecture at this stage and undisclosed is the 
extent of implicit judgments influencing the explicit decisions (and under which 
circumstance is this more likely), and explicit judgments influencing implicit 
decisions (and under which circumstance); if they do consciously, and if so under 
which particular circumstance do they occur consciously or otherwise. To 
confidently state the predictive value of one decision for the other is premature at 
this stage. Nevertheless, based on the current understanding of these results, 
Figure 2 offers a workable representation that stands to be further developed, 
verified or challenged with more research in this area. 
 
13.5 VERBAL ANALYSIS 
 Part 2 of this thesis sought to examine diagnostic indicators of deception in 
television appeals. A supplementary aim was to not only utilise a methodological 
approach which objectively observed verbal cues that differentiate honest from 
deceptive appeals to a high degree of certainty, but to examine these verbal cues 
in relation to each other to generate a verbal profile that will prove valuable in 
practice. The current thesis not only uses frequency counts, in line with a 
traditional method in investigating the cues to deception, but also examines verbal 
cues in relation with each other. The latter has not yet been conducted in the 
current context. The importance of investigating variables in relation to each other 
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cannot be undervalued and was outlined in Chapter 12. POSAC analysis provides 
a robust consideration of how cues to innocence and guilty appeals work with each 
other in a three-dimensional space. By using this method of analysis, rare 
behaviours that occur infrequently were also able to be incorporated to provide a 
methodical and robust representation of deception cues in this context.  
 This technique enabled an assessment of the degree of similarity between 
all appealers in the sample, based on the commonality of their appeal features. 
This was done by partially ordering these aspects on a geometric representation. 
This then allowed Study 5 to explore the relationships between ordered variables 
to reveal the fundamental structure of aspects derived from grief theories. The 
present thesis was able to convey in a conceptual space the relationship between 
appealers as determined by eight carefully selected aspects. The resulting plots 
showed appealers located close together, and within the spatial representation 
appeal profiles are plotted in a way that the closest to the appealer has the most 
similar profile and furthest away from the profile is most disparate. In Study 5, 
the J axis (which was the dominant quantitative axis determined by the joint 
combination of all eight aspects) was able to significantly and reliably discriminate 
between genuine and false appeal. This means that the interpretation of the 
underlying structure which imparts variability offers much insight into the 
language characteristics appealers use when pleading for a loved one’s return.  
 Put together, all axes discussed in Study 5 underlie the aspects of appeals 
derived from the pre-existing theories found in literature and their significance on 
the cognitive processes were construed to successfully discriminate a true appealer 
from a false one. Study 5 found that genuine appealers were significantly more 
likely to publicly verbalise their emotions, emotional state or emotional lability 
they were experiencing whereas false appealers were generally devoid of 
verbalising this despite expressing emotions in non-verbal ways. This was an 
important distinction and finding. Whether the victims were missing or dead, 
genuine appealers were also significantly more likely to talk about the victim in 
the present tense. This showed hope for their return, presenting a clearer 
indication of innocence in not having knowledge of what happened to the victims. 
In contrast while true appealers in this sample never used conditional clauses, 
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false appealers used conjunctions of ‘if’ and ‘or’ regarding the victim coming home 
(e.g. ‘If you can’t come home, just call’, indicating that they were either reluctant 
for the victim to come home as they will suffer repercussions in a case of 
kidnapping, or they held the knowledge that the victim coming home is not a 
possibility in a murder case.  
 While false appealers generally sought to distance themselves from any 
involvement with the victim, true appealers wanted to continue the bond that they 
lost with the victim. As shown in previous research by ten Brinke and Porter 
(2012), Zuckerman et al. (1981) and DePaulo et al. (2003), liars tend to show 
behaviours that generally impede a direct communication, choosing instead to use 
equivocal language in an attempt to psychologically eschew possible feelings of 
shame and/or guilt. In this instance, perhaps false appealers used distancing 
language, blame shifting and conditions to reduce their conflict created by the 
incongruity between their inner knowledge of what happened to the victim and 
their outer public pleas. In contrast, true appealers attempted maintaining a 
connection with the victim by verbally imagining them, counting the days since 
they were gone, and generally were preoccupied with the victim in their appeals. 
They relied on a higher power to sustain them through the pain they were going 
through, whereas all these aspects were absent in false appeals. True appealers 
displayed a verbalised urgency in moving the investigation forward to find their 
relatives or to find the killer in cases where a body has been found, whereas most 
false appealers remained passive in their appeals. The aspects categorised in 
Study 5 as ‘movement’ words had not been investigated before in the present 
context. False appealers were significantly more likely to refer back to the event, 
and talked about the situation during their press conference or interview 
statements, frequently in sequential order. This was an interesting attempt to 
disclose something they knew to be true as part of fabricating a false appeal.  
 Taken as a whole, the strengths of the present thesis included using high 
stakes situations, generating diagnostic cues derived from a strong theoretical 
foundation using grief theories that relate directly to the context of the appeal, 
and producing profiles of appeals across a number of aspects analysed by POSAC. 
All these provided novel possibilities for future studies in a wide variety of 
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different circumstances. They showed that speech differences can be identified 
that distinguish between honest and deceptive appealers with a very high degree 
of reliability. In future, these diagnostic indicators will benefit from being included 
in the implicit portion of the questionnaire in Part 2. 
 
13.6 METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS 
 First and foremost, it must be acknowledged that there was no room for 
studying the objective verbal aspects found with observer reactions to these 
implicit judgments in the present thesis. It would have been valuable indeed to 
include diagnostic indicators found in Study 5 in the questionnaire used in Part 2. 
This will be expounded in the Future Suggestions for Research section. In 
addition, although the questionnaire used provided interesting results it had only 
limited internal validity. Future studies with a more fully developed questionnaire 
would therefore be of value. A fuller discussion of improvements that can be made 
towards the current questionnaire can be found under Section 11.8. 
 The present thesis can only infer that there is a meaningful relationship 
between several implicit variables and explicit decisions. Probability estimations 
were calculated that a particular explicit decision was arrived at, determined by 
judges making certain implicit judgments. However, a methodological limitation 
here was not being able to objectively and directly measure to what degree explicit 
innocence and guilt detection comprises an implicit element, and to what extent 
implicit innocence and guilt detection comprises an explicit element. The 
placement of the explicit question of whether the appealer is guilty or otherwise 
at the start of the questionnaire could have further confounded results.  
 The use of regression was a rudimentary and a gateway method to 
understand the complexities of how judges’ implicit decisions associate with 
explicit ones. The assumption behind this choice was that implicit decisions judges 
used will always be correlated with their explicit ones. However, it remains a 
possibility in Studies 1 to 4 that in certain circumstances judges can indeed detect 
accurate implicit cues, and yet this does not necessarily translate to higher correct 
explicit ratings. In other words, there was no way to tell (in certain conditions 
within the present thesis at least) if judges had actually used an implicit cue 
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knowingly or unknowingly, meaningfully or otherwise. The findings could also be 
taken to indicate that judges may not have recognised the association between 
implicit and explicit decisions in the first place. Moreover, regression does not take 
into account measurement error.  The assumption with regression is that data is 
measuring perfectly the underlying construct. Path analysis is a promising avenue 
for exploring the extent to which implicit variable influence explicit ones for future 
research, as will be elaborated in the section below.  
 The third methodological limitation was that conceivably television appeals 
were too short a stimulus material to make any sort of valid judgment and may 
have further convoluted findings. Consequently, this made it problematic to credit 
findings to the usage of highly ecologically valid stimulus material, with absolute 
certainty. Care was taken so that only appeals with a longer content was chosen, 
but taking into consideration only a limited range of appeals were available this 
became difficult to always select longer videos. For example, for Study 1’s high 
emotionality condition, there were only so many videos to select from that will fit 
the study’s criteria and definitions of what constitutes high emotional display. 
Although very highly ecologically valid, televised appeals tend to be short clips 
with not much information provided on the case, which may further lead to 
cognitive heuristics processing. Thin-slicing has been found to improve accuracy 
in some instances and in others, decrease it (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992; 
Albrechtsen, Meissner & Susa, 2009; Street & Masip, 2015). In the present thesis, 
since the video clips shown to judges were very short, indeed it was found in 
certain conditions innocence and guilt detection accuracy were better than others. 
Therefore, while using television appeals as stimulus material was beneficial in 
extracting the use of heuristics and expectations in the face of limited available 
information, it also presented a limitation by influencing veracity decisions by its 
very nature (that may not be evident in other types of high stakes sources). 
Caution must be exercised in generalising the current results to other high stakes 
situations. 
 Certain implicit cues were bound to require a more systematic and 
conscious processing than others, and in the current thesis there was no way of 
observing this unless participants were asked this directly. Even then, 
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participants may have found it a difficult task to express or remember their 
cognitive decisions let alone accurately. While there are benefits in implicit 
assessments of veracity, challenges also exist. For example, observers may not 
come to a full understanding in terms of how they came to the assessment or the 
meaning of it. A case in example, in Anderson et al.’s (1999) study some 
participants are not able to realise that by them refocusing from the verbal cue of 
story plausibility to a visual cue of gaze aversion may potentially be an indication 
of deception. Their participants found that when making implicit veracity 
assessments it was often difficult to make a parallel explicit decision. While using 
the questionnaire developed in the present thesis combatted some issues 
highlighted in the authors’ studies (instead of depending on participants’ own 
memory retrieval processes in cue self-reporting), the current questionnaire could 
benefit from encompassing a fuller range of items to include non-verbal cues as 
well, as will be expounded in the Suggestions for Future Research section. 
 Another methodological limitation in the present thesis was excluding 
participants who did not agree with the operational definitions set out in Studies 
1 and 3. For example, in Study 1 those who did not agree that videos selected for 
the condition of Low Emotionality were indeed so, were excluded from further 
analysis. While vital that this step was taken, it highlighted subjectivity of 
perceptual impressions and individual differences, and overlooked a unique group 
of individuals. In future research, attention should be paid to this group of 
individuals and observe further into how and why they perceived the way they did. 
Rather than treating variables as absolutes and disregarding perception that is 
different from the chosen definition, studies could be designed to consider these 
variables as relative and/or on a continuum. This could also potentially reduce the 
artificiality of the experimental design and reduce guesswork in having to choose 
a veracity response in the face of an uncertain outcome. 
 In Study 5, it was acknowledged that appeals utilised in this study differed 
in status as to whether the relative was missing or dead. A mixture of direct 
appeals and indirect appeals were also used. In addition, the timing of the appeals 
was not controlled for either. It could be construed that what is said during the 
first week of an appeal would differ from an appeal made after several months of 
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the investigation being carried out. While controlling for these issues may or may 
not offer any differences in results from the ones found in Study 5, it would 
certainly be useful in regulating and monitoring these questions. In Whelan et 
al.’s (2014) paper the authors used a balance of 10 cases where the relative’s body 
had been found, meaning the relative was missing and not publicly known to be 
dead, and also another six cases where the status of the relative was publicly 
known to be dead. In Study 5, 26 appeals were used for cases where the status of 
the relative is missing and another 13 for cases in which the body had been found 
and the relative known publicly to be dead.  
 As already acknowledged notwithstanding the many advantages of using 
high stakes data, using these comes with a price which presents limitation to their 
generalisability. One of these limitations was not being able to control for video 
quality, where some footage quality were better than others, which was why non-
verbal behaviours were not chosen in the present study as a focal point. Judges 
may have a hard time straining to view behaviours such as ‘pupil dilation’ with 
such questionable video resolution. Furthermore, the range of appearance that can 
be seen in each video would be very much varied, where in some videos only a head 
can be seen and in others a full body. While the implicit variables of ‘body 
attractiveness’ and ‘whether the appealer was perceived to be well-dressed’ were 
initially measured in the questionnaire, it was not included in any analyses as in 
some appeals a body was not within the image range.  
 An additional limitation in using a high stakes dataset was not being able 
to control for where the appeals are being made from. All appeals used in the 
present thesis were collected from the United States, United Kingdom, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand, where most appealers were from the 
Western culture. Thus, it was essential that all participants in the current thesis 
spoke and understood English. This also presents a possible methodological 
limitation for the generalisability of the set of results in the present thesis, 
where certain verbal aspects measured in Study 5 may not be present across 
other cultures, for example. Furthermore, due to the small number of videos that 
were presented to participants to counter for maturation effect, this could impact 
the generalisability of the findings in Studies 1 to 4. Results could also strictly be 
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idiosyncratic and attributable to the videos chosen, and warrants further 
replication with a higher number of videos. The difficulty also lies in not being 
able to find many video clips for certain studies. For example, there were only a 
small number of video clips showing an innocent appealer who was very 
emotional/unemotional. Likewise, there were only a small number of guilty 
appealers who were/were not.   
 Appeal veracities could not be ignored while selecting the videos for study 
analyses, and in order to establish ground truth as the basis for selecting these 
videos. While in Study 5 there was a second inter-rater present, who contributed 
to the reliability assessment and was ignorant to appeal veracities, in future 
studies this number of inter-raters could be higher. As such, future studies should 
endeavour to carry out content analysis in total ignorance of the appealers’ 
veracities with a higher number of inter-rater reliability assessments to prevent 
the possibility of false positive cues, or cues overlooked.   
 A final limitation of the studies presented in the current thesis was that 
because data from all four studies were collected at same time, improvements to 
the methodology section could not be made succeeding each study. Randomisations 
of the question item order as well as video clips were also not employed. Although 
there has been widely cited research studies in lie detection that also did not 
employ randomisation of video clips such as in Kassin, Meissner and Norwick 
(2005), Gilbert et al. (1990) and Street and Kingstone’s (2016) studies where these 
authors opted to present them in a constant order, a randomisation future 
questionnaires would benefit from this improvement to reduce question order 
effects as well as increase quality of overall data.   
     
13.7 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 While the present thesis’ groundwork results should be cautiously 
considered, its contribution in understanding subjective perceptions and biases as 
well as understanding deception in this particular high-stakes context are 
invaluable. The studies presented in the present thesis grapples with many issues 
that lie detection research has so far not delved into yet, and warrants further 
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research. This section highlights suggestions for where certain area can benefit 
from further research. 
 Studies 1 to 4 provided some insight into the underlying cognitive processes 
of judges is now accessible. In the present thesis, these cognitive mechanisms were 
studied through implicit questions. Implicit judgments were shown to be affected 
by cues that were emphasised to judges as well as the amount or form of 
information presented. Judges adapted according to the available information and 
make decisions accordingly.  
Asking participants to make an explicit judgment at the start of the 
questionnaire and then proceeding to implicit assessments, as well as not allowing 
for a free mental recall meant that this thesis was not able to study what they 
truly thought. Implicit judgments could have been influenced by explicit ones. 
Reverse-ordering explicit and implicit segments in future research is 
recommended to further explore this relationship. The number of times appeals 
are watched and changes in explicit answers are also suggested to be reported in 
forthcoming studies as this can reveal cognitive interplay between explicit and 
implicit components of lie detection. Further, allowing participants the 
opportunity to view video clips multiple times and change their answers may have 
neglected the issue of perceived consistency across multiple viewings. Multiple 
viewings may have also affected innocence-guilt judgments due to the judge’s 
perceived familiarity with it (Weaver, Garcia, Schwarz & Miller, 2007; Schwarz, 
Sanna, Skurnik & Yoon, 2007). Schwarz (2015) proposed that people tend to make 
decisions based on their perceived feelings pertaining to how easy or difficult it is 
for them to process a stimulus. This ease or difficulty is influenced by factors such 
as fluency in processing, which then affects how truthful people find this stimulus 
to be. The association of fluency and repetition heightens perceived familiarity 
when the stimulus is watched again and again (Weaver et al., 2007; Schwarz et 
al., 2007). Consequently, this repetition increases perceived truthfulness (Schwarz 
et al., 2007). 
Allowing multiple viewings may have also reduced the processing of new 
information when existing stereotypes has already been made, affecting 
consistency across multiple responses as it is more favourable to one’s schema. A 
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schema is a mental shortcut that is used during the process of encoding and 
retrieving information from memory. The easier it is to access a schema, the 
more likely to be used as a heuristic. This is akin to a mere exposure effect 
(Zajonc, 2001). Certain schemas can hold a long-lasting effect because of the 
emotional arousal experienced when watching or listening to the story reinforces 
the neural networks that result from that experience (Freeman, 1991; McGaugh, 
1989). This results in the activation of this schema later and increases with 
repeated exposure as well as the rejection of alternative understandings. This 
may especially be so in the present thesis as the stimulus material is emotional 
in nature.  
Asking an explicit question at the very start of the questionnaire would 
mean judges would have had the least time to systematically process the very brief 
video or audio clip they would have just experienced. As such, judgment rates 
could have been affected by this. In the lie detection literature, Street and Masip 
(2015) contended that this decrease in truth bias is not attributable to the factor 
of time, rather, it is a product of simply making more than one veracity judgments. 
To capture the actual moment a judge arrives at a decision as to whether a sender 
is innocent or otherwise may have been important and warrants further study in 
future research. While it is known that the truth bias disappears over time (Masip 
et al., 2009), it is not known if the emotional bias or the possible innocence-guilt 
bias outlined in the present thesis will follow the same trajectory, requiring 
additional study as well as what account will best explain the results (Street & 
Masip, 2015).  
From Part 2 of the present thesis it can be tentatively surmised that there 
is a relationship between explicit and implicit decisions, perhaps even an 
‘unconscious’ segment yet to be methodically eliminated if it does not exist. 
Street and Richardson (2015) maintained that the unconscious cannot provide an 
explanation for indirect lie detection. Street and Vadillo (2016) further argued 
that there is not much existing empirical evidence for (fully) unconscious but 
accurate lie detection. While of course it is possible that the ‘unconscious’ 
accuracy increase is really the result of a conscious process (Street & Richardson, 
2015), the question remains of whether an unconscious process exists. Even if 
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unconscious lie detection has come under attack (Franz & von Luxburg, 2015; 
Levine & Bond, 2014; ten Brinke, Stimson & Carney, 2014), Street and 
Richardson (2015) did not entirely dispute that the unconscious segment does 
not exist, rather, that conscious processes can explain accuracy rates in absence 
of a grounded theory and measurement of the unconscious process. In order to 
study unconscious lie detection, Street and Vadillo (2016) proposed that a 
theoretical model of unconscious lie detection is necessary to clarify (and 
measure) the role of the unconscious in influencing lie detection accuracy, 
developed from current knowledge.   
To note, by directly asking judges a supposed ‘unconscious’ question could 
be said to be evoking what could have been embedded in the unconscious, into the 
conscious, so to speak. The thought process, if stemming from an unconscious 
source, fundamentally surfaces into the conscious mind. How much of this is 
retained as an automatic and instinctive judgment, and how much of each (the 
unconscious part and the now cognisant part) plays into the ultimate judgment of 
whether a sender is lying or not are aspects that need to be distilled in future 
research.   
 In addition to this, where the concept of ‘intuition’ or gut feelings fits into 
this relationship is also presently unclear. Granhag (2006) wrote that in the 
general lie detection literature, ‘implicit lie detection’ is broadly accepted in the 
most part due to the immeasurability of one of its component; ‘intuition’ or ‘gut 
feeling’. While there are insinuations and undertones of this intuitive, unconscious 
process, there is little empirical evidence of it captured. Intuition may certainly 
contribute in the process of making implicit judgments for some question items 
more than others; however, Granhag (2006) proposed that there may not be a 
strong relationship between the two concepts. While this may or may not be so, it 
is either important to eliminate it as an extraneous variable or find its place (and 
relationship with other variables) in Figure 2. 
 Some dual process theorists do not make a distinction between what is 
implicit and what is automatic, claiming that both forms of mental processes are 
under System 1 and thus both are not able to be measured (Stanovich & West, 
2000). Conversely, DGC (single system framework) proposes that ‘automatic 
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reasoning’ should be distinguished from ‘implicit reasoning’ because with 
automatic reasoning observers can demonstrate what Osman (2000) calls ‘meta-
knowledge’ that can be reliably reproduced as the representations used are strong, 
stable and distinctive. In contrast, for implicit reasoning observers cannot broach 
into the meta-knowledge of their thought or conduct, and it cannot be consistently 
replicated. While it is not disputed that some levels of knowledge are currently 
inaccessible on the conscious dimension, this shows that there are different levels 
of awareness observers have into their own mental processes and more 
importantly there is a prospect of accessing and studying it (Osman, 2000; Siegler 
& Stern, 1998). Evidently, while this was beyond the scope of the present thesis 
additional research is required to extricate what distinguishes the implicit from 
the automatic system of reasoning. 
 As an alternative or add on, future questionnaires could also benefit from 
adopting an open-ended response option rather than the close-ended one employed 
in the present thesis. For the purposes of this thesis, the close-ended questionnaire 
option was useful and presented important insights as well as to avoid 
experimental maturity. In future, besides including cues found in Chapter 12, an 
open-ended response option gives judges a freer rein to accurately and wholly 
explore their implicit and explicit decisions. Sporer and Schwandt (2007) 
highlighted that another issue with using questionnaires is that participants may 
not have instinctively thought about the implicit assessments asked when 
assessing the veracity of the appealer had a prompt not been available. The think-
aloud protocol can prevent this issue and be applied to future research endeavours 
(Ericsson, 1996; Okada & Simon, 1997). While the implicit judgment 
questionnaire used in in the present thesis is no doubt valuable compared to only 
using explicit judgments, they may be less able to gather the subtler and refined 
mental processes.  
 Think-aloud protocols (TAP), which is used to reveal the strategic decisions 
an individual uses to come to a decision or when performing tasks, can be used in 
its place in future studies. It is the most direct and therefore one of the best 
implements to examine the continuum of cognitive processes when a judgment 
takes place. There are two types of measuring think-aloud procedures, which are 
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concurrent and retrospective think-aloud (Kuusela & Paul, 2000). The concurrent 
protocol is prompted during an experimental task. Here participants usually 
either state out verbally their thoughts, how they reason and how they feel during 
the task, or takes a break from the task and state their thoughts, reasoning and 
feelings at a prompt. In contrast, the retrospective protocol lets participants think-
aloud their mental processes when the task is completed while their short-term 
memory is still fresh. Guan, Lee, Cuddihy and Ramey’s (2006) study showed 
evidence for the validity and reliability of the retrospective think-aloud method. 
The authors compared their participants' verbalizations with eye movement 
trackings and accounted in a valid way what they attended to during their tasks. 
They concluded that the retrospective protocol introduces a very low possibility of 
fabricating a thought or mental process, and the validity of this method is 
unaffected by how difficult the task performance is. As with the concurrent 
protocol, retrospective think-aloud method provides the experimenter with useful 
evidence of an observer’s interpretations, judgments and approaches when 
performing a task. Ericsson and Simon (1998) established that the think-aloud 
protocol can be used to study verbalised mental processes and processes that 
mediate it without altering their course while being able maintain undisrupted 
focus on the completion of the experimental tasks. When participants are thinking 
aloud, their sequences of thoughts have not been found to be systematically altered 
by verbalisation.  
However, Meissner, Brigham and Kelley (2001) and Schooler and 
Engstler-Schooler (1990) found evidence that thinking aloud can affect and 
impair the thought process, through a process called ‘verbal overshadowing’. 
Meissner, Brigham and Kelley (2001) and Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) 
found evidence that thinking aloud can affect and impair the thought process, a 
process called ‘verbal overshadowing’. In the latter study, the authors divided 
their participants into a ‘description group’ and a control group. All participants 
watched a video showing a mock robbery, and only participants in the 
description group had to describe the suspect in the video. Both groups were then 
asked to perform a recognition task of the suspect. The authors found that 
participants who were in the control group performed considerably better in the 
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recognition task then their counterparts. A similar process to verbal 
overshadowing called ‘articulatory suppression’ which impedes the working 
memory was examined by Murray, Rowan and Smith (1988). Articulatory 
suppression in this study included participants having to articulate a simple ‘the’ 
and spelling a word out aloud while showing a list for them to memorise. The 
authors found that the more difficult the articulatory suppression was, the more 
it interfered with participants’ encoding of visual information processes. Their 
memorisation accuracy decreased as the articulatory task became more difficult, 
because more effort is required for them to remember a task and thus less 
attention is paid to incoming visual information presented at the same time.  
That said, the think-aloud protocol will still benefit future research in 
studying subjective perceptions in guilt and innocence detection. This method can 
be particularly informative, especially when judges may expose alternate tactics 
or cues not thought of by the researcher. One of the advantages of this method in 
lie detection research is rather than grossly assuming that judges are simply 
resorting to heuristics, for example, deeper enquiry could perhaps disclose that 
there was a belief or principle they followed and why is this so. Think aloud 
protocols offer a higher degree of certainty of discerning whether participants 
knowingly or unknowingly and meaningfully used a certain implicit cue and 
whether this fed into their explicit decision (or vice versa). This could potentially 
bypass the issue of the current questionnaire not being able to capture what 
implicit cues led to accurate decisions (see Table 30), or at least provide a clearer 
indication of whether participants arrived at explicit judgments independently of 
conscious implicit judgments, and whether they arrived at such judgments 
knowingly or unknowingly. At this stage, it is unclear whether the reason for very 
few significant cues as highlighted in Table 30 is a result of 1) the type of questions 
asked, or that 2) whether implicit assessments are in fact not related to explicit 
decisions at times. 
 Instead of only using participants’ responses that corresponded with the 
author’s definitions (as was done in Studies 1 and 3), a preliminary study involving 
a group of participants to rate the level of emotionality in these videos could be 
conducted. Only videos achieving very high consensus among the raters could be 
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retained, and consequently shown to judges. This could avoid the correlational 
issue between variables as put forward in Section 7.9 as well as promote a more 
meaningful interpretation of results. Another suggestion for future research is to 
compare responses of judges who did not agree with the author’s definitions of a 
certain variable (i.e., level of emotionality of appeals) to those who did, to examine 
why these differences in thinking exists and how this interrelates with veracity 
decision-making.  
While a judgment of innocence-guilt and a judgment of truth-lie are not 
entirely identical, in the context of judging a brief video such as in the present 
thesis it appears that the two are linked. Furthermore, with someone having no 
other extra information on the case (unlike most jury trials, where a juror would 
not have to only rely on an appeal video to make a judgment of guilt or innocence 
of the subject with no other evidence or information given to them) in the 
experiments set out here in the present thesis they must rely heavily on the 
appeal video itself. In the typical criminal trial setting, jurors typically receive a 
great deal of evidence and usually over a longer period of time, sometimes even 
for days and weeks (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). One model put forward is that 
jurors process this evidence as they receive it, assess this evidence and try to fit 
it into a story form that they can understand (Pennington & Hastie, 1990). 
Pennington and Hastie (1990) proposed that this explanations-based model is 
relevant when there is a considerable amount of complex, interconnected pieces 
of evidence which are pertinent to deciding verdict. In the current thesis, it was 
useful to observe how participants adapted and made decisions of the appealer’s 
guilt or innocence with virtually no other information about the appealer or the 
case. However, it is recommended that in future studies, if the research interest 
is be more reflective of a legal trial procedure, for more information and/or 
evidence to be given to a participant in order for them to make an innocent or 
guilty verdict towards a sender or an account in question.  
Study 3 raises the inquiry of measuring cognitive loading, as cognitive load 
was surmised to have taken place and would imaginably be more robust if 
measured directly. A more direct method to objectively measure cognitive loading 
is the use of a dual-task analysis, which posits that when participants has to 
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perform two separate tasks at the same time, and particularly if requires the same 
resources in verbal or visual working memory then the available resources would 
have to be distributed between the two tasks (Brünken et al., 2003). The 
performance level in both tasks would be the outcome variable with the hypothesis 
being lower performance in the dual-task group compared to the single-task one.  
Yet another method is a self-reported stress level and/or self-reported difficulty of 
materials presented (Brünken et al., 2003). Suggestions for future studies will 
include a more direct method of objectively measuring cognitive load.  
 Study 4 indicates that perception and subjective impressions of when more 
than one person lying is different from when an individual person lies. Added to 
this, most crimes occur as a group and in a group. Vrij et al. (2010) proposed that 
it is crucial to study liars and truth-tellers in pairs as it reflects reality in the 
criminal world, where criminals usually work in groups or networks and not by 
themselves. Many crimes are planned and committed by several offenders working 
together rather than one person acting alone (Weerman, 2001). Further studies 
must be conducted with more than one liar present in high-stakes deception, as 
little is still understood of the processes that take place when corroborating a lie 
together, as well as the implicit assessments made by judges other than the 
questions asked in the present study.  For example, group lying and the actual 
collaboration of a lie should be observed and with that a comparison with truthful 
collaborative recall procedures be observed.  
 Furthermore, Study 4 introduced a suggestion for development that is 
beyond the scope of the present thesis. Limitations of the current stimulus 
material include not being able to study a conversation between two liars for 
example, as television appeals are a unique stimulus material. Interactive and 
non-interactive deception is fundamentally different in important ways (Burgoon, 
2015a). Burgoon and Buller (1994) provide several interactional characteristics 
where liars may display such as higher levels of uncertainty, vagueness, non-
immediacy and reticence, negative affect, arousal and non-composure, formal and 
submissive behaviour and generally a poor impression. While television appeals 
cannot be used to investigate this interpersonal deception as they are simply 
recordings with no observer interaction, this calls for studies of group or dyadic 
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lying behaviour. In this context, a clear and actual interpersonal deception never 
took place as participants in the present study were not directly being lied to. 
Lying is, at the end of the day, a social behaviour; it happens mostly during an 
interaction and within the transaction between two individuals. As identified by 
the interpersonal deception theory, lying is a dyadic and interactive event 
(Burgoon & Buller, 1994). Rather than focusing on very short abstracts of 
behaviour or even observing responses after watching these short abstracts in 
artificial settings, IDT proposes changes over time in patterns of dynamic and 
unique within-pair interaction and judgments (rather than the broad between 
group differences such as that employed in the present thesis). 
 Due to the confines of the present thesis, studies presented here largely 
ignored non-verbal aspects of guilt and innocence detection in television appeals. 
While verbal cues are valuable to be studied as shown in the present thesis, the 
importance of non-verbal implicit cues (as well as those that are neither verbal nor 
non-verbal) cannot be overlooked. Ten Brinke and Porter (2011) who used 
television appeals could not find a single reliable indicator in body language to 
distinguish truthful from false appealers (although they did find reliable cues in 
the emotional expressions facet). Of note, certain implicit cues are not 
straightforwardly classifiable, as they are along both the verbal and non-verbal 
continuum. Granhag (2006) extended an example of this type of cue to be the 
magnitude of perceived sender cooperation. While many of the implicit cues 
examined in the present thesis yielded significant differences future questionnaire 
items still need to include other cues perhaps not captured in this questionnaire. 
Future studies’ question items should be expanded to include non-verbal cues such 
as ‘demeanour’ (i.e. the sender was laid back when telling the story, the sender 
was not very comfortable when telling the story), ‘gaze aversion’, ‘head shaking’ 
and ‘illustrators’ to name a few, as well as cues that do not fit in a particular 
category such as ‘they stated that from the beginning’ (Anderson et al., 1999; Vrij 
& Mann, 2001a; Zuckerman et al., 1981; Vrij et al., 2008). The innocence score 
items discussed in the present thesis could be expanded to include other verbal 
aspects not currently incorporated such as story complexity, story flow, 
restatements and story repetitiveness (Anderson et al., 1999). This way, both 
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verbal, non-verbal implicit judgments and everything in between can be studied 
with some cues pertaining to a liar and truth-teller’s verbal behaviour, some 
others pertaining more to their non-verbal behaviour, and still some others which 
lie in between the continuum.  
 As suggested in the conclusion section of Chapter 12, the consideration of a 
combination of cues increases accuracy in distinguishing lies from truths as it has 
been established that there are no universal cues to deceit (DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Whelan, 2014; Hartwig & Bond, 2014; Burgoon, personal communication, 25th 
August, 2015; ten Brinke & Porter, 2012; Vrij & Mann, 2004). Hence, the 
possibility exists that considering multiple factors or cues tested across Studies 1 
to 4 collectively would yield higher accuracies than recorded in the present thesis. 
In keeping with this, studies such as that of Ekman, O’Sullivan, Friesen and 
Scherer (1991) and Leal et al. (2010) reported accuracy rates as high as 80% using 
a case by case system of individual cases as opposed to observing the variances 
between two conditions. Rather than observing the frequency of single cues 
between groups, these studies categorised single subjects as innocent or guilty 
based on the occurrence of multiple cues. In line with this, methods of analysing 
data such as generalised estimating equations (GEE) can be employed to model lie 
detection accuracy using a correction of estimated standard errors to account for 
within-cluster correlation such as in Sweeney and Ceci’s (2014) study. Thus, for 
example, if a participant watched 10 video clips the data can be clustered as such 
that each participant is their own cluster (Norton, Bieler & Ennett, 1996).  
 As stated in the very beginning of the section above, there was no room in 
the present thesis for studying the objective verbal aspects found with observer 
reactions to these implicit judgments. Importantly, the findings from Chapter 12 
highlights ‘true implicit cues’ that are diagnostic in identifying truthful appealers 
from their counterparts, therefore, these cues should be included in the 
development of future questionnaires. These items include ‘the appealer seems to 
imagine the victim’, ‘the appealer distances himself/herself from the victim’, as 
well as the one reliable indicator found in ten Brinke and Porter’s (2011) study of 
‘tentative words’.  
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13.8 PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 As reiterated throughout the present thesis, one of the fundamental 
premises was using highly ecologically valid stimulus material in the hopes that 
results presented will implicate a higher practical application to real life police 
investigations. As of yet, there are no formal recommendations as to how these 
appeals should be conducted, how they should be televised and how ought these 
appeals help police officers with their investigation. While there are police 
manuals for lie detection (Inbau et al., 2001) and police interrogation manuals 
(Gudjonsson, 2003), a specific standardised procedure for conducting television 
appeals have yet to be put forward. In fact, existing police manuals on lie detection 
are wrought with erroneous information on how to detect deceit (Kassin & Fong, 
1999; Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2004). Kassin et al. (2005) found that special ‘training’ in 
lie detection given to police investigators (with an average of nearly 11 years of 
experience) actually reduced the accuracy to accurately identify a truthful 
confession from one that is not. Conversely, Forest, Feldman and Tyler (2004) 
maintain that being knowledgeable about valid and diagnostic cues to deception 
makes an individual better and more accurate in discriminating truths from lies. 
The authors found that the higher the accuracy their participants were in 
answering questions pertaining to their beliefs and perceptions of cues to 
deception, the better they accomplished in distinguishing a truth from a lie. 
 The need for a general guideline specifically for televised appeals is 
important because as of yet, solvability of missing or murdered relatives’ cases 
based on the airing of the appeal itself is unknown. The extent to which these 
appeals are of help to the investigation is unidentified; whether investigations 
take longer or shorter to solve compared to cases where public appeals are not 
made is yet to be revealed. As of yet, it is not known whether television appeals 
help police investigators in solving these cases of missing or murdered relatives, 
while holding the potential to do so. 
 Sporer and Schwandt (2007) asserted that before being able to be applied 
practically, beliefs about observed behaviours need to first be examined and 
understood. They posited that it is important to find out whether these cues are 
valid and diagnostic or otherwise. While more research in this area is necessary 
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to be distilled as these studies can only imply a correlation and not causation thus 
far, these initial results would seem to suggest that judges think differently when 
presented with different manipulated conditions. These studies were yet unable 
to encapsulate the progression of cognitive processes involved in explicit and 
implicit decisions but were able to present a snapshot of them. The studies in the 
present thesis seem to support an adaptive decision-making tendency (Street, 
2015) rather than an uncontrollable mental default in believing others (Gilbert, 
1989; Gilbert et al., 1990). Further investigation into how people process, encode 
and manage information and how that translates to them making a guilt-
innocence and/or a truth-lie judgment can either support these initial suggestions 
or challenge them.  
Although firm conclusions cannot yet be made at this stage, the results from 
the present thesis were valuable in providing an idea of the complex underlying 
process of decision making when presented with high-stakes stimulus materials. 
For example, the results from Study 2 indicated that better innocence-guilt 
detection can potentially be achieved by judges when no visual element is 
presented. This replicated Bond and Depaulo’s (2006) findings in their meta-
analyses where people were less accurate in judging lies they could visibly see, 
compared to audible-only lies.  When a visual element was presented judges 
tended to use invalid and un-diagnostic cues for veracity assessments. A practical 
suggestion for future investigation and airings of such cases would include police 
officers instructing only one appealer to appeal rather than a pair or several at a 
time, with police officers not included in introducing the appeal (as this would 
generate biases of its own). By making aware these possible perceptions and 
biases, not only can these results be used to aid in how these appeals are presented 
but in also notifying police officers of cues to watch for when studying the appeal 
contents.  
 Another implication lies in how appealers present themselves, and 
instructions given to courtroom juries. Sporer and Schwandt (2007) contend that 
in many legal proceedings jurors are asked to or will observe the behaviours of a 
defendant or witness on trial to gather evidence for deception or truthfulness. 
When this observation is carried out with invalid expectancies and erroneous 
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beliefs, consequences can be grave. As exemplified in the case of Amanda Knox, 
and to some extent in Study 1, even honest grievers can be mistakenly judged to 
be lying; these implications also extend beyond television appeals. If the conjecture 
in Study 1 is true, subject to replication with a higher number of videos and trials, 
a lack of crying or overtly grieving behaviours displayed when making a television 
appeal or during trial can be misinterpreted and seen as a defendant who is guilty. 
An awareness and/or instruction of how emotions displayed may present as an 
invalid cue of veracity judgments will aid juries to consciously attempt in 
disregarding this cue when making decisions of guilt or innocence, enabling juries 
to reach a fairer and more accurate outcome. The results in Study 3 seemed to 
suggest that biases persist in how appealers present themselves and in how they 
deliver their speech. An awareness and/or instruction to members of the jury as to 
be cautious in writing off an incoherent speech as a valid indicator of guilt and 
vice versa will enable juries in attaining a more objective verdict. 
 The eight aspects presented in Study 5 in accordance with the hypothesised 
role of emotion and indicators of grief, can hopefully aid police officers in guiding 
considerations to certain cues in an appealer’s speech to predicting truthful from 
false ones. The present thesis proposes cues such as verbally declared emotions (or 
the lack of), the declaration of needing social and communal help, activity and 
movement in appeal, seeking religion, maintaining hope, speaking about the 
victim in present tense, denial of involvement, conditional markers in regard to 
the return of the missing relative, declaring presence near or at the time of murder 
and referencing the event to be helpful indicators in distinguishing a true from a 
deceptive appeal. This presents a simple way to guide police officers in charge of 
these investigations where little to no training is pre-required. These findings are 
potentially relevant also in similar research areas in other high stakes scenarios 
in terms of cues that emerged. 
 
13.9 CODA   
The present thesis distinguishes itself from both ten Brinke and Porter’s 
(2012) and Whelan et al.’s (2014) work in two ways. Ten Brinke and Porter’s 
(2012) research, while using the same stimulus material as the present thesis’, 
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focused more on investigating the behavioural consequences of these pleaders 
and how that relates to differences in verbal and non-verbal cues including facial 
expressions between truth-tellers and liars.  Similarly, Whelan et al.’s (2014) 
research examined behavioural cues discriminating truth-tellers and liars. These 
works consider psychological theories, such as distancing and cognitive load, to 
help explain why their findings where liars’ speech, behaviour and facial 
expressions differ from truth-tellers (ten Brinke & Porter, 2012). Study 5 in the 
present thesis supported these differences using a novel method in analysing a 
similar dataset. In addition, Studies 1 to 4 considered the underlying processes 
of making innocence-guilt judgment from a judge’s point of view, rather than a 
sole focus on identifying diagnostic and discriminative cues between truthful 
appealers and deceptive ones. The present thesis also discussed the implications 
of cognitive models such as different classes of dual process theories (Gilbert et 
al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993; Sloman, 1996; Sloman, 2002; Reinhard & Sporer, 
2008; Reinhard & Sporer, 2010; Evans, 2007) and the single process system 
(Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002). While a firm conclusion as to which model best 
explains the mental development of making explicit and implicit decisions, the 
present thesis offers a step forward towards clarifying this process.  
 While Part 2 investigated subjective perceptions of these television appeals, 
Part 3 concerned developing theoretical frameworks linking the more objective 
aspects of verbal cues and how these cues can be studied in organisation with each 
other. This study not only found verbal cues discriminated between truthful and 
false television appealers but also generated verbal profiles from the relationship 
of these cues in accordance with each appealer, which is valuable in an applied 
context. Both objective findings and subjective assessments may operate as a 
guide to not only raising awareness in biases that may surface in a practical 
context, but also serve as a checklist to law enforcement agents when airing an 
upcoming television appeal in a future missing or murdered relatives’ case.  
The approach that best fits the results presented in the present thesis is the 
ALIED approach (Street, 2015), where the existence and trend of these biases 
seems to be conditional upon context. The results from Part 2 would appear to 
challenge the existence of any intrinsic tendency towards biases, as initially 
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anticipated in the earlier chapters of the present thesis. Rather, results would 
suggest that biases that surfaced are consequences of an adaptive decision-making 
mode when confronted with little or unconstructive information about the Source.  
 The extent to which implicit cues contain an explicit element and the 
extent to which explicit cues contain an implicit element remains a subject to 
explore. This thesis presents a first step in understanding this complex 
interaction which was largely missing in lie detection literature. With regression 
analyses, implicit judgments can be construed at this stage to have a certain 
degree of association with explicit decisions, although taking into consideration 
that they could have been influenced by explicit decisions in the first place. 
Standing theories in current lie detection research are subject to be further 
developed, supported or challenged based on whether certain cognitive 
processing is a default (therefore unconscious) or not, for example.  
Additionally, this thesis presents the first steps in uncovering if an 
innocence or guilt bias persists using high-stakes scenarios. While results here 
would tend to suggest that such biases are not consistent (i.e., people seem to be 
also poor in telling apart innocence from guilt as they are in detecting truths 
from lies), more research is needed to uncover the overlap and distinctions 
between the concepts of truth-lie and innocence-guilt. The presence or absence of 
an innocence bias (and its link with other person perception judgments), if can be 
further developed, supported or challenged, would carry implications in the 
psycho-legal arena. Future studies would benefit more from adopting an 
experimental setting that simulates a criminal trial more closely (i.e., presenting 
judges with more evidence regarding the case before having to make an 
innocence-guilt judgment where the prosecution holds the burden of proof, for 
example) (Helgeson & Shaver, 1990; Pennington & Hastie, 1993).   
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APPENDIX A: Content dictionary of variables 
 
Number 
on SSA 
figure 
Key Definition Frequency 
for 
Genuine 
Appealers 
(%) 
Frequency 
for False 
Appealers 
(%) 
 Self-centred    
1 Conditional Appealer in reference to victim, mentions 
the conjunctions ''if you cannot contact'' 
and ''or'' 
0 17.6 
2 Ididntdo Appealer mentions ''I didn't do it'', ''I'm 
not a suspect'', ''I had nothing to do with 
it'' 
0 17.6 
3 Idontknow Mention of ''I don't know'' or ''don't know'' 
any time per narrative 
4.5 17.6 
4 Somebody Appealer mentions ''somebody/some 
people'' 
13.6 29.4 
 Tense    
5 Vicpresenttense Appealer speaks about the victim in the 
present tense regardless of whether the 
victim has been found, is dead, or is still 
missing 
72.7 41.2 
 Victim-centred    
6 Vicimagined Appealer fantasises about what victim 
would be doing if they were with them, 
what they are going through, or wonder 
about their condition 
9.1 0 
7 keepcount Appealer keeps count of time since victim 
has been missing or dead 
27.3 5.9 
      315 
 
 
 Social    
8 communality Appealer cooperates with community, 
builds rapport and a sense of everyone 
helping together to find victim and/or 
killer; the community holding the 
appealer up in support to keep going 
54.5 11.8 
9 religion Appealer mentions or refers to ''God'', 
''faith'', ''prayer''  
22.7 0 
 Emotional    
10 Hope Appealer mentions ''hope'', ''hopefully'', 
''not give up'' 
22.7 0 
11 Emotions Mention of basic emotions such as 
‘sadness’, cognitive state of affect 
appealer i.e. ''peace'', or the lack of 
emotions i.e. ''I've got no feelings'' 
45.5 5.9 
12 Miss Appealer states that he/she misses the 
victim 
18.2 0 
 Grammar    
13 Wronggrammar Grammatical errors, syntax structure 
errors in appeal 
18.2 41.2 
 Chronology    
14 Eventref Appealer mentions or refers to the event 
i.e. abduction, killing, in terms of time i.e. 
morning of, day of the week, date 
9.1 35.3 
 Movement    
15 Activity Defined as presence of movement, 
activity, directional, change, with 
appealer mentioning phrases such as ''If 
anybody knows anything, let us/police 
know'', ''forward'', ''call for search'', 
''moving'', ''looking'' 
45.5 11.8 
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APPENDIX B: Consent form 
TELEVISION APPEALS PROJECT 
As part of a study of people making appeals or interviews on television where their 
loved ones have disappeared or been killed, I will show you 4 short films taken 
from actual televised appeals. Some of them are guilty and some of them are not. 
I would then like you to answer some questions about each film. It should all take 
less than 30 minutes. 
There is no right or wrong answer. It is your own personal opinion that is wanted. 
We do not need to know your name, so the whole study is anonymous and your 
responses will be confidential to the research team. 
Some people may find these short videos distressing. So if, at any time for 
whatever reason, you feel like you wish to stop taking part just let me know and 
we’ll stop the experiment and you can leave without any consequences. You can 
withdraw from this experiment at any time but once the questionnaire is handed 
in it is subject to analysis and your name will be replaced by a code number so all 
anonymity is ensured. If you feel you have been affected by any of the issues 
surrounding this experiment you can approach the Samaritans for emotional 
support; alternatively you can seek counselling service offered by CareLine and 
Victim Support. 
 My name is Magdalene Ng. I am supervised by Professor David Canter and Dr 
Donna Youngs. If you would like any further information regarding the study 
please contact Dr. Youngs at d.youngs@hud.ac.uk. 
If you do wish to continue with the experiment please sign this consent form below. 
Thank you for your time and agreement to take part in this study. 
………………………………..............................  Date: ………………………... 
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APPENDIX C: Debrief form 
Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this experiment. 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the phenomena of lying and 
telling the truth behaviours specifically in the context of false appeals from the 
receiver’s end. A false appeal is where a family member or partner of a person who 
has gone missing or has been injured or murdered publically appeals for 
information regarding the crime either in a press conference or on while being 
interviewed by a journalist. However this person is either involved in the 
disappearance or is complicit in it but pretends not to know anything about it and 
deceives both the investigating police officers and attempts to extend this to the 
general public.  
In order to explore false appeals I found cases of false appeals and matched them 
with true appeals for participants to watch and/or listen to them to see whether 
they could decide whether the person speaking in each case was lying or telling 
the truth. I also matched these appeals according to other variables such as age 
and attractiveness, as well as the narrative contents and roles. The study aims to 
explore whether people typically perceive certain characteristics in true and false 
appeals and whether these impact on their judgment of veracity.  
If you were not able to correctly decide whether they were lying or telling the truth 
you must not worry. Detecting lies in other people is a notoriously difficult task 
and that is why psychology and other disciplines for many decades now has been 
trying to explore ways to detect lies and identify the verbal and nonverbal 
behaviour that may signal deceit. 
If you feel you would like more information on any of the issues this 
experiment addresses, or on the experiment in general you can contact my 
supervisor Dr Donna Youngs at d.youngs@hud.ac.uk. Or alternatively if you could 
contact me at magdalene.sophie@yahoo.com. 
If you feel you have been affected by any of the issues surrounding this 
experiment you can call the Samaritans for emotional support on 0845 909090. 
Alternatively you could call the counselling service CareLine on 020 85141177 or 
Victim Support 0845 30 30 900. 
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APPENDIX D: Question sheet 
 
1. Do you think the appealer in the video is innocent or guilty? 
  
Please rate the following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, with options ranging from 
1 for Strongly Disagree, 2 for Disagree, 3 for Undecided, 4 for Agree, and 5 for 
Strongly Agree.  
 
2. The appealer's story makes sense. 
3. The appealer sounds like he or she has had practice in making the appeal 
4. The appealer tells a story that seems plausible. 
5. I felt absorbed into the story the appealer was telling. 
6. The appealer’s emotions do not seem to match his or her story. 
7. The appealer has a pleasant voice. 
8. The appealer sounds like they had thought out well their appeal. 
9. The appealer words his or her sentences in a manner that is pleasant to hear. 
10. The appealer has an attractive face. 
11. When I was listening to the appeal I was focused on what happened during the 
appeal. 
12. I was worried about what was going to happen to the appealer and the missing 
person. 
13. I felt sympathy for the appealer. 
14. The appealer displays less emotion than seems appropriate for their situation. 
15. The appealer makes an appeal that affected me emotionally. 
16. The appealer gives an organised speech. 
17. I believe that the appealer sounds credible overall. 
 
18. Do you know personally anyone who featured in the appeal you’ve just heard? 
 
19. Do you know of the appeal you have just heard i.e. you’ve watched or heard it on 
TV? 
 
20. If you ticked yes to knowing the appeal, what did you believe the outcome was? 
Was the appealer guilty or innocent? 
 
If you have any other comments or notes for this particular appeal, please state 
them on the space given on the answer sheet. 
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APPENDIX E: Question sheet for Audio-only condition in Study 2 
 
1. Do you think the appealer in the video is innocent or guilty? 
  
Please rate the following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, with options ranging from 
1 for Strongly Disagree, 2 for Disagree, 3 for Undecided, 4 for Agree, and 5 for 
Strongly Agree. Please ignore questions labelled ‘N/A’ - these apply to a different 
version of the appeals. 
 
2. The appealer's story makes sense. 
3. The appealer sounds like he or she has had practice in making the appeal 
4. The appealer tells a story that seems plausible. 
5. I felt absorbed into the story the appealer was telling. 
6. The appealer’s emotions do not seem to match his or her story. 
7. The appealer has a pleasant voice. 
8. The appealer sounds like they had thought out well their appeal. 
9. The appealer words his or her sentences in a manner that is pleasant to hear. 
10. N/A 
11. When I was listening to the appeal I was focused on what happened during the 
appeal. 
12. I was worried about what was going to happen to the appealer and the missing 
person. 
13. I felt sympathy for the appealer. 
14. N/A 
15. The appealer makes an appeal that affected me emotionally. 
16. The appealer gives an organised speech. 
17. I believe that the appealer sounds credible overall. 
 
18. Do you know personally anyone who featured in the appeal you’ve just heard? 
 
19. Do you know of the appeal you have just heard i.e. you’ve watched or heard it on 
TV? 
 
20. If you ticked yes to knowing the appeal, what did you believe the outcome was? 
Was the appealer guilty or innocent? 
 
If you have any other comments or notes for this particular appeal, please state 
them on the space given on the answer sheet. 
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APPENDIX F: Demographic sheet 
 
Finally, please answer the following demographic questions: 
a) What is your gender? Please circle: Male / Female 
b) What is your age?  
c) How would you describe your ethnic origin? Please circle below: 
From the Asian subcontinent / African / White European / Chinese / Other 
(Please specify:                  )/ Mixed (Please specify:                  ) 
d) Please state your nationality:  
e) What is your occupation? E.g. academic / police officer:  
f) How long have you been in your current occupation?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the end of the questionnaire. Thank you for your participation. 
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APPENDIX G: Sample answer sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question Question Question Question
Strongly D
isagree
D
isagree
U
ndecided
Agree
Strongly Agree
Strongly D
isagree
D
isagree
U
ndecided
Agree
Strongly Agree
Strongly D
isagree
D
isagree
U
ndecided
Agree
Strongly Agree
Strongly D
isagree
D
isagree
U
ndecided
Agree
Strongly Agree
2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x
3 x 3 x 3 x 3 x
4 x 4 x 4 x 4 x
5 x 5 x 5 x 5 x
6 x 6 x 6 x 6 x
7 x 7 x 7 x 7 x
8 x 8 x 8 x 8 x
9 x 9 x 9 x 9 x
10 x 10 x 10 x 10 x
11 x 11 x 11 x 11 x
12 x 12 x 12 x 12 x
13 x 13 x 13 x 13 x
14 x 14 x 14 x 14 x
15 x 15 x 15 x 15 x
16 x 16 x 16 x 16 x
17 x 17 x 17 x 17 x
Comments:
Video 1
Video 2
Video 3
Video 4
Innocent
Guilty
29
Yes
No
Yes
No
18
19
Yes
No
20
Innocent
Guilty
1
Innocent
Guilty
Video 1 Video 2
Answers
1
Answers
30
Yes
No
31
Innocent
Guilty
Video 3
Answers
1
Innocent
Guilty
29
Yes
No
30
Yes
No
31
Innocent
Guilty
Video 4
Answers
1
Innocent
Guilty
30
Yes
No
29
Yes
No
31
Innocent
Guilty
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APPENDIX H: Frequency of evidence types used to establish ground 
truth 
Evidence type Genuine (N =23) Deceptive (N =16) 
Forensic evidence (e.g. soil, pollen, fibre, 
blood spatter patterns, arson tracks) 
1 2 
DNA evidence (e.g. body fluids, hair, skin) 9 7 
CCTV/video/speed/security camera footage 1 2 
Presence of victim's blood (e.g. in car; home 
of the accused) 
4 2 
Knowledge of location of victim’s body or 
body parts 
13 12 
Confession un-recanted  7 12 
Computer search history of location of 
crime/body 
1 0 
Post mortem evidence 2 0 
Medical evidence (e.g. expert testimony) 2 0 
Eyewitness testimony of appealer's 
whereabouts 
2 2 
Possession of murder weapon  1 1 
Possession of items from crime scene 0 1 
Phone records/phone range/phone tap 1 2 
Incriminating monetary transactions 2 2 
Inadequate account/alibi inconsistent with 
evidence 
1 3 
Public tip (e.g. finding burnt victim in car) 4 3 
NOTE: Totals exceed sample size because majority of cases were classified 
based on several pieces of evidence 
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APPENDIX I: Not-sure percentages reported by judges for the High and 
Low Emotionality conditions 
 
Variables High Emotionality (%) Low Emotionality (%) 
Emotions match 53.3 57.1 
Voice 35.6 31.7 
Face 36.4 43.5 
Plausible 11.1 31.7 
Practice 31.1 20.6 
Credible 24.4 32.3 
Wording 20.0 28.6 
Well-thought-out 17.8 14.3 
Organised 11.1 12.7 
Sense 11.1 19.0 
Meta-emotion 2.2 1.6 
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APPENDIX J: Not-sure percentages reported by judges for the Audio-
only and Audio-visual conditions 
 
 
Variables Audio-only (%) Audio-visual (%) 
Sense 24.5 19.2 
Voice 20.3 24.0 
Plausible 21.8 20.1 
Credible 18.7 28.8 
Practice 16.4 27.5 
Organised 12.6 9.6 
Wording 10.5 5.7 
Well-thought-out 5.6 6.1 
Meta-emotion 1.0 0.9 
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APPENDIX K: Not-sure percentages reported by judges for the High and 
Low Sense conditions 
 
Variables Low Sense (%) High Sense (%) 
Voice 30.0 23.7 
Plausible 28.0 11.4 
Practice 24.4 13.8 
Wording 20.1 20.5 
Organised 12.5 12.4 
Face 22.0 33.8 
Credible 22.0 14.6 
Emotionsmatch 13.2 14.2 
Well-thought-out 8.9 10.0 
Less emotions 8.9 8.3 
Meta-emotion 1.2 0.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      326 
 
 
APPENDIX L: Not-sure percentages reported by judges for the Paired 
and Solo conditions 
 
Variables Paired (%) Solo (%) 
Face 36.8 22.4 
Voice 27.6 20.8 
Sense 25.8 31.6 
Practice 22.2 12.0 
Wording 22.7 22.3 
Credible 24.9 21.2 
Plausible 21.8 30.7 
Emotions match 20.9 21.1 
Less emotions 20.4 19.9 
Well-thought-out 18.7 15.4 
Organised 16.0 18.1 
Meta-emotion 4.0 0.6 
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APPENDIX M: Hypothesised cues for genuine and deceptive appeals by aspects 
 
 
Hypothesised genuine cues Brief definition 
Tense Presenttense Speaking about the victim in the present tense  
Victim-
centred 
Vicimagined Wondering or fantasizing about the victim's condition 
 Keepcount Keeping count of time since victim has been 
missing/dead 
Social Religion Mentioning religion 
 Communality Mentioning and building rapport with community 
Emotional Emotions Mentioning emotions or the lack of emotions 
 Hope Mentioning hope 
 Miss Mentioning missing the victim 
Movement Activity Presence of movement words and activity in appeal 
Hypothesised deceptive cues Brief definition 
Self-centred Conditional Mentioning conjunctions regarding victim coming 
home  
 Ididntdoit Mentioning ''I didn't do it''  
 Somebody Mentioning ''somebody/some people'' 
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 Idontknow Mentioning ''I don't know''  
Expletives Swear Cursing 
Grammar Wronggrammar Grammatical/syntax errors that deviates from the 
official English language 
Chronology Eventref Referencing event i.e. abduction/killing in terms of 
time 
 Repetition Mentioning words/phrases thrice or more in 
succession in the same sentence, excluding ‘uhms’ and 
‘ahs’ 
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APPENDIX N: Empirical support for Eight Language Areas  
 
Areas Variables Empirical Support 
Tense Presenttense Dulaney, 1982; Ebesu & Miller, 1994; Harpster et al., 2009 
Victim-centred Vicimagined 
Klass, 2006; Maciejewski et al., 2007; Field & Filanosky, 2010; Shuchter & 
Zisook, 1988 
 Keepcount Engel, 1975 
Social Religion Bjork & Thurman, 2007 
 Communality 
Stone & Pennebaker, 2002; Cohn et al., 2001; Vrij & Mann, 2004; Bond et al., 
2014; DePaulo et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 1999 
Emotional Emotions Granhag et al., 2015; Sporer, 1997; Sapir, 2005; ten Brinke & Porter, 2012 
 Hope Whelan et al., 2014 
 Miss Granhag et al., 2015; Sporer, 1997; Sapir, 2005 
Movement Activity Vrij & Mann, 2004; Harpster et al., 2009 
Self-centred Conditional Harpster et al., 2009 
 Ididntdoit/Somebody/Idontknow Granhag et al., 2015; Davis et al., 2005 
Grammar Wronggrammar 
Davis et al., 2005; Whelan et al., 2014; Zuckerman et al., 1981; Goldman-
Eisler, 1968; Vrij & Mann, 2001; Whelan et al., 2014 
Form/Structure Eventref Vrij, 2005a; Vrij et al., 2010 
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APPENDIX O: Direct and indirect appeals according to appeal veracity 
 
Appeals Direct Indirect 
Innocent 13 8 
Guilty 7 11 
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APPENDIX P: Monotonicity coefficients between 
variables with POSAC map axes X and Y 
 
 
 Base coordinate 
Feature X Y 
Self-centred 0.64 0.91 
Vicpresenttense 0.86 0.58 
Victim-centred 0.82 0.23 
Social 0.80 0.35 
Emotional 0.10 1.00 
Grammar 0.74 0.59 
Chronology 0.60 0.86 
Movement 0.99 0.13 
 
 
